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1.  Introduction 
This paper reviews one of the more complex areas of financial reporting: accounting for income 
taxes (AFIT).  Before this decade, AFIT and its implications for financial reporting and effective tax 
planning attracted limited attention in scholarly circles.
1  However, in recent years, both financial 
accounting and tax researchers have begun to focus on AFIT, so much so that AFIT has become the most 
active area of accounting research in taxation.
2
To our knowledge, this is the first review of AFIT research.  It is designed both to introduce new 
scholars to this field and to encourage active researchers to expand the frontier of AFIT.  It is challenging 
to reach such a broad audience.  Some readers have little or no understanding of the process by which 
firms account for income taxes in their financial statements (the income statement, balance sheet, 
statement of cash flows, and the statement of equity).  For that group, we start the paper with a primer 
about the rules governing AFIT to facilitate an appreciation of the questions and findings that follow.  
Other readers thoroughly understand the accounting and are looking for structure and guidance in the 
  Almost all of the studies have been empirical, primarily 
testing the incremental information content of the tax accounts and their role in earnings management.  To 
provide a structure for understanding this growing literature, we explain the essential principles that 
govern AFIT reporting, review extant studies, highlight key contributions, identify specific remaining 
questions of interest, and discuss weaknesses and opportunities of a more general nature. 
                                                 
1 Throughout the paper, we use the term “effective tax planning,” to mean tax plans that consider all parties to a 
transaction, all taxes (explicit and implicit), and all costs (tax and non-tax).  See Scholes et al. (2009) for 
elaboration. 
2 To calibrate the growing interest in AFIT research, we searched the titles of papers published during the last 
decade in the Journal of Accounting and Economics, the Journal of Accounting Research, and The Accounting 
Review for the word “tax” or any variant.  We find that 35% of the “tax” papers from 2004-2008 address AFIT 
issues, up from 22% of the tax papers from 1999-2003.  One possible reason for this growth in AFIT studies is that, 
beginning in the 1990s, anecdotal information indicates that the tax accounts assumed an enhanced role in financial 
reporting, becoming instrumental to managing earnings and designing corporate tax shelters.  In fact, some 
companies began to view the tax function as a profit center with a particular focus on managing the effective tax rate 
in the income statement (see Robinson et al. (forthcoming), Bryant-Kutcher et al. (2007) (2007), and Schmidt 
(2006), among others). 2 
 
research domain. These readers may wish to skip to Section 7, where we begin our analysis of the extant 
work and detail our suggestions for future research. 
To narrow the scope of our analysis, we define AFIT research as work that evaluates the 
implications of financial reporting choices involving the income tax accounts.  Examples include tests of 
AFIT’s role in earnings management and its information content.  We exclude from our analysis those 
studies that use the tax accounts to analyze other phenomena.  For example, Mills (1998) tests whether 
differences in book and tax accounting affect Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit decisions.  Another 
excluded example is the ongoing work examining the association between differences in book and tax 
accounting and the cost of capital (e.g., Ayers et al. (2009); Dhaliwal et al. (2008), and Crabtree and 
Maher (2009)).  While these papers are interesting and important, we exclude them from our analysis 
because they evaluate the impact of AFIT, rather than studying AFIT itself.  We recognize that this 
delineation is somewhat arbitrary, but as with all literature reviews, we are forced to set boundaries for 
our analysis. 
In addition, we do not discuss the sizeable literature that addresses tradeoffs between financial 
reporting and tax considerations.
3
To date, most empirical AFIT research has focused on two major questions: (1) Do firms use the 
tax accounts to manage earnings?  (2) Are the tax accounts priced in capital markets, and, if so, are they 
priced efficiently?  Neither question is unique to tax accounting.  Both questions have been explored in 
the context of numerous other components of the financial statements.  In fact, the tax accounts were 
among the last accounts to be studied. 
  Although AFIT may involve tax planning considerations, we ignore 
issues related to the coordination of book and tax choices and refer readers to Shackelford and Shevlin 
(2001) and Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) reviews. 
The fact that scholars have been somewhat slow to examine the tax accounts in addressing these 
questions of broad interest (i.e., earnings management and pricing) should not be construed as evidence 
                                                 
3 See Shevlin (1987), Thomas (1988), Matsunaga et al. (1992), Guenther (1994), Collins et al. (1995), Beatty et al. 
(1995), Clinch and Shibano (1996), Hunt et al. (1996), Maydew (1997), Collins et al. (1997), Engel et al. (1999), 
and Keating and Zimmerman (1999), among many others. 3 
 
that AFIT studies are somehow less important.  To the contrary, since corporate tax returns are 
confidential, the tax information in the financial statements is the primary (usually sole) source of 
information about a firm’s corporate taxes.  Thus, understanding the creation and role of tax information 
in the financial statements is critical for at least four reasons.  First, taxes are a major expense for most 
companies (often exceeding one-third of pre-tax profits).  Second, tax planning affects numerous 
activities of the firm (see Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) for many examples).  Third, policymakers rely on 
the tax information in the financial statements to establish both tax and other policies.  Fourth, because 
taxes are computed using a different measure of income (based on tax rules) than book income (based on 
accounting rules), they potentially provide additional information about the profitability of a firm.  These 
four reasons are in addition to the usual scholarly interest in better understanding the factors (in this case, 
AFIT) that affect business decisions.  
Although closely related to traditional corporate income tax research, recent AFIT work 
resembles mainstream financial accounting research more than it resembles “Scholes-Wolfson” tax 
research, which draws heavily from economics and finance.
4
Indeed, one of the challenges facing the emerging field is developing producers and consumers of 
AFIT scholarship outside of the accounting community.  We are encouraged that some economists and 
lawyers have already begun to focus on the implications of differences in book and tax accounting for 
manipulating financial statements and/or tax filings (e.g., Desai and Dharmapala (2006), Schön (2005), 
and Whitaker (2005)).  We hope that our paper will expose even more non-accounting scholars to current 
AFIT research and guide them toward issues of interest in their fields.   
  To test the tax accounts in the financial 
statements for earnings management and incremental content, AFIT scholars have imported research 
questions and designs mostly from the financial accounting field.  Moreover, accountants have provided 
much of the technical tax expertise in the extant AFIT studies.   
                                                 
4 See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001), Graham (2003), and Hanlon and Heitzman (2009) (2009) for reviews of this 
literature.   4 
 
In addition, we hope to contribute to ongoing policy discussions among accounting regulators and 
tax policymakers.  In particular, there is a growing debate about increasing the alignment between book 
and tax accounting.  While many accountants oppose book-tax conformity and tend to dismiss its 
possibility, there is support among some economists and lawyers and it has spilled into Congressional 
testimony (e.g., Desai (2006) and Shackelford (2006)).  We hope that this review will sharpen the focus 
for these ongoing policy discussions.  
As mentioned above, we dichotomize the paper into a primer, which discusses the principles that 
govern AFIT (Sections 2-6), and a review of the scholarly studies in the field (Sections 7-9).  Figure 1 
depicts the organization of the paper.  Appendix A categorizes the research studies that are examined in 
each section. Such grouping helps the reader quickly see the sometimes large number of papers that apply 
to a given AFIT topic. The “blank spots” in the Appendix A table highlight the areas in which little or no 
work has been undertaken to date, which we hope spurs research in these areas when practicable.  
Appendix B provides a glossary of accounting and tax terms.  Appendix C lists examples of the book-tax 
differences that result when tax rules differ from GAAP financial statement rules.  Appendix D details the 
rules that govern the reporting of deferred tax accounts.    
In our attempt to reach a broad audience, we first cover the basic rules governing AFIT, 
beginning with a brief discussion of accrual accounting (see Section 2), which undergirds the entire 
financial accounting system.  Section 3 shows that when the tax law accounts for transactions in the same 
manner as does financial accounting, AFIT is straightforward, intuitive, and relatively simple.   
Complexities arise when book and tax treatment differ, e.g., measuring the rate of depreciation 
for property. Section 4 details the two types of differences between book and tax income: permanent and 
temporary.  These book-tax differences
5
                                                 
5 Words that are defined in the glossary at the end of the paper (Appendix B) appear in bold the first time they 
appear in the text. 
 can be complex and have been proposed as measures of both 5 
 
earnings manipulation and tax fraud.  Studies show that the tax accounts can materially affect both 
income statements and balance sheets.
6
Section 5 describes the income tax contingency account on the balance sheet, an estimate of the 
tax payments that are expected if the tax returns were to be audited.  Recently enhanced disclosures of 
this estimate have spurred tests of the extent to which firms exploit the uncertainty in this estimate to 
manage earnings.   
   
Section 6 closes the first part of the paper by discussing two questions of primary interest to many 
users of the tax information in the financial statements: (1) How well does the tax information in the 
financial statements approximate actual tax return information? (2) How well does the tax information in 
the financial statements aid in assessing the effectiveness of a firm’s tax planning?  The short answer to 
both questions is, “in many cases, poorly.”  As with all information in the financial statements, the tax 
accounts are designed to provide information about the financial condition of the firm.  They are not 
intended to provide information about the firm’s tax returns or the effectiveness of its tax planning.  
Consequently, attempts to infer confidential tax return information from the tax accounts in the financial 
statements can lead to erroneous and misleading conclusions.  Nonetheless, we recognize that the 
financial statements often provide the only publicly available tax information.  Thus, we discuss ways that 
researchers, policymakers, and other interested parties can use the tax information in financial statements 
to better approximate information in the tax return. 
The second half of the paper reviews the extant scholarly studies and identifies unresolved 
questions.  Table 1 summarizes the main findings from these papers and positions them in the literature, 
organizing them by tax accounts and research questions.  The table highlights the primary topics of study 
and identifies those areas in which little research has been undertaken.    
Section 7 focuses on the use of the tax accounts to manage earnings through the valuation 
allowance, the income tax contingency, and permanently reinvested foreign earnings.  Extant 
empirical research indicates that managers appear to use the valuation allowance and the tax contingency 
                                                 
6 Appendix 2.2 of Scholes et al. (2009) also provides a detailed discussion of accounting for income taxes. 6 
 
to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  Similarly, they appear to classify a portion of their foreign earnings as 
“permanently reinvested” to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  However, the literature finds only weak 
support for the hypothesis that firms use these accounts to meet or beat other earnings targets or to smooth 
earnings. 
Section 8 explores the pricing of tax information.  Here, the evidence is more compelling.  With 
the possible exception of the valuation allowance, the extant literature consistently shows that the capital 
markets impound information from the deferred tax accounts into prices in predictable ways.  In addition, 
estimated taxable income has information content incremental to book income, but it appears that 
estimated taxable income is not fully and immediately impounded into market prices. 
Section 9 explores a topic of increasing interest among policymakers and economists, increased 
alignment of accounting for book purposes and tax purposes.  Proponents of book-tax conformity assert 
that it would mitigate overstatement of book earnings and understatement of taxable income.  However, 
extant research identifies a potential cost—the markets appear to glean information from the tax accounts, 
which would be eliminated under conformity.   
Throughout the paper, we identify specific research questions and topics that deserve further 
study.  In Section 10, we focus on five issues of general importance.  Specifically, we discuss: (1) the 
need for a theoretical framework to interpret and guide empirical AFIT studies; (2) the inconsistencies 
between empirical findings implying that the tax information in the financial statements is useful and 
anecdotes of its poor quality and limited usefulness to practitioners; (3) the need to study the 
disaggregated components of book-tax differences; (4) the need to better understand whether some 
findings imply market inefficiency or whether they are driven by market imperfections; and (5) the 
research opportunities that may present themselves as the U.S. moves toward International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS).  Section 11 discusses econometric weaknesses that are common in AFIT 
research and proposes ways to mitigate their deleterious effects.  Section 12 concludes. 
 7 
 
2.  Accrual Accounting 
Although AFIT requires expertise in both financial accounting and taxation, it is important to 
understand that AFIT is a financial accounting system.  No tax statute mandates or governs AFIT.  The 
purpose of all financial accounting is to provide useful information to stakeholders, such as investors and 
creditors.  The specific purpose of AFIT is to present information about the firm’s taxes, using the same 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that govern the reporting of other economic activities 
of the firm.
7
GAAP accounting uses an accrual system as opposed to a cash system.
 
8
Two principles govern the accrual-basis system of accounting.  First, the revenue recognition 
principle states that revenue should be recognized (i.e., recorded) once it is realized or is realizable (i.e., 
the goods have been exchanged for cash or claims to cash) and earned (i.e., the firm has substantially 
  Under a cash-basis 
system of accounting, revenues are recorded (i.e., included in the income statement) when cash is 
received and expenses are recorded when cash is paid out.  Under an accrual-basis accounting system, 
revenue and expenses are recorded when a transaction happens.  For example, assume that a firm sells 
100 units of product for $1,000 on credit in 2008, but does not collect cash until 2009.  Under a cash-basis 
system, the firm records revenue in 2009 because that is when it receives the cash.  Under an accrual-
basis system, the firm records revenue in 2008, when the transaction occurs.   
                                                 
7 U.S. GAAP is based on standards set by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB), and the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA).  The primary 
accounting pronouncements that affect AFIT in the United States are:  (a) SFAS No. 109 - “Accounting for Income 
Taxes,” (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1992) (b) FIN 48 – “Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes”, 
and (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 2006) (c) APB No. 23 (Accounting Principals Board, 1972) – 
“Accounting for Income Taxes – Special Areas.”  Although these statements have been superseded by the recent 
FASB codification, which primarily includes these statements in FASB ASC topic 740, we refer to the legacy 
statements throughout the paper.   
8 Except for the smallest businesses, the accrual system is also required for tax purposes.  Specifically, the Internal 
Revenue Code Section 448(c) mandates the accrual accounting method for tax purposes if a corporation exceeds $5 
million in gross receipts.  The tax law does require cash accounting for some transactions, but a discussion of the 
conditions under which cash accounting is used is beyond the scope of this paper. 8 
 
accomplished what it must do to be entitled to the benefits of the revenue).
9  Thus, in the previous 
example, the firm would recognize revenue in 2008, the year it was realized and earned.
10
Second, the matching principle of accrual accounting states that an expense is generally 
recognized when the revenue to which it is related is recognized.
 
11
The matching principle means that the income tax expense (also known as the income tax 
provision) reported in the income statement of the firm is not the actual income taxes paid by the firm in 
that period (as it would be under a cash-basis system).  Rather, the income tax expense arises from 
matching the taxes paid in prior periods, paid in this period, or to be paid in future periods with the 
revenue that is recorded in this period.  Likewise, any taxes paid in the current period that are not related 
to revenues recorded in the current period would not be included in the tax expense reported on the 
income statement. 
  Continuing the example above, 
assume the firm purchased and paid $700 in 2007 for the 100 units it sold in 2008. Under the cash-basis 
system, the firm would recognize the expense of the goods in 2007 because that is when it paid cash.  
However, under the accrual system of accounting, the firm will record the expense in the same period that 
it records the related revenue (i.e., the firm will match the expense to the revenue) and thus it will record 
the expense in 2008. 
Note that taxes are also included on the statement of cash flows.  The tax item there is the actual 
taxes paid during the period. These taxes paid are net taxes paid during the current year, which include 
taxes from the current tax return, taxes required upon audit of tax returns from prior years, and refunds 
from tax returns filed in previous years.
12
 
 In short, in most cases the statement of cash flows measure does 
not report the actual taxes paid on the current year’s tax returns. 
                                                 
9 See FASB Concept Statement No. 5, “Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises”, paragraphs 83 and 84 (Financial Accounting Standards Board, 1984).   
10 The FASB is currently reconsidering revenue recognition.  However, no final pronouncements have been issued at 
the time of this writing. 
11 See FASB Concept Statement No. 5, “Recognition and Measurement in Financial Statements of Business 
Enterprises”, paragraphs 85 and 86.   
12 See Dyreng et al. (2008) for more discussion of the cash taxes paid on the statement of cash flows. 9 
 
3.  When Book and Tax Are the Same 
Despite the many differences between book and tax accounting, transactions are often accounted 
for in the same manner under GAAP and the tax law.  In fact, book accounting is the default starting point 
for tax accounting.  When GAAP computes revenues the same way as the tax law computes income and 
GAAP records expenses the same way that the tax law records deductions, AFIT is relatively 
straightforward and simple.
13
For example, suppose Company A begins business in 2008 and bills, but does not yet collect, 
$500 in revenue (and magically incurs no expenses).  Assume that these sales transactions have identical 
treatment for both book and tax purposes and that the tax rate is 35%, the current top statutory corporate 
income tax rate.  In this case, the company will pay a tax of $175 to the government. On the company’s 
GAAP-based income statement for 2008, it will report revenue of $500 and income tax expense of $175 
($500*35%).  On the 2008 year-end balance sheet, the firm will report an asset (accounts receivable) of 
$500 and a liability (taxes to be paid in 2009) of $175.  Since net income increases owners’ equity, the 
company will now have equity of $325.  The first column of Figure 2 presents the GAAP income 
statement and balance sheet for this example.
  
14
AFIT’s most widely followed statistic is the effective tax rate (ETR).  The ETR is the income tax 
expense divided by NIBT (net income before taxes) and represents the portion of profits recorded in the 
period whose claimant is the government.  Not surprisingly, in this simple scenario, the ETR is the 
statutory tax rate or 35% (175/500). 
 
 
                                                 
13 Revenue is the term for additions to book income; income is the term for additions to taxable income. 
Analogously, expense is the term for subtractions in computing book income; deduction is the term for subtractions 
in computing taxable income. 
14 The journal entries for this scenario would be as follows.  First to record the sale, debit accounts receivable, an 
asset on the balance sheet, for $500 and credit sales revenue, which is reported on the income statement, for $500.  
To record the impact of income taxes, debit income tax expense, which is reported on the income statement, for 
$175 and credit income taxes payable, a liability on the balance sheet for $175.  When the cash is collected, the 
accounts receivable will be removed from the books with a credit and cash, which is reported on the balance sheet, 
will be debited (i.e., cash increases).  When the taxes are paid, the income taxes payable will be removed from the 
books with a debit and cash will be credited (i.e., reduced).  10 
 
4.  Book-tax Differences 
While there are many transactions where book and tax treatment are the same, often the treatment 
differs.  These book-tax differences (BTDs) stem from tax legislation that mandates departures from 
GAAP accrual accounting for various economic, social, political, and administrative reasons.  Reasons for 
these departures include attempts to alter corporate behavior (e.g., increase investment through 
accelerated depreciation), simplify the tax law (e.g., specify depreciation rates), and lower administrative 
costs by limiting discretion (e.g., specify when equipment is obsolete).  Other departures include 
mandates for the cash method (e.g., warranties) and exclusion from tax treatment for some types of 
income (e.g., interest income from municipal bonds) and expenses (e.g., fines by the government).     
 AFIT is relatively straightforward and simple when book and tax are the same.  When 
transactions are treated differently for GAAP and tax purposes, AFIT can quickly become complicated.  
The purpose of this section is to review the accounting rules governing the treatment of two forms of 
BTDs, permanent differences and temporary differences.  We discuss permanent differences next and 
cover temporary differences immediately thereafter.   
 
a.  Permanent Differences 
Permanent differences arise when an item (a) affects taxable income, but never affects book 
income; or (b) affects book income, but never affects taxable income.  We have already mentioned an 
example of a permanent difference, municipal bond interest income, which is included in book income, 
but excluded from taxable income.   
To show the effects of a permanent BTD, assume Company A is as described in Section 3 with 
one variant.  Besides its sales revenue in 2008, Company A receives $40 of municipal bond interest.  
Under GAAP, Company A’s NIBT is $540; under the tax law, its taxable income is $500.  Since the $40 
will never be taxed, the municipal interest income is excluded from the calculation of income tax expense.  
In other words, income tax expense is computed as though there is no municipal bond interest.  11 
 
Consequently, the income tax expense is the same as it was in the first example.  The computation is as 
follows:   
NIBT  $540 
Less permanent differences    (40) 
  $500 
Statutory income tax rate 
Income tax expense 
Net income (after income taxes) 
x  35% 
$175 
$365 
   
See the second column in Figure 2 for the GAAP income statement and balance sheet under this 
scenario.
15
Because the municipal bond interest income increases NIBT without affecting the income tax 
expense, the ETR declines.  In the first example (with no book-tax differences), the ETR was the statutory 
rate of 35% (175/500).  In the second example (with the exempt interest permanent difference), the ETR 
falls to 32.4% (175/540).  In other words, the government has a smaller percentage claim on the firm’s 
profits.  Appendix C provides a list of common transactions that create permanent BTDs.  Some reduce 
the ETR; others, such as nondeductible fines, increase the ETR. 
 
The tax footnotes of the financial statements provide information about permanent differences 
through a reconciliation of the effective tax rate to the federal statutory tax rate.  All significant 
reconciling items must be disclosed.  The governing principal (SEC Reg S-X Rule 4-08(h)) defines 
significant as 5% of the statutory rate (1.75% for a 35% statutory tax rate).  This high threshold typically 
results in disclosure of only a handful of permanent differences for any given firm-year.   
We are unaware of any computer-readable information about the rate reconciliation.  In their 
studies of permanent differences, Seidman (2008) and Poterba et al. (2009) hand-collect information from 
the tax footnotes. 
 
                                                 
15 The journal entries for this scenario would be as follows.  First to record the sale, debit accounts receivable and 
credit sales revenue for $500.  To record the receipt of interest, debit cash and credit interest revenue for $40.  To 
record the impact of income taxes, debit income tax expense and credit income taxes payable for $175. 12 
 
b.  Temporary Differences 
i.  General 
Temporary differences are the second, and more complicated, form of BTD.  Temporary 
differences arise when the book treatment and the tax treatment for a transaction differ in a given year, 
but (ignoring the time value of money) have the same cumulative effect over the life of the firm.   
For example, suppose that a machine costs $200.  Over the life of the machine, both total book 
depreciation and total tax depreciation must equal $200.  However, during any year in the life of the 
machine, book depreciation likely will never equal tax depreciation because the rate of depreciation for 
book and tax is rarely the same.   
Book depreciation is based on the actual deterioration of the asset.  Thus, if the machine is 
expected to deteriorate evenly over two years, then, during the first year, the firm will record $100 of 
book depreciation expense.  During the second year, the firm will again record $100 of book depreciation 
expense.   
The tax law ignores the deterioration of the machine in determining tax depreciation.  Instead, 
statutory depreciation rates apply.  For example, in this case, if the tax law requires $150 of tax 
depreciation in the first year, then the firm will record a deduction on its tax return of $150 ($50) in the 
first (second) year.
 16
This difference between book depreciation and tax depreciation causes a difference between book 
income and taxable income.  Furthermore, since the income tax expense reported on the financial 
statements is based on book income and the amount paid to the government is based on taxable income, 
the amount of income tax expense reported on the financial statements will differ from the amount paid to 
the government.  This difference is attributable to temporary differences between book and tax treatment.   
 
 
                                                 
16 Note that the life of the machine in this example is identical for book and tax, but the lives need not be the same.  13 
 
ii.  Deferred Tax Accounts 
Temporary differences give rise to deferred tax liability and deferred tax asset accounts.  A 
deferred tax liability (DTL) represents the income taxes that are booked as a tax expense on the income 
statement in the current year, but that will actually be paid in future years.  Therefore, a DTL represents a 
tax obligation that will be paid in future taxes.  A deferred tax asset (DTA) represents amounts that reduce 
the income tax expense reported in the current year financial statements, but will not actually result in a 
reduction in taxes paid until future years.  Therefore, a DTA represents a tax benefit or tax reduction that 
will occur in future years.   
We provide simple examples of computing both DTLs and DTAs below.  Recognize that the 
computation of deferred tax accounts is among the more complex features of AFIT.  We direct interested 
readers to a more extensive discussion of the calculation of deferred tax accounts in Appendix D.  
We start with an example of a DTL.  Assume the same scenario as the example in Section 3.  
Company A has earned sales revenue of $500 and has no permanent differences.  Now assume that 
Company A also has additional revenue of $60 in installment sales that have not yet been collected.  
These sales are considered revenue and accounts receivable for book purposes.  Conversely, revenue will 
be recognized for tax purposes (creating taxable income) when the cash is collected.  For tax purposes, no 
taxable income has been generated.  Thus, for tax purposes, it is as though no sale occurred and, 
therefore, no accounts receivable should be recorded.  
Under these assumptions, the book basis of assets (specifically, accounts receivable) is $60 
greater than the tax basis of assets (with zero accounts receivable).  This excess of book asset over tax 
asset generates a DTL, which is measured as the difference in the book basis and the tax basis of the asset 
times the statutory tax rate or: 
Book Basis of Assets  $60 
Tax Basis of Assets (not publicly observable)  $0 
Difference  $60 
Statutory income tax rate 





We already know that the income tax expense is the product of the statutory rate and book 
income adjusted for permanent differences.  Since there are no permanent differences in this example, 
income tax expense equals $196 ($560 * 35%).  Since the income tax payable is the amount that 
Company A owes the government this year, it is calculated as taxable income times the statutory rate 
($500 *35%).  Thus, income taxes payable on the tax return equals $175.
17  The third column in Figure 2 
presents the GAAP income statement and balance sheet for this scenario.
18
Now, consider an example of a DTA.  Assume Company A has sales revenue of $500 and no 
permanent differences.  Assume also that the company records, for book purposes, a product warranty 
liability of $110.  Under tax law, warranties create no deduction until cash is paid out.  Thus, for tax 
purposes, it is as though no liability exists during the period before the cash is paid.   
  The $21 deferred tax liability 
represents the taxes that will actually be paid in the future. 
Thus, the book basis of the firm’s warranty liability ($110) exceeds the tax basis for the warranty 
liability of $0 (since there is no warranty liability on the tax books).  This excess of book liability over tax 
liability gives rise to a deferred tax asset.  The DTA is computed as follows: 
Book Basis of Liabilities  $110 
Tax Basis of Liabilities (not publicly observable)  $0 
Difference  $110 
Statutory income tax rate 






Income tax expense is the book income ($390) times the tax rate (35%) which, in this case, equals 
$136.50.  Income tax payable is taxable income ($500) times the tax rate (35%), or $175. 
19
                                                 
17 The journal entries for this scenario would be as follows:  First to record the sale, debit (credit) accounts 
receivable (sales revenue) for $500.  To record the receipt of installment sale revenue, debit (credit) accounts 
receivable (installment sale revenue) for $60.  To record the impact of income taxes debit income tax expense for 
$196, credit income taxes payable for $175, and credit DTL for $21. 
   The fourth 
18 Continuing on with this example, assume that in the following year Company A collects the $60 in installment 
sales.  At this point, the revenue is reported on the tax return, and the company will need to pay taxes to the 
government on this amount.  It has already been reported for book purposes, and thus the related income tax expense 
has also been reported.  Thus, the only tax accounts that are affected are the DTL and the income taxes payable.  The 
DTL will be removed from the books and the income taxes payable will be increased by the same amount.  The 
journal entry is a debit (credit) to DTL (income taxes payable) for $21.  
19 The journal entries for this scenario would be as follows.  First to record the sale they would debit (credit) 
accounts receivable (sales revenue) for $500.  To record the warranty, they would debit (credit) warranty expense 15 
 
column in Figure 2 presents the GAAP income statement and balance sheet for this scenario.
20
Note that in both of these examples of temporary differences the ETR is 35%.  Generally, only 
permanent differences result in an effective rate that is different from the statutory rate.   
 The 
$38.50 deferred tax asset is the amount by which book tax expenses were reduced in the current year but 
that will not actually reduce taxes paid until some point in the future. 
 
iii.  Valuation Allowance 
If a firm records a DTA, then it is required to evaluate whether, and, if so, how much, it expects 
to benefit from that asset.  One reason that the company may not expect to realize the DTA’s tax savings 
would be if it were to have no taxable income in the future, and consequently no need for the further tax 
reductions provided by the DTA.  In time, the tax benefits would expire, never having reduced the firm’s 
tax payments.   
This is conceptually identical to the GAAP treatment of accounts receivables.  GAAP requires 
accounts receivables (which arise from credit sales) to be recorded, net of an estimate of bad debts.  This 
contra-asset account (or negative asset account) recognizes that not all receivables will be converted into 
cash.  Analogously, GAAP requires DTAs to be booked, net of the tax benefits that are not expected to be 
converted to cash.  The firm performs this netting process by recording a valuation allowance (VA).  An 
increase to the VA results in an equal increase in the income tax expense recorded on the books.
21
                                                                                                                                                             
(warranty liability) for $110.  To record the impact of income taxes they would debit income tax expense for 
$136.50,$136.5, debit DTA for $38.50,$38.5, and credit income taxes payable for $175. 
 
20 Continuing on with this example, assume that next year the company is required to pay out the warranty amount 
of $110.  Since the warranty expense, and thus the related income tax expense, has already been recorded on the 
books, the only tax accounts that are affected are the income taxes payable and the DTA.  The DTA will be removed 
from the books and the income taxes payable will be reduced by the $38.50 since the firm is now receiving the tax 
benefits of the warranty expense.  The journal entry would be to debit (credit) income taxes payable (DTA) for 
$38.50. 
21 There are two possible approaches to determining the VA balance, the impairment approach and the affirmative 
judgment approach.  The impairment approach is to “recognize a DTA unless the likelihood of not realizing the 
future tax benefit is more than 50%.”  The affirmative judgment approach is to “recognize a DTA if the likelihood of 
realizing the future benefit is more than 50%”. Heiman-Hoffman and Patton (1994) demonstrate that, although there 
should be no difference in the end result under these two approaches, psychological biases cause the net DTA 
balance to be higher under the impairment approach than under the affirmative judgment approach.      16 
 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles list four possible sources of income that managers 
should consider when they estimate how much of the DTA will not be recovered: (1) future reversals of 
existing taxable temporary differences, (2) future taxable income, (3) taxable income in carryback 
periods, and (4) the existence of tax-planning strategies (FASB, 1992).  Firms must reevaluate the 
existing VA each time they prepare financial statements,   increasing or decreasing the valuation 
allowance as circumstances change (e.g., new forecasts of future taxable income).  Any change in the VA 
changes the firm’s income tax expense and thus its effective tax rate.  Thus, by overstating (understating) 
the valuation allowance, the firm can decrease (increase) its net income.  We discuss empirical tests of 
managing earnings through the VA in Section 7.   
 
c.  Preference for Permanent Differences Over Temporary Differences 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that managers value tax plans that produce permanent tax 
differences more than they value tax plans that produce temporary differences (even if the two plans have 
the same after-tax net present value) because permanent differences can reduce ETRs.  For example, 
Neubig (2006) asserts that the business community was lukewarm toward the President’s Advisory Panel 
on Federal Tax Reform’s 2005 proposal to deduct fully and immediately the cost of capital investments 
because it would create a temporary difference (rapid depreciation) and leave the ETR unchanged.  
Instead, businesses strongly preferred a reduction in the statutory tax rate because it would create a 
permanent difference, thereby reducing the ETR.
22
                                                 
22 Changing the rate of depreciation creates a difference in the timing of the depreciation for book and tax purposes, 
thus, having no effect on the ETR.  Changing the tax rate has no effect on the timing of the deduction.  Instead it 
lowers the tax rate and thus the ETR. 
  Similarly, Edgerton (2009) finds that investment tax 
credits, which reduce income tax expense, boost capital investment more than accelerated depreciation 
(for tax purposes), which does not reduce income tax expense.  He infers that companies are more 
responsive to government policy that increases earnings than they are to government policy that does not 
increase earnings, even if cash flows are unaffected.    17 
 
The ability to structure a transaction that creates permanent differences is purported to be critical 
for designing effective tax shelters (Weisbach, 2002).
23
   
  In fact, Plesko (2004, p. 730) asserts that “The 
ideal tax shelter…reduces the amount of income reported to the [government], without affecting the 
amount of income reported to shareholders, and creates a permanent rather than temporary difference.”  
Moreover, besides reducing taxes without adverse book effects, transactions generating permanent 
differences can serve to boost earnings without increasing actual taxes (see U.S. Congress (2003), for 
details of such transactions at Enron).  
d.  Descriptive Information 
There are two primary sources of information about BTDs.  First, as mentioned above, the 
balance sheet includes net DTAs and DTLs, and the tax footnotes detail component information about the 
material deferred tax accounts and reconcile the ETR to the statutory tax rate.  Second, some researchers 
can access confidential corporate tax returns through special arrangements with the IRS.  Corporate tax 
returns include a reconciliation of book income and taxable income on Schedule M-1 and more recently 
Schedule M-3. This reconciliation includes both permanent and temporary differences. This section 
reviews some descriptive information that we know about BTDs, as found in these data sources.    
Examining tax footnote information in the financial statements of all firms that were in the 
Fortune 50 during any year from 1993-2004, Poterba et al. (2009) analyze in detail the deferred tax 
accounts (which allows them to focus on temporary differences, which comprise 73% of total book tax 
differences in their sample).  For every year, they find that more companies have net DTLs than have net 
DTAs.  For example, in 2004 among their sample firms, 48 companies with net DTLs had an aggregate 
net balance of $224 billion, while 25 companies with net DTAs had an aggregate net balance of $62 
billion.  For some companies, the deferred accounts are very large.  In 2004, 29% of the net-DTL 
companies had net DTLs that exceeded 5% of total assets, compared to only 8% of net-DTA firms that 
                                                 
23 There is no widely accepted definition of a corporate tax shelter and tackling that elusive concept is beyond the 
scope of this paper.  However, in this context, we use the term to refer to corporate tax plans that the Internal 
Revenue Service has deemed (or likely would deem) as illegal or abusive. 18 
 
exceeded that threshold. The authors find that the mean VA balance in their sample of Fortune 50 firms 
was $472 million in 2004.  This compares with a mean DTA balance related to credits and carryforwards 
of $859 million. This indicates that over half of the DTA balance is not expected to provide a tax benefit.   
Poterba et al. (2009) also report the components of deferred tax positions.  They found that the 
largest sources of DTLs for their sample of 73 firms were property, plant and equipment with a mean of 
$2.3 billion, other liabilities (mean of $0.7 billion) and leases ($0.6 billion).  The largest sources of DTAs 
were other assets ($1.5 billion), employee benefits ($0.5 billion), and tax credit and other carryforwards 
($0.5 billion).  The DTLs from property, plant and equipment arose primarily from more rapid 
depreciation for tax purposes than for book purposes.  DTAs from employee benefits are created by the 
cash-basis approach used in tax reporting versus the accrual-basis approach used in book reporting for 
deducting many forms of compensation, such as deferred wages.  
The DTL components with the largest increases in their mean values from 1993 to 2004 were 
subsidiary-related items (up 4160%), pensions (up 1156%), merger and acquisition-related (up 474%), 
and intangible assets (up 457%).  Property, plant and equipment, the largest DTL in total dollars, grew a 
relatively modest 66%.  The DTA component with the largest increase in its mean value was tax credits 
and other carryforwards, up 264%.      
Manzon and Plesko (2001) attempt to identify the factors that create BTDs.  They analyze 
financial statement data from 1988-1999 for two samples: a panel of 178 firms, and an unbalanced sample 
with 10,702 firm-years.  They measure BTDs as the difference between domestic book income (defined 
as NIBT from domestic sources) and an estimate of taxable income (defined as the current federal tax 
expense grossed up by the statutory tax rate).
24
                                                 
24 Note that Manzon and Plesko (2001) measure of taxable income is not the number on the firm’s tax return.  
Rather, as they acknowledge, it is a tax measure estimated from the financial statements, which can be problematic. 
This imperfect measure of tax, arising from their inability to observe confidential tax returns, hampers their study 
and the many others that attempt to use tax disclosures in the financial statements to estimate taxable income or 
taxes paid.  Throughout this paper, we distinguish between “estimated taxable income” and actual taxable income, 
reserving the term “taxable income” to describe the actual taxable base from the actual tax return.  See Section 5 for 
a detailed discussion of the difficulties with using tax information in the financial statements to estimate taxable 
income. 
  They find that an increase in sales and the amount of 19 
 
plant, property and equipment cause book income to exceed their estimate of taxable income.  Both 
factors are consistent with growing firms investing in tax-favored assets, such as depreciable property. 
(However, as noted by Shevlin (2007), these factors can explain activities that are unrelated to sheltering 
as well as explain tax shelter activity). Manzon and Plesko (2001) conclude that the primary factor 
causing their estimate of taxable income to exceed book income is a permanent difference, the amount of 
pre-1993 goodwill.
25
 Using confidential tax returns, Plesko (2002) examines Schedule M-1 for all U.S. corporate tax 
returns from 1996-1998.  (As mentioned above, Schedule M-1 reconciles book net income and taxable 
income and thus includes both permanent and temporary differences. Plesko (2002) reports that total 
book-tax differences (aggregated across all U.S. corporate tax returns) were $159 billion in 1998, 20% of 
aggregated net income before income taxes.  Two industries contain 88% of the BTDs: the finance, 
insurance, real estate and rental and leasing sector ($81 billion); and the information sector ($58 billion).  
In both sectors, the ratio of BTDs to NIBT was 49%, which was the highest across industries.  The 
aggregated 1998 Schedule M-1s show: 
 
•  income subject to tax, but not on the books, of $377 billion, 
•  income on the books, but not on the tax return, of $472 billion, 
•  expenses on the books, but not deducted on the tax return of $698 billion, including $125 
billion of depreciation, and 
•  deductions on the tax return that were not expensed of $744 billion, including 
depreciation of $205 billion.  The net depreciation BTD of $80 billion ($205 billion less 
$125 billion) was half of the total BTDs in 1998.       
Plesko (2002) also finds that BTDs are concentrated among the largest firms.  Firms with assets 
exceeding $250 million accounted for 96.9% of BTDs in 1998, a higher percentage than they represented 
of the nation’s assets, book profits and taxable income.  Interestingly, of the $66.5 billion increase in 
                                                 
25 Before 1993, goodwill was never deductible for tax purposes.  Since then, goodwill is occasionally deductible for 
tax purposes. 20 
 
BTDs from 1996-1998, two-thirds was from loss companies, i.e., those with negative NIBT and negative 
taxable income.
26
Several papers note the change in BTDs over the last decade.  Using Compustat and tax return 
data from 1991-1998 for 1,579 companies, Mills et al. (2002) show that NIBT exceeded taxable income 
throughout the 1990s and that the disparity widened over time.  The gap was greatest for financial firms 
and multinationals.  Off-balance sheet structured transactions or special purpose entities accounted for 
part of the difference.  Consistent with Plesko (2002), Mills et al. (2002) find that the BTDs are 
concentrated among the largest firms.  In 1998, the largest 20% of firms accounted for almost all the 
BTDs, with the 15 largest companies responsible for almost one-third of the total.  Noting that by 1998 
more than half of the spread between taxable and book income could not be explained by understandable 
differences (e.g., depreciation), Desai (2003) conjectures that the widening gap is driven by the growth in 
corporate tax shelters.  However, Poterba et al. (2009)’s analysis suggests that this conclusion should be 
interpreted cautiously. They find that 73% of the book-tax gap from 1993 to 2004 was attributable to 
temporary differences, and these differences grew during their sample period.  We believe that a fruitful 
area for future research would be to study permanent differences more directly (rather than all BTDs as in 
Desai (2003) to see if their trend and magnitude could plausibly explain the pattern and magnitude of tax 
sheltering activity. 
   
Seidman (2008) attempts to explain the factors that create the divergence between book and tax.  
Analyzing hand-collected firm-level information about specific book-tax differences for the Fortune 50 
companies from 1995 to 2004, she reports that general business conditions, earnings management, and 
changes in the financial accounting rules explain 55% of the variation in book-tax differences.  
Interestingly, she finds that changes in GAAP mitigated the book-tax difference, i.e., the disparity would 
have been even larger if the accounting rules had not changed (in particular, rules related to the 
accounting treatment of goodwill).  Seidman (2008) concludes that tax sheltering explains less than half 
                                                 
26 The reason that loss companies would be the primary source of BTDs is that these firms have recognized their 
losses on their income statements, but have not yet realized the benefit from net operating loss carryforwards on 
their tax returns.   21 
 
of the variation in book-tax differences. As mentioned above, future research into this area should 
consider separating permanent differences from temporary differences.  
Figure 3 updates the book-tax gap through 2008.  Measuring book income as pretax income 
adjusted for minority interests and estimating taxable income as federal and foreign tax expense divided 
by the maximum statutory rate, we compute the economy-wide book-tax gap from 1993 to 2008.  Book 
income exceeds estimated taxable income in all years, except 2001 and 2008.  In those two recessionary 
years, a precipitous drop in book income reverses the book-tax gap, leaving book income substantially 
less than estimated taxable income.  Over the 16 years, aggregate book income is 94% of aggregate 
estimated taxable income.  However, if the two recessionary years are excluded, aggregated book income 
rises to 108% of aggregate taxable income.  We infer from these findings that overall economic activity is 
an important predictor of the book-tax gap and that generalizations about the direction of the book-tax gap 
depends critically on whether the period of investigation is one of economic expansion or contraction.        
Examining confidential tax return data, Plesko (2004) notes that before 2001 firms were 
recognizing more book revenue than taxable income (although firms also were recognizing more book 
expenses than tax deductions).  In 2001, the revenue difference evaporated due to the substantial 
corporate losses and book expenses far exceeded tax deductions.  We find a similarly abrupt 
disappearance of book profits in 2008, while estimated taxable income remains relatively steady during 
both recessions.  One possible explanation for the divergent paths for book and taxable income during 
recessions would be a spike in impairments, which would reduce book income, but not taxable income.  
We find that impairments account for about half of the reversal in both 2001 and 2008.  However, the 
pattern of book income exceeding taxable income, except during recessions while book income plunges, 
remains even after adjusting for impairments. 
To summarize, both financial statements and corporate income tax returns provide information 
useful for estimating BTDs. Key findings are that DTLs exceed DTAs, with depreciation being the largest 
source of temporary differences.  BTDs are concentrated among the largest companies and they are 
concentrated in two industries, namely the financial and information industries.  The gap between book 22 
 
income and taxable income widened throughout the 1990s, reversed in 2001, then widened again, only to 
reverse again with the 2008 recession.
27
 
  Finally, the determinants of BTDs undoubtedly include tax 
planning, earnings management behavior, changes in financial accounting rules, changes in firm-level 
sales and the level of property, plant and equipment in a given firm.  However, the similarly sharp 
reversals in the book-tax gap in both 2001 and 2008 lead us to conclude that much of the gap is a function 
of the business cycle.  
5.  Tax Contingency 
As discussed in section 2, the income tax expense includes future tax payments arising from 
revenue recognized in the current period.  Those future taxes include an estimate of the taxes expected to 
arise from audits of the current year’s tax returns.  If the taxing authorities successfully challenge the 
firm, then the company will pay taxes in future years that are related to activity in the current period.  To 
accrue an expense on the income statement in the year of the activity for these possible future tax 
payments, firms establish liabilities on the balance sheet, known as tax contingencies, which are estimates 
of the additional taxes that might have to be paid in the future.   
Although this uncertain tax contingency account (commonly referred to as the “cushion”) is 
included among the other liabilities on the balance sheet, historically it has rarely been reported as a 
separate line item or even disclosed.  Thus, the cushion has been largely unobservable to researchers 
(impeding scholarly work), the taxing authorities (potentially impeding their ability to detect firms that 
consider their tax positions potentially unsustainable under audit), or other users of the financial 
statements (potentially enhancing its usefulness for managing earnings).   
Since 2007, a new financial reporting standard (FIN 48) has required firms to disclose the balance 
of the tax contingency in their financial statement footnotes. These disclosures substantially expand our 
understanding of the process by which firms impound the uncertainty of tax plans in their income tax 
                                                 
27 Correlation through time or across firms with a given year (or both) can inflate t-statistics. As we discuss in 
Section 11, book-tax differences are highly correlated across firms within a given year. In Section 11 we discuss 
how to deal with this issue econometrically so as to mitigate potential problems with inflated t-statistics.   23 
 
expense calculation.  The new disclosure has spurred several studies about the use of the cushion to 
manage earnings, and we anticipate FIN 48 disclosures will attract considerable scholarly attention over 
the next few years.   
FASB’s adoption of FIN 48 was controversial.  Many believed that these disclosures would hurt 
companies because the IRS could use them to both identify firms with significant uncertain tax positions 
as well as use the disclosures to more effectively challenge the firms’ aggressive tax positions.
28
One possible reason that FIN 48 may not have had the negative impact that some anticipated 
(e.g., may not have provided the IRS a road map for auditing purposes) is that the FIN 48 information is 
of limited usefulness to the IRS.  Although other users of the financial statements may value the FIN 48 
disclosures, the IRS may already have better information about a company’s tax position than FIN 48 
disclosures provide.  In fact, Frischmann et al. (2008) document results consistent with the market’s 
knowing that the IRS already had superior cushion information. This may be particularly true for the 
largest firms, which are for the most part under constant IRS audit and review.  
  
However, the first studies in this area do not support these concerns.  Frischmann et al. (2008) conduct 
short-window event studies around key dates leading up to and including the passage of FIN 48.  They 
find no evidence that tax-aggressive firms (which they classify as those with large BTDs or low cash 
taxes paid) experience significantly negative abnormal returns, except around the release of the exposure 
draft.  Mills et al. (2009) model FIN 48’s impact on the strategic interaction between companies and the 
taxing authorities and show that the mandatory disclosure of a firm’s tax contingency does not necessarily 
put the firm at a disadvantage.  Their conclusions rest critically under several simplifying assumptions 
(the most critical of which is that all firms truthfully report their FIN 48 liabilities). Even so, their paper 
can be viewed as highlighting the conditions that would be required for FIN 48 to be unambiguously 
deleterious from the corporate perspective.   
                                                 
28 Consistent with the IRS’ believing that the disclosures would aid in identifying firms that had underpaid their 
taxes, in 2007 (the year of FIN 48’s adoption) IRS official Robert Adams said that FIN 48 disclosures were the 
“centerpiece of our revenue agent training this year” (Messier, 2007). 24 
 
Although the market did not seem to view the FIN 48 requirements negatively, corporate 
managers may have.  Blouin et al. (forthcoming) examine the behavior of firms between the enactment 
and the adoption of FIN 48.  Specifically, they examine the number of settlements made with the IRS 
between enactment and adoption, as well as the number and amount of reserves that were reduced during 
this period.  They find that firms with higher IRS deficiencies were more likely to settle during the period 
between enactment and adoption.  In addition, they find that firms reduced their reserves more during this 
period than they did prior to enactment.  Thus, these results provide evidence that corporate management 
may have been worried about increased IRS scrutiny of the FIN 48 disclosures.  
Several studies provide descriptive evidence of the magnitude of the contingency account, the 
change in the contingency account around the adoption of FIN 48, and the quality of the disclosures in 
terms of completeness and clarity.  Blouin et al. (2007) and Dunbar et al. (2007) evaluate the new 
contingency disclosures mandated under FIN 48.  Examining 100 of the largest companies with at least 
five analysts, Blouin et al. (2007) find that the aggregate contingency balance as of December 31, 2006 
(the last disclosure before FIN 48 became effective) was 1.8% of assets.  Examining 348 S&P 500 firms, 
Dunbar et al. (2007) find a similar average contingency balance of 1.5% of assets.  Blouin et al. (2007) 
also report that more firms changed their contingency in 2006 than in 2005.  Most of those changes were 
decreases, consistent with companies having overstated their contingency balance in the past and 
reversing them before FIN 48 disclosures became publicly observable by investors; however, the mean 
change in 2006 was not statistically different from that in 2005.  For comparison, they examined 100 of 
the smallest firms with at least five analysts and found no differences in the frequency or the magnitude of 
the changes in the contingency.  While both of these studies provide interesting information, their sample 
sizes are quite small.  Thus, results may not be broadly generalizable.
29
                                                 
29 Alexander et al. (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) examine the required disclosures made prior to the actual adoption 
of FIN 48.  The SEC requires that firms provide information about the likely effects of accounting standards that are 
enacted, but not yet adopted.  Thus, Alexander et al. (2009) (2009) (2009) (2009) examine the information provided 
by firms in 2006 about the future enactment of FIN 48.  Interestingly, they find that fewer than one-fifth of 
companies provided an estimate of the effect of the adoption of FIN 48.  
 Finally, there are two studies that 
examine the completeness and clarity of tax contingency disclosures.  Gleason and Mills (2002) examine 25 
 
the disclosures made before the enactment of FIN 48.  They analyze the factors that cause firms to report 
and/or disclose their tax contingencies.  Examining the 200 largest manufacturing firms on Compustat 
and included in the IRS’s Coordinated Industry Cases (a confidential database with tax information about 
some of the largest, most frequently audited companies), the authors measure a company’s expected loss 
upon audit as the product of its potential tax deficiency (from the IRS database) and its industry-specific 
average settlement rate.  They find that only 27% of the firms disclose a contingency, and only 30% of 
those companies provide the level of information required by GAAP.  As would be expected, the 
likelihood that the firm discloses a contingency increases with the magnitude of the tax deficiency and the 
amount of the contingency increases with the expected loss.
30
Robinson and Schmidt (2009) examine the disclosures that were reported after the adoption of 
FIN 48.  They hypothesize and find that the quality of the disclosure is inversely related to the tax 
aggressiveness of the firm.  Robinson and Schmidt (2009) measure quality in terms of both completeness 
and clarity.  They measure tax aggressiveness using a principle component analysis on seven measures of 
tax aggressiveness used in prior studies.
  Since the study preceded FIN 48, the 
authors do not have access to the actual contingency amount and therefore use a very rough estimate of 
the contingency (domestic current tax expense less the total tax liability).  As a result, the paper’s results 
should be interpreted with caution. 
31
                                                 
30 Gleason and Mills (2007) (2007) find that auditor-provided tax services are associated with higher quality 
reporting of the contingency account.  Specifically, they find that corporations that purchase tax services from their 
auditor had more fully reserved contingency balances upon IRS audit. 
  Their results are interesting and based on a larger sample (643 
firms in the S&P 1500) than used in prior FIN 48 disclosure-related research.  However, one important 
caveat is that their analysis is only performed on the disclosures included in the 1
st quarter of 2007 (i.e., 
the first quarter after adoption of FIN 48).  Thus, it is unclear whether these behavioral patterns will 
31 See Robinson and Schmidt (2009, p. 11) (2009, p. 11) for an interesting example of the many variations of 
compliant FIN 48 reporting. 26 
 





6.  AFIT Misconceptions 
This section addresses two common misconceptions related to AFIT.  The first relates to how 
well the tax information in financial statements approximates actual tax return information.  The second 
misconception relates to the extent to which the tax information in financial statements is useful for 
assessing a firm’s tax choices.   
To shed light on the first issue, we review several studies that attempt to assess how well the tax 
information in financial statements approximates actual tax return information, e.g., the actual amount of 
taxes paid, taxable income, and loss and credit carryforwards.  The literature identifies numerous reasons 
that book information could be a poor proxy for tax information and emphasizes that, under certain 
circumstances, the book numbers can lead to misleading and erroneous inferences, e.g., that a firm is 
paying substantial taxes when it is actually paying none.
33
Before we proceed, it is important to note that for many research questions the relevant tax 
measure is the tax information in the financial statements, not an estimate of actual taxes paid computed 
using the tax information in the financial statements.  For example, suppose the research question is: Do 
  The extent to which the mismeasurement 
adversely affects research, markets, policy, and practice is not well understood.   
                                                 
32 Several studies address tax shelter/ tax avoidance issues in the context of FIN 48.  While we briefly mention them 
here, they are beyond the scope of this review.  Lisowsky (2009b) (2009b) (2009b) develops a model of the 
likelihood of a firm engaging in tax sheltering behavior.  The study finds that the uncertain tax liability is 
significantly related to the use of tax shelters.  In a similar study, Wilson (2009) takes data from companies known 
to use tax sheltering to reduce their tax burden and develops a profile of the type of firm likely to use a tax shelter.  
He finds larger BTDs and more aggressive financial reporting practices among firms with the shelter profile.  Song 
and Tucker (2008) find that certain variables (size, profitability, levels of research and development, growth, levels 
of general expenses, and levels of  debt) that are typically associated with tax shelter activity are also associated with 
the tax contingency  balance.  The authors infer that the reported contingencies are indicators of tax sheltering 
activity.  Gupta et al. (2009) (2009) provide evidence consistent with firms reducing their multistate tax avoidance in 
response to FIN 48 reporting requirements. 
33 For an example of firms reporting large income tax expense but not paying any taxes, see Graham et al. (2004) 
and Sullivan (2002), who provide evidence that many technology stocks in the late 1990s paid no (or very little) 
taxes because of huge employee stock options deductions, even though they reported substantial current income tax 
expenses. 27 
 
firms manage earnings through the income tax expense?  The income tax expense from the financial 
statements, not an estimate of the actual taxes paid, is needed to answer this question.  In fact, even if a 
researcher had access to the firm’s tax returns, she would still use the income tax expense from the 
financial statements to answer this earnings management question.  That said, to answer many questions, 
the researcher wants to estimate the actual taxes paid and therefore must rely on the financial statements.  
This section discusses the usefulness of the tax information in the books to provide such estimates.   
Our discussion of the second issue (i.e., how useful is the tax information in the financial 
statements for evaluating the effectiveness of a firm’s tax planning) centers on three limitations to 
assessing a firm’s tax position based on the tax information in financial statements.  Specifically, we 
discuss the failure of the tax information in the financial statements to report implicit taxes, non-tax costs, 
and discounted deferred tax accounts.  
 
a.  How Well Does the Tax Information in Financial Statements Approximate Actual Tax 
Return Information? 
i.  Book-tax comparisons 
For many studies, the primary use of the tax information in the financial statements is to estimate 
the actual tax information on a tax return, usually the U.S. Federal tax return.
34
Hanlon (2003) thoroughly analyzes the difficulties in using the income tax expense on the income 
statement to infer actual tax information.
  Often, no other 
information is available to estimate the actual taxes.  The purpose of this section is to identify the hazards 
of using tax information from the financial statements to estimate actual taxes on the tax return.  
35
                                                 
34 We recognize that firms file tax returns in many countries and other jurisdictions.  However, throughout this 
paper, we will generally refer to the U.S. tax return as the tax return of interest and the U.S.’s Internal Revenue 
Service as the representative taxing authority. 
 The income tax expense on the income statement is 
dichotomized into current and deferred amounts. The deferred portion is the amount of expense that is 
attributable to temporary timing differences and, thus (at least conceptually) will result in future tax 
35 For a similar analysis of data from pre-SFAS No. 109 years, specifically 1979 to 1981, see Dworin (1985). 28 
 
payments.  The remainder is the current income tax expense.  Researchers sometimes use the current 
income tax expense on the income statement as a measure of the firm’s confidential, and thus 
unobservable, current income tax liability on its tax return.  As discussed above, a common approach to 
estimating taxable income as reported on the tax return is to gross up the current tax expense by the 
statutory tax rate.  Hanlon (2003) identifies the following problems with this approach: 
•  Current tax expense rarely equals the actual taxes paid.  Financial statements are usually filed 
months before the tax return is submitted.
36
•  The income tax expense reported separately on the income statement (and used to estimate 
taxable income) does not include all of the book income tax expense.  Income from discontinued 
operations, extraordinary items, prior period adjustments, and other comprehensive income are 
not considered part of the ongoing activities of the firm; thus, they are reported separately in the 
income statement.  Furthermore, these “below-the-line” items are reported net of any income 
taxes that they generate, a process called intraperiod tax allocation.  Consequently, even though 
net-of-tax transactions affect actual taxes, the tax expenses related to them are excluded from the 
income tax expense that is commonly used to estimate actual taxes paid.
  Thus, the tax information in the financial statements 
is only an estimate of the eventual numbers in the actual tax return.  Even if the tax information in 
the financial statements perfectly anticipates the eventual numbers in the actual tax return, the 
current income tax expense in the financial statements will rarely equal the actual taxes paid.  The 
reason is that the income tax expense must include an estimate of the taxes that will be paid under 
IRS audit, if detected.  By definition, these potential future taxes are not reported in the tax return.   
37
                                                 
36 For example, a calendar-year end company must file its U.S. tax return by March 15.  However, the filing date for 
the U.S. tax return can be and typically is extended six months to September 15.  In contrast, large calendar-year 
firms must file their complete financial statements (10-K) with the SEC by the end of February.   
 The current income tax 
37 Lisowsky (2009a) (2009a) (2009a) reports that the inability to observe the taxes imbedded in below-the-line items 
does not introduce substantial error into estimates of the U.S. tax liability.  He regresses firms’ actual U.S. tax 
liabilities, as reported on confidential tax returns, on various financial statement measures including a categorical 
variable that equals one if the absolute value of discontinued operations as a percentage of income from 
discontinued operations and extraordinary items exceeds 5%.  He finds that the estimated regression coefficient on 
the categorical variable is not significant, which he interprets as evidence that ignoring the taxes related to “below-
the-line” items is not particularly problematic in estimating actual taxes paid.  It may be an overstatement, however, 
to infer from this analysis that below-the-line items are irrelevant in estimating taxes paid.  Lisowsky (2009a) 29 
 
expense is reported after subtracting tax credits, which are not disclosed in the financial 
statements. Thus, using the statutory tax rate to gross up current income tax expense produces a 
measure that is less than actual taxable income.
38
•  The books and the tax returns often report information about different entities because the 
consolidation rules differ for book and tax.  Two of the key differences are: 
 
1.  Books generally require consolidation of entities with common ownership of more than 
50%, while tax law only permits consolidation of firms with at least 80% common 
ownership. 
2.  Regardless of common ownership, foreign subsidiaries are never consolidated for tax 
purposes.  GAAP makes no distinction between domestic and foreign subsidiaries. 
This is not a complete review of the issues raised in Hanlon (2003).
39  For brevity, we have only 
highlighted a few key insights, and we refer interested readers to her paper as well as Lisowsky (2009a) 
and Frank (2009) for further discussion of the difficulties in inferring U.S. tax liabilities from financial 
statement information.
40
Despite the many concerns that Hanlon (2003) raises, in some cases it is still possible that the 
book numbers may provide a reasonably good measure for estimating the taxes on the tax return.  To 
assess how deleterious the book limitations are, we look to studies that compare the tax figures reported in 
the books with the actual tax information in the tax returns.  Few such studies exist because access to 
confidential tax returns is difficult to obtain and limited to specific projects and researchers approved by 
the IRS.  Furthermore, while access to corporate tax returns provides information that cannot be observed 
  Nonetheless, this list provides a sense of the key issues. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2009a) (2009a) ignores all below-the-line items except large discontinued operations, and only uses a categorical 
variables to identify those items.  Thus, further analysis is warranted before dismissing below-the-line items when 
using financial statements to estimate the total tax liability.        
38 To prove, assume book and tax accounting are identical, the firm’s taxable income is $100, its statutory tax rate is 
30% and it has $10 of credits.  Then both its actual tax liability and its current income tax liability are $20.  If the 
$20 is grossed up by the statutory tax rate of 30% then the estimated taxable income is $67 or $33 less than actual.   
39 One complex issue that we ignore is inferring the tax deductions from exercising employee stock options.  See 
Hanlon and Shevlin (2002) for an excellent analysis of the problems associated with this estimation process.  
40 See McGill and Outslay (2002) for an excellent, detailed analysis of the difficulties in determining Enron’s tax 
status from its financial statements, and see McGill and Outslay (2004) for a more general discussion of the 
difficulties of using financial statement to identify tax shelter activity. 30 
 
using publicly available data, these studies still face many of the Hanlon (2003) limitations.  For example, 
if the consolidated firms in the tax return differ from the consolidated firms in the financial statements, 
then seemingly analogous measures, such as pre-tax book income and taxable income, are not comparable 
and must be adjusted, if possible.  Nonetheless, studies with access to actual corporate tax returns provide 
valuable information about how closely the tax information in the financial statements approximates 
actual tax return information. 
Using confidential IRS audit information for 219 firms from 1981 to 1995, Mills et al. (2003) 
assess the measurement error arising from using the net operating loss (NOL) measure on the books to 
identify firms that have NOL carryforwards on their tax returns.
41
   Graham and Mills (2008) access tax return data and simulate corporate marginal tax rates using 
the method of Shevlin (1987) and Graham (1996) to account for dynamic features of the tax code.
  Their findings are encouraging; a firm 
with a book NOL carryforward and either a negative current income tax expense or a negative pretax 
book income is highly likely to have an NOL carryforward on its tax return.   
42
                                                 
41 Note that because book income does not necessarily approximate taxable income, a firm may have an NOL 
carryforward for tax purposes but not exist for book purposes or vice versa. 
  They 
simulate marginal tax rates (MTRs) based on the tax return information for 3,667 companies during 1998 
to 2000. The authors perform a “horse race” by comparing these tax return tax rates with MTRs based on 
financial statement data, using several different definitions as well as simulation techniques to calculate 
several different MTRs based on book information.  The correlation between tax return-simulated and 
book-simulated MTRs is about 70%, which is the strongest relation to the tax return MTR for any of the 
tax rates that are based on financial statement data.  The authors conclude that simulated MTRs based on 
financial statement data are reasonable approximations of MTRs based on tax return data.  Again, this is 
encouraging and implies that tax return effects can be reasonably approximated with financial statement 
data. In addition, they provide a summary table of the different tax rates that researchers should consider 
using depending on the research question that they face. 
42 See Blouin et al. (2008) (2008) and Graham and Kim (2009) (2009) for alternative methods of simulating future 
taxable income to use in the estimation of corporate marginal income tax rates.   31 
 
 Plesko’s (2006) findings are less encouraging to researchers who look to the tax information in 
the financial statements to estimate actual taxes on the tax return. He compares financial statements and 
actual U.S. tax returns from 1994 to 2001 (37,853 firm-years) to determine whether financial reporting 
information allows a user to infer information about a firm’s tax attributes.  Using a modified Jones 
(1991) model, Plesko (2006) compares discretionary financial accounting accruals with discretionary tax 
accruals. He contends that if book and tax are identical in all regards, they will move together.  To the 
extent they are unrelated, a change in one has little effect on the other.  Finding limited correlation 
between discretionary financial reporting accruals and discretionary tax accruals, Plesko (2006) concludes 
that financial statement disclosures do not convey much information about a firm’s tax attributes. To 
summarize, much is known about differences between book and tax accounting and the difficulties in 
inferring information about the tax return from the tax information in the financial statements.  
Unfortunately, we know less about whether using the best publicly available firm-level tax data, i.e., the 




  In the meantime, in light of the scarcity of alternative sources of firm-level tax information, 
researchers will often have no choice but to continue to rely on the tax information in the financial 
statements.  The good news is that as Mills et al. (2003) and Graham and Mills (2008) show, AFIT may 
provide reasonably good estimates of the actual taxes paid.  However, we encourage producers and 
consumers of research to consider the limitations of the tax information in the financial statements and to 
interpret scholarly findings with caution.  
ii.  Other issues 
This section discusses three topics that are related to the use of the tax information in the financial 
statements.  First, even though we just detailed several problems with using tax information in the 
financial statements to estimate actual taxes paid, as mentioned above, for most research questions in this 
literature these problems are irrelevant because the tax information in the books is the correct tax 
                                                 
43 See Frank (2009) for a review of the literature assessing the level and impact of potential mismeasurement. 32 
 
information.  For example, suppose the research question is: Do investors use the tax information in the 
financial statements? Or, how do analysts value corporate tax shelters?  Since neither investors nor 
analysts can observe the actual tax returns, it is the tax information in the financial statements that the 
researcher needs to answer these questions.  For these types of questions and many other typical AFIT 
questions, the tax information in the financial statements provides the correct data.  No adjustments are 
needed to estimate actual taxes paid.  In fact, how well the tax information in the financial statements 
estimates the actual taxes paid is tangential to these questions. 
Second, note that even researchers with access to U.S. tax returns struggle to link a multinational 
firm’s financial statements to its U.S. tax return.  The reason is that the financial statements are designed 
to provide information about the entire enterprise, both domestic and foreign, while the tax returns are 
jurisdictionally based (for example, U.S. tax returns reflect U.S. taxes levied on U.S. activities).  
Furthermore, even if the financial statements dichotomize net income and tax expense into U.S. and 
foreign parts, the U.S. tax information in the financial statements does not necessarily purge the impact of 
multinational activities.  For example, as we detail in Section 6, foreign profits may trigger U.S. taxes.  In 
those cases, U.S. book income will not include the profits from foreign operations.  However, U.S. tax 
expense will include the taxes on those foreign profits.  Thus, the U.S. ETR may be overstated because 
the foreign profits are in the foreign grouping, but the U.S. tax expense on those foreign earnings is in the 
domestic grouping.
44
Finally, as noted in Section 2, there is tax information in the statement of cash flows.  The 
account is cash taxes paid and, on the surface, this would appear to be a superior measure of the actual 
    
                                                 
44 We would welcome a study that gained access to non-U.S. tax returns and attempted to map the tax information in 
those returns to the tax information in the financial statements.  Given that studies comparing U.S. tax returns and 
financial statements shed light on the extent to which financial statements are useful for estimating U.S. tax 
payments (e.g., Plesko (2002)), a study of non-U.S. tax returns would enable us to assess the usefulness of foreign 
tax information in the financial statements for estimating foreign tax payments.  Understanding the usefulness of the 
foreign tax information would make a valuable contribution because the foreign tax provision is commonly used in 
studies of tax haven activity, transfer pricing, treaty shopping, and other international tax maneuvers and also in 
studies of the impact of deferral, foreign tax credit limitations, and the inability to offset one country’s losses against 
another country’s gains on business decisions.  Finding that the foreign tax information in the financial statements 
reasonably matches the actual foreign tax payments would allay concerns that these studies of international tax 
choices employ a flawed (and potentially misleading) measure. 33 
 
taxes paid on that year’s tax returns.  Unfortunately, it includes all taxes paid to all jurisdictions during the 
current year, regardless of the year of the tax return, and is net of refunds.  For example, suppose that in 
2008, the IRS and a company settle an audit triggered by a 1998 tax shelter.  The taxes (or refund) 
resulting from that settlement will appear in the cash taxes paid account in the 2008 statement of cash 
flows.  Therefore, this measure does not capture the actual taxes paid on the current year’s tax return.
45
That said, Dyreng et al. (2008) use cash taxes paid to measure the net taxes paid over a ten-year 
period.  Mismeasurement associated with the timing of cash taxes paid is mitigated in this setting because 
the longer the period, the less likely it is that a large settlement in a single year would distort an 
approximation of the firm’s actual taxes paid.  This holds true for income tax expense, as well. While they 
make progress on the temporal issue, Dyreng et al. (2008) do not address the jurisdiction issue.  Ideally, 
studies in this area would either address jurisdiction directly or at least confirm their results on 
subsamples of firms for which jurisdictional issues most likely are minor (e.g., a U.S.-only sample or a 
sample of firms with no foreign tax credits).  
  
Moreover, as with the tax expense on the income statement, taxes on the statement of cash flows might 
contain data from foreign jurisdictions, which reduces its value for assessing U.S. tax return information. 
 
b.  How Useful is the Tax Information in the Financial Statements for Assessing the 
Effectiveness of a Firm’s Tax Planning? 
This section discusses three reasons why AFIT rarely produces sufficient information to conduct 
a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of a firm’s tax planning.  In fact, even if financial 
statements were to provide perfect information about the content of the firm’s tax return, they would still 
provide an incomplete picture of how well the firm manages its tax function.  The reason is that AFIT 
                                                 
45 The income tax expense also suffers from an imperfect match between the profits in one year and the taxes 
attributed to those profits in that year.  The reason is the income tax expense includes an estimate of future taxes 
attributed to the current year’s economic activity.  At some point, the uncertainty about those future taxes will be 
resolved and that future year’s income tax expense will be adjusted to reflect the differences between the eventual 
tax settlement and the tax reserves.    34 
 
does not report (and indeed is not intended to provide) information about implicit taxes and non-tax costs, 
and AFIT does not discount the deferred tax accounts.   
First, the income tax expense in the financial statements is limited to explicit taxes.  Since AFIT 
ignores implicit taxes (the reduced returns an investor earns on favorably taxed investments), it is difficult 
to assess the full cost (tax and non-tax) of a transaction based just on financial statement data.
46  As proof, 
suppose a firm invests in tax-exempt municipal bonds.  Because of the tax-exemption, the interest income 
from municipal bonds is less than the interest income from equally risky, fully taxable bonds (because 
investors bid up the price of the tax-exempt bonds because they are tax-advantageous).  Suppose that 
after-tax book profits from investing in municipal bonds were identical to those from investing in taxable 
bonds.  In this case, the tax expense and the ETR would be lower if the firm invested in municipal bonds 
than they would be if the firm was invested in fully taxable bonds since AFIT ignores implicit taxes.  
Furthermore, even if the firm’s after-tax profits were lower because it invested in municipal bonds, the tax 
expense would remain lower and, under certain conditions, the ETR would also be lower.
47
Second, AFIT does not produce sufficient information to assess the non-tax costs of tax 
minimization (see Scholes et al. (2009) for a thorough discussion of tax and non-tax costs).  For example, 
if a bank sells real estate that has depreciated in value, the realized loss will reduce its taxable income, but 
  In other 
words, there are cases where the tax information in the financial statements can mask poor tax planning.  
In short, a naïve analysis of tax information in a firm’s financial statements might conclude that the firm  
is well-managed from a tax perspective, when that is not the case.  
                                                 
46 Implicit taxes are reflected in the reduced before-tax rates of return earned on tax-advantaged investments (see 
Scholes et al. (2009)).  For example, the yield on a municipal bond, which is exempt from federal taxation, is less 
than a similarly risky, fully taxable corporate bond.  This reduction in the return on the tax-advantaged municipal 
bond is an implicit tax.  Implicit taxes arise throughout the economy when similar assets are taxed differently.  
Ignoring these implicit taxes can lead to erroneous inferences about the effectiveness of a tax plan. See Jennings et 
al. (2009) (2009) for a recent analysis of implicit taxes. 
47 After-tax returns will be larger if the implicit tax rate exceeds the explicit tax rate, but the ETR also may be larger. 
For example, assume the firm’s tax expense is 100 and its pre-tax income is 500, leaving 400 of after-tax profits and 
an ETR of 20%.  If a firm invests in $1,000 in municipal bonds paying 6%, its tax expense will remain 100 and its 
pre-tax income will increase to 560.  Its after-tax profits will now be 460, and its ETR will fall to 17.9%.  
Conversely, if the firm invests $1,000 in fully-taxable bonds paying 10% and its tax rate is 30%, then the firm’s 
income tax expense will rise to 130 and its pre-tax income will be 600.  Its after-tax profits will be 470 and its ETR 
will increase to over 21.7%.  In other words, by investing in fully taxable bonds, the firm has increased its after-tax 
profits, but also its ETR. 35 
 
it also will deplete its regulatory capital.  It is possible that the costs associated with a reduction in 
regulatory capital could exceed any tax benefits from the realized loss.
48
 Third, AFIT ignores the time value of money.  Since tax deferral is a primary means of reducing 
the net present value of taxes, the (undiscounted) deferred tax accounts make it difficult for tax analysts to 
assess the timing of the firm’s future tax payments.  Section 7 discusses this issue in more detail. 
  If so, the firm should hold the 
asset, pay higher taxes, and report more tax expense on the income statement.  If a company were to 
follow this course of action, a naïve analysis of the information produced by AFIT might erroneously 
suggest that the firm’s tax planning is ineffective. 
To summarize, to the chagrin of tax researchers and other users of the financial statements who 
attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of a firm’s tax plans, financial statements are not designed for ideal 
evaluation of a company’s tax policy or even the full tax implications of a particular transaction.  
Although the financial statements provide users with substantial and important information about a firm’s 
tax situation, they do not provide all of the information that would be required to undertake a 
comprehensive review of the effectiveness of the firm’s tax planning.   
   
7.  Earnings Management  
The remainder of the paper examines existing AFIT research, identifies areas that warrant 
additional inquiry, and proposes extensions.  We begin with the primary area of AFIT empirical research, 
the study of whether, how, and why companies use GAAP-based tax accounts to manage earnings.  All 
but a handful of the studies in this area have focused on two specific tax accounts: the valuation 
allowance and the income tax contingency.  These studies look for evidence that managers manipulate 
these accounts in a manner consistent with achieving certain financial reporting objectives.
49
                                                 
48 See Scholes et al. (1990), Beatty et al. (1995), and Collins et al. (1995) for evidence that banks forgo tax 
reductions in cases where these reductions would adversely affect their regulatory positions. 
  In general, 
49 Note that when managers manipulate balance sheet accounts, an income statement account is affected by the same 
amount. In the context of AFIT research, the affected income statement account is the income tax expense account. 36 
 
the evidence suggests that managers use these accounts to meet (or beat) analysts’ forecasts, but not to 
meet (or beat) prior earnings or to smooth earnings.  
 
a.  Studies of Earnings Management Using the Valuation Allowance 
As discussed above, when managers believe that some or all of the future tax benefits of a 
deferred tax asset (DTA) will never be realized, they establish a valuation allowance account as an offset 
against the deferred tax asset account.  Before exploring whether firms manipulate these accounts to 
manage earnings, two early papers studied how firms compute the VA.  Behn et al. (1998) create proxies 
for the four sources of income that are supposed to be considered in estimating the VA.
50
Another early study, by Miller and Skinner (1998), hypothesizes that firms with (1) greater 
expected future taxable income and (2) more DTLs (relative to DTAs) should be more likely to realize 
their DTAs and thus should have smaller VA balances. They also hypothesize that firms with larger 
carryforwards should be less likely to realize their DTAs and thus should have larger VA balances.  
Miller and Skinner (1998) find support for these hypotheses, which they test by determining the amount 
of DTLs the firm has relative to their DTAs, an association between future taxable income and the portion 
of the firms’ DTAs that are attributable to loss and/or credit carryforwards because tax law places time 
limitations on the realization of these tax benefits.  We note that Miller and Skinner (1998)’s support for 
the association between the VA and expected future taxable income is weak.  They do find a very strong 
association between the VA and the amount of the DTA attributable to carryforwards, indicating that 
limitations of carryforwards are a primary determinant of the valuation allowance. 
  They determine 
that all four sources of income are statistically significant determinants of the VA balance (as a 
percentage of the DTA balance) in 1993, although the income sources explain less than half of the 
variation in the VA account, suggesting that other factors are also at work. 
                                                 
50 Recall from Section 4 that GAAP lists four possible sources of income that managers should consider when they 
estimate how much of the DTA will not be recovered: (1) future reversals of existing taxable temporary differences, 
(2) future taxable income, (3) taxable income in carryback periods, and (4) the existence of tax-planning strategies 
(FASB, 1992).   37 
 
A recent study by the Federal Reserve Board concludes that there is substantial variation in the 
practice of establishing valuation allowances (Lindo, 2009).  Surprised by the lack of increases in banks’ 
valuation allowances during the recent financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board reviewed the December 
31, 2008 audit working papers for 15 banks with DTAs.  The sample banks varied by asset size, coverage 
ratios, and financial strength and were audited by 10 different firms.  The Board found that most banks 
were not establishing a VA if positive taxable income was anticipated during the next two to six years.  At 
the extreme, two banks took the position that no VA was required if positive taxable income was expected 
within 10 years; notably, one of those banks failed soon thereafter.  The study also documented a wide 
range of approaches to estimating future taxable income. 
This considerable subjectivity in the determination of the VA suggests that it may be an attractive 
account for managing earnings.
51
Both Visvanathan (1998) and Miller and Skinner (1998) test the hypothesis that the change in the 
valuation allowance account is associated with managers’ incentives to smooth earnings.
  Since changes in the VA account typically flow through the income tax 
expense, manipulation of the VA account could be an effective means of earnings management.  On the 
other hand, to the extent managers wish to camouflage their earnings management, other accounts may 
dominate the VA because firms must report the amount of the VA in the footnotes to their financial 
statements.  In other words, the visibility of the VA may diminish its usefulness in earnings management.   
Research in this area examines a variety of possible earning management objectives including reporting 
smooth earnings, taking big baths, creating “cookie jar” reserves, and meeting various earnings targets.  
Largely, these studies provide little evidence that the valuation allowance is used to manage earnings with 
one exception: firms appear to use the VA to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. 
52  Both studies 
regress the change in the VA on the change in income.
53
                                                 
51 See Khalaf (1993) for a brief discussion of the subjectivity of the VA account. 
  They suggest that if managers use the VA to 
smooth earnings then the coefficient on the change in earnings should be positive because a positive 
52 Besides testing for earnings smoothing behavior, Miller and Skinner (1998) predict that highly levered firms are 
less likely to book a large VA because they have incentives to increase income. However, the authors find no 
support for this hypothesis.  
53 Visvanathan (1998) computes change in income excluding the effects of the change in the VA. 38 
 
(negative) change in earnings would result in an increase (decrease) in the VA.   Neither study finds 
results consistent with the smoothing hypothesis; thus, this evidence is not supportive of firms’ using the 
VA to smooth earnings.   
That said, there are several reasons why readers should be cautious in accepting these 
conclusions.
54
Three studies (Bauman et al. (2001), Christensen et al. (2008), and Frank and Rego (2006)) 
address the research question of whether firms use the VA to increase the magnitude of a big bath.
  First, both sample sizes are small.  Second, the samples include a narrow set of firms so it 
is not clear whether the results are generalizable.  Third, both samples cover only the two or three years 
immediately following the effective date of SFAS No. 109.  Specifically, Visvanathan (1998) examines 
105 (182) observations in 1993 (1994) from firms in the S&P 500 that had changes in their VA account.  
Attempting to focus on firms with large deferred tax asset balances, Miller and Skinner (1998) study 200 
observations of firms that took large other post-employment benefit charges upon the adoption of SFAS 
No. 106.  In addition,, the actual tests for smoothing (based on the coefficient on the change in earnings) 
are potentially problematic because more than one year of data is needed to construct a powerful test of 
smoothing.  Earnings smoothing is inherently a time series phenomenon.  A powerful test of smoothing 
would use many years (or quarters) of earnings data to examine the firm-specific pattern of earnings.   
55
                                                 
54 Miller and Skinner (1998, p. 232) acknowledge that their tests of earnings management are weak. 
  
Examining a limited sample of 62 firms, Bauman et al. (2001) find that the association between the 
income effect of the change in the VA and the amount of the loss (excluding the VA income effect) is 
consistent with a big bath story.  That is, firms appear to overstate the VA when they face large losses 
from other operations.  However, they cannot rule out a very likely alternative explanation, namely that 
firms with big losses are less likely to realize their DTAs and thus should increase their VA.  Christensen 
et al. (2008) take a different approach.  In an attempt to identify big-bath firms, they examine a sample of 
firms that reported large write-offs from 1996 through 1998.  They compute unexpected VA (scaled by 
DTA) using VA determinants identified by Behn et al. (1998) and Miller and Skinner (1998).  They then 
55 The term “big bath” refers to a scenario where the firm accelerates as many expenses as possible into the current 
year (and defers as much revenue as possible), with the goal of enhancing future profitability.  39 
 
compare the unexpected VA balances for their sample with the unexpected VA balances for a control 
sample of firms without large write-offs, matched on industry and size.  If the unexpected VA balances 
for their sample are larger than those for the control sample, they infer that firms are using the VA 
account to increase the magnitude of the big bath.  Results are mixed.  Thus, it is unclear whether the 
firms believed to be big-bath firms used the VA to decrease their income even more in the write-off year.  
Besides the problem of the alternative explanation of the results in Bauman et al. (2001), the analyses in 
both Bauman et al. (2001) and Christensen et al. (2008) are largely univariate, further limiting the 
conclusions that can be drawn.   
Frank and Rego (2006) provide a thorough and well-executed study that provides strong evidence 
that companies do not use the VA to enhance a big bath.  (We discuss Frank and Rego (2006) in more 
depth below.)  After joint evaluation of Bauman et al. (2001), Christensen et al. (2008), and Frank and 
Rego (2006), we conclude that the extant literature provides no conclusive evidence that mangers utilize 
the VA account to enhance the magnitude of a big bath. 
Schrand and Wong (2003) investigate whether firms use the VA account to create hidden 
reserves.  They examine whether banks (which tend to have large DTAs) created reserves when they 
initially set up their VA accounts at the adoption of SFAS No. 109.  They reason that in future years the 
bank could remove the reserves, reducing the VA account and increasing book earnings in the process.  In 
their tests, the authors regress the VA on disincentives for earnings management, as measured by 
inadequacy of a bank’s regulatory capital. If bank capital adequacy is low, the authors posit that banks are 
less likely to decrease current income by increasing the VA (which would thereby create hidden reserves).  
The authors find little evidence that banks established hidden reserves.  While the study is definitive with 
respect to banks, its generalizability is limited.   
Finally, three studies examine whether managers use the VA to meet (or beat) various earnings 
targets.  Frank and Rego (2006), Schrand and Wong (2003) and Bauman et al. (2001) test whether firms 
use the VA to meet (or beat) prior earnings and analysts’ forecasts.  Frank and Rego (2006) and Bauman 
et al. (2001) also test whether firms use the VA to avoid reporting a loss.   40 
 
Schrand and Wong (2003) find that banks use changes in the VA account to meet both prior 
earnings targets and analysts’ forecast targets, though the latter result is weaker.  In contrast, Bauman et 
al. (2001), in their study of 62 Fortune 500 firms that reported a change in VA during 1995-1997, find no 
evidence that managers use the VA to meet positive earnings or prior earnings.  However, they do find 
some evidence that managers use the VA to meet analysts’ forecasts.   
Frank and Rego (2006) examine 2,243 firm-years from 1993 through 2002 to test for earnings 
management in the form of meeting earnings targets.  They first regress the VA on previously identified 
determinants of the VA account.  The residual is their measure of the unexpected (or discretionary) 
change in VA.  They then regress the unexpected VA change on three measures of the amount by which 
the adjusted earnings of the firm (i.e., the earnings excluding the income effect of the discretionary 
change in the VA) miss the first target, positive earnings.  They repeat the process for three measures of 
prior earnings and analysts’ forecasts.  This results in nine independent variables (3 measures for each of 
3 targets).  For each target, they include three categorical variables that indicate adjusted earnings are: (1) 
below the target by a large amount, (2) below the target by a small amount; or (3) above the target by a 
large amount. 
Frank and Rego’s (2006) predictions assume that firms will overstate the VA if pre-managed 
earnings are higher than the target and understate the VA if pre-managed earnings are lower than the 
target.  For example, if the firm uses the VA account to provide a small boost to earnings to meet the 
target, then the coefficients on the indicator variables that measure whether the adjusted earnings are 
slightly below the target will be negative since firms will be decreasing the VA in order to increase 
earnings.  Based on these tests, Frank and Rego (2006) find no evidence that the VA is used to avoid 
losses or to meet earnings targets based on prior earnings.  They do, however, find strong evidence that 
managers use the VA to meet (or beat) analysts’ forecasts.  Given the comprehensive nature of the Frank 
and Rego (2006) study, we conclude that managers do not use the VA to avoid losses or to meet prior 
earnings targets but that they do use the VA account to manage towards analysts’ forecasts.  Banks, 41 
 
however, may be different, given Schrand and Wong’s (2003) finding that banks manage towards prior 
earnings.   
To summarize, the VA-earnings management studies provide somewhat mixed evidence as to 
whether managers use the VA account to manipulate earnings.  There is no evidence consistent with 
smoothing behavior; however, recall that there is room for sample composition and other empirical 
improvements in this area.  While there is mixed evidence that firms use the VA to increase their losses in 
a big bath, the most comprehensive study, Frank and Rego (2006) concludes that the VA is not used in 
this manner.  Similarly, there is limited evidence that managers use the VA to avoid losses and meet prior 
earnings.  Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is the only setting where there is consistent evidence that 
nonfinancial managers use the VA to manage earnings.
56
 
  Finally, we note that these overall findings are 
consistent with Raedy and Wilson (2009) who find that managers use earnings discretion to achieve 
analysts’ forecast targets (as opposed to other forms of earnings management) when the firms’ primary 
stakeholders are equity investors (as is the case in the United States).  
b.  Studies of Earnings Management Using the Tax Contingency Account 
Scholars also study the uncertain tax contingency account for evidence of earnings management.  
As discussed in section 5, the “cushion” is booked when a company takes an uncertain tax position on its 
tax return.  The contingency balance is an estimate of how much the company will ultimately remit to the 
government related to the aggressive tax position taken.  Since this estimate is subjective, it could allow 
for considerable manipulation. 
                                                 
56 The papers in this section address the use of the tax accounts to manage earnings.  A related literature, which is 
beyond the scope of this paper, explores the usefulness of the tax accounts to detect earnings management.  Some 
examples include Phillips et al. (2003), who test whether the use of the deferred tax expense balance can help 
identify earnings management behavior incremental to using various existing accrual models to identify earnings 
management. They find that it can.  Phillips et al. (2004) follow by examining which of the components of deferred 
tax expense are incrementally useful in identifying earnings management behavior.  Building on these two papers, 
Joos et al. (2005) (2005) add that consideration of the level and change of deferred taxes can indicate both the 
conditions under which earnings management is more likely (when book income is smaller than taxable income) and 
the strategies that managers use to achieve certain earnings targets.   42 
 
Gupta and Laux (2008) use footnote disclosures from 2003 to 2005 (before FIN 48) to test 
whether companies reduced their tax cushion to meet or beat prior earnings and analysts’ forecasts.
57
A strength of this paper is that it uses pre-FIN 48 data.  Since the passage of FIN 48 (and thus the 
requirement that firms disclose their contingency balances) could cause a change in behavior, this is a 
useful analysis.  A limitation of the paper is that before FIN 48 firms self-selected into disclosing the 
contingency.  In an attempt to address this endogeneity, the authors utilize a two-stage analysis, with the 
first stage modeling the decision to disclose.     
   
From a random sample of 100 companies in the Fortune 500, they identify firm-quarters during which 
reversals in the tax contingency were reported.  (Note that a reversal of the tax contingency results in an 
increase in income).  They regress the amount of the cushion reversal on the amount by which earnings 
(adjusted for the amount of the cushion reversal) are less than the earnings target.  The authors infer that 
firms manage the contingency account to beat analysts’ forecasts.   
  To our knowledge, no paper directly tests whether the contingency account is used to manage 
earnings post-FIN 48.  However, some indirect evidence about earnings management can be gleaned from 
Blouin et al. (forthcoming).  As discussed above, Blouin et al. (forthcoming) examine the number of 
settlements made with the IRS during the period between enactment and adoption of FIN 48, as well as 
the number and amount of reserves that were reduced during this period.  When firms adopted FIN 48 (as 
of January 1, 2007 for calendar year-end firms), these companies had to adjust their contingency in 
accordance with the new rules under FIN 48 and they had to adjust their beginning shareholder’s equity 
by the same amount.  However, if firms adjusted their contingency in 2006 before FIN 48 became 
effective, then changes in the contingency balance flowed through income with a decrease (increase) in 
                                                 
57 Blouin and Tuna (2007) (2007) also attempt to test for earnings management of the contingency before FIN 48.  
The problem that they faced, and a key reason why scholars had shied away from studying this interesting question, 
is that before FIN 48, the cushion disclosure was not required.  Thus, it had to be estimated, and any error in the 
estimate could potentially render the study’s findings meaningless.  Blouin and Tuna (2007) (2007) measure the 
cushion as the difference between the current tax expense and the current tax liability with adjustments for stock 
options deductions.  As evidence that they measure the cushion with error, for a small subsample of firms that 
disclosed their contingency balance, they find the correlation between the disclosed amount and the cushion amount 
that they estimated is only 40%. 43 
 
the contingency increasing (decreasing) earnings.  Thus, firms facing a decrease in their cushion had an 
earnings-based incentive to decrease the contingency in 2006.  If they had waited until 2007, the 
adjustment would have flowed directly to their opening equity balance without affecting net income.  
Blouin et al. (forthcoming) find limited evidence that IRS settlements were associated with earnings 
management behavior.  A logit analysis of the probability of settlement finds marginal evidence that a 
firm would have settled in the period between enactment and adoption, if the analysts’ forecasts would 
have been missed without a reduction in tax expense.  They find no evidence that they reduce the reserve 
account to meet analysts’ forecasts.   
Testing for earnings management through the contingency account is not the primary purpose of 
Blouin et al. (forthcoming) and thus it is unfair to criticize their paper for its shortcomings in shedding 
light on earnings management.  However, in the spirit of learning from their work, note that Blouin et al. 
(forthcoming) suffers from at least three weaknesses.  First, the earnings management tests are somewhat 
weak.  In particular, the measures used to capture the incentive to manage earnings (primarily a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm would have missed the analysts’ forecasts without a reduction in the tax 
expense) do not consider whether the reduction in the reserve balance actually allowed the firm to meet 
the forecast.  The reason for this omission is that the actual decrease in the reserve account is not always 
included in the disclosures.  Second, the sample size is only 100 firms, limiting the study’s 
generalizability.  Third, this is a study that is primarily about possible opportunistic behavior at adoption 
of the standard, rather than ongoing earnings management behavior, where the latter is of more ongoing 
interest.  In summary, we know little about the use of the tax contingency to manage earnings on an 




c.  Studies of Earnings Management Using the Discretion in Reporting the U.S. Tax 
Expense on Foreign Profits 
Another AFIT opportunity to manage earnings involves the reporting of U.S. taxes on foreign 
profits.  APB No. 23 (Accounting Principals Board, 1972) permits managers to choose between 
permanent or temporary treatment if the U.S. tax rate exceeds the local tax rate for the foreign 
subsidiary.
58  To elaborate, foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies pay income tax in the jurisdictions 
where they operate.  Their parent companies generally do not pay any U.S. taxes on these foreign 
earnings until the profits are repatriated to the parent as dividends.  If the profits are never repatriated, 
then U.S. taxes are never paid.
59
GAAP permits corporations to record the residual U.S. taxes in two ways.  The first creates a 
temporary difference, leaving the ETR unaffected.  Specifically, a firm estimates the U.S. tax that will be 
required at repatriation and accrues that income tax expense when it records the foreign earnings that will 
eventually trigger those U.S. taxes.  This matching treatment creates a temporary difference (i.e., a DTL is 
recorded).  A consequence of this option is reduced current after-tax book income.  However, in the year 
that the dividend is repatriated to the parent and the U.S. taxes are paid, after-tax book income is 
unaffected.   
   
A second option, if the firm does not expect to repatriate the profits in the foreseeable future, is to 
defer the expense until it decides to repatriate the funds.  When a company makes this choice, the foreign 
profits are termed permanently reinvested.  This deferral reduces the ETR because if the firm never 
repatriates, then it never pays the U.S. taxes.  In contrast to the first option (i.e., booking the expense on 
the residual U.S. tax liability), this option boosts after-tax book earnings when the foreign profits are 
earned (because it assumes that repatriation and the accrual of eventual U.S. taxes will never occur).  
                                                 
58 For further discussion of APB No. 23 and its implications for corporate behavior, see Collins et al. (2001), Krull 
(2004), Shackelford et al. (2009) (2009), Blouin and Krull (2009), Dharmapala et al. (2009) (2009), Graham et al. 
(2009) (2009), Schultz and Fogarty (2009), and Wunder (2009). 
59 Even upon repatriation, no U.S. taxes would be required if foreign tax credits offset any U.S. taxes due upon 
repatriation.  Since foreign tax credits and other details about U.S. taxation of foreign profits are complex and 
beyond the scope of this paper, we assume for this discussion that at least some U.S. taxes are due at repatriation. 45 
 
However, the downside of this choice is that the after-tax book income falls by the amount of the 
estimated U.S. residual tax in the period if expectations change and the firm eventually repatriates the 
foreign profits.  
Wunder (2009) shows that the amount of permanently reinvested foreign earnings (PRE) has 
grown rapidly in recent years.  She finds that, as of year-end 2008, 273 firms in the Fortune 500 reported 
some amount of PRE.  The total PRE for her companies is $1.02 trillion, led by General Electric at $75 
billion.  The 2008 total far exceeds Albring et al.’s (2005) estimate of $381 million of PRE in 2002 for 
296 Standard & Poor’s 500 firms.  Wunder’s (2009) average of $3.74 billion per firm is over seven times 
the $485 million mean reported by Krull (2004) is her study of Compustat firms in the 1990s.   
The growth in PRE is particularly noteworthy because a large amount of PRE was eliminated 
through the large repatriations during the tax holiday provided by the American Jobs Creation Act of 
2004.
60
Examining the 50 largest U.S. companies, based on 2008 market capitalization, we find that their 
aggregate PRE in 2008 was $610 billion.  The mean, median and standard deviation of PRE as a 
percentage of market capitalization is 15%, and the maximum is Pfizer’s ratio =of 67%.  PRE exceeds 
one-third of market capitalization for three other pharmaceuticals (Merck, Bristol-Myers-Squibb, and Eli 
Lilly) and General Electric.   
  On the other hand, since PRE was one of the factors that determined the amount of foreign 
earnings that was subject to the favorable holiday rates in the 2004 Act, managers may be classifying as 
PRE as much foreign profits as possible so that their total PRE is as large as possible in the future.  In 
other words, if managers believe that tax rates will be temporarily lowered in the future and PRE will be a 
factor in determining the amount of dividends that can enjoy the low rate, they have an incentive to 
overstate PRE now.     
To our knowledge, Krull (2004) is the only empirical study that examines whether firms manage 
earnings by exploiting the GAAP discretion in reporting permanently reinvested foreign earnings.  Krull 
                                                 
60 The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 provided a one-time U.S. tax rate of 5.25% on dividends from foreign 
subsidiaries (see Blouin and Krull (2009), for more details).  An IRS study of actual corporate tax returns estimates 
that the legislation led to the repatriation of $362 billion of foreign earnings (Redmiles, 2008). 46 
 
advances four reasons why firms may manage earnings by exploiting the discretion in recording residual 
taxes paid to the IRS.  First, the computation of the permanently reinvested portion of foreign earnings 
forces managers to exercise considerable judgment.  Second, changes in the permanently reinvested 
account have no cash flow implications.  Third, investors may have difficulty detecting earnings 
management via this account because there is limited public information about a firm’s foreign 
operations.
61
Krull’s (2004) conclusions rest critically on assuming that the tax information in the financial 
statements reveals the actual tax position of the firm, which is problematic as discussed in section 6.  Her 
tests rely on the assumption that those companies whose foreign ETR (current foreign tax expense to 
foreign profits over the last five years) is less than the U.S. statutory rate are the only firms’ managing 
earnings through the permanently reinvested foreign earnings account.  This is a reasonable assumption 
because other firms could offset any residual U.S. taxes with excess foreign tax credits.  However, it is 
not clear whether the tax footnotes provide enough information to identify the firms that will face 
repatriation taxes.  As an example of the potential inadequacy of the data, the foreign ETR aggregates all 
foreign taxes and profits in the current year, whether from dividend-paying subsidiaries or other entities; 
however, the foreign tax credits are based on past and current taxes paid by the subsidiary remitting 
dividends and computed in the year of repatriation.  In short, Krull (2004) is an example of research that 
relies crucially on AFIT to provide information about the actual taxes of the firm; whether the tax 
information in the financial statements is adequate for this task is unclear.  
  Fourth, the amount of unrepatriated foreign earnings (potentially subject to earnings 
management) is large.  Consistent with her predictions that firms manage earnings by using their 
discretion in recording residual taxes, Krull (2004) shows that year-to-year changes in the amounts 
reported as permanently reinvested foreign earnings from 1993 to 1999 are positively related to the 
difference between analysts’ forecasts and pre-managed earnings.   
                                                 
61 This difficulty in detecting earnings management does not exist in all countries.  The disclosure requirements in 
some countries (especially, European countries) provide substantial information about a firm’s foreign operations.    47 
 
Collins et al. (2001) test whether the market can see through this APB No. 23 earnings 
management option.  They examine the tax footnotes of the financial statements for firms that have 
classified at least some of their foreign profits as permanently reinvested.  They find that the market 
values the permanently reinvested foreign earnings net of tax, i.e., as though the firm will eventually 
repatriate the profits and pay any residual U.S. taxes.
62
Collins et al. (2001) potentially suffers from self-selection.  Under SFAS No. 109, firms are not 
required to disclose a residual tax if it is “not practicable” to determine the amount, a position that 26% of 
their sample takes.  Since Collins et al. (2001) cannot observe the unrecognized residual taxes for these 
firms, they cannot reject the proposition that these firms are successfully managing their earnings through 
this APB 23 reporting option.  Collins et al. (2001) also is subject to other design problems because it 
employs a price level regression model.  As discussed in Barth et al. (2001), several studies identify a host 
of econometric concerns with price level regression models including measurement error, coefficient bias, 
inefficient standard errors, and cross-sectional differences in valuation parameters.  While this same 
literature provides solutions to many of these problems, Collins et al. (2001) generally do not make use of 
these techniques.  Thus, their analysis could produce misleading implications. 
  Since it appears that the market can undo this type 
of earnings management, this suggests that either managers are unaware of the market’s ability to see-
through this management technique or managers use this earnings management option to achieve non-
equity market goals.   
To summarize, presently only a very limited amount of research addresses whether and why 
managers exploit the discretion under APB 23 to manage earnings.  The inference drawn from Krull 
(2004) is similar to those inferences drawn from the other AFIT earnings management studies, i.e., firms 
are more likely to defer recognition of the residual taxes if deferral better enables them to meet analysts’ 
forecasts. 
                                                 
62 De Waegenaere and Sansing (2008) analyze the role of the deferred tax liability in relation to the amount of 
permanently reinvested foreign earnings. They find that the valuation effects depend on whether the foreign earnings 
are invested in operating assets (which the authors argue would  have no effect on firm value) or financial assets. If 
financial assets, the authors argue that there is some effect on firm value, but the book value sometimes overstates 
the effect of the liability on firm value. 48 
 
 
d.  Other Studies 
The papers discussed above study specific tax accounts in search of evidence of earnings 
management.  Another approach is to investigate settings where earnings management is suspected and 
then look for patterns in the tax expense consistent with earnings management, without specifying the 
balance sheet account that is being manipulated.  Although knowing the specific balance sheet account 
through which manipulation is occurring is important, the evidence about whether firms manage earnings 
through the tax accounts is sufficiently wanting that we find merit in any documentation of AFIT earnings 
management.     
An example of this approach is Dhaliwal et al. (2004).  They reason that since the income tax 
expense is usually the final account determined in the financial statement preparation process, it provides 
an important “last chance” to manage earnings.  Dhaliwal et al. (2004) examine data from 1986 to 1999 to 
determine whether companies use the income tax expense account to meet analysts’ forecasts in the 
fourth quarter.  They find a negative association between the difference in the fourth quarter and the third 
quarter ETRs and the amount by which the firm would have missed its earnings forecast at the end of the 
year if earnings had not been managed.
63 Their findings are consistent with managers manipulating tax 
expense down (thus, increasing net income and decreasing the ETR) when the pre-managed earnings 
would fall short of the forecasted earnings.
64  Dhaliwal et al. (2004) do not attempt to identify the specific 
balance sheet account through which earnings management occurs.
65
                                                 
63 The pre-managed fourth quarter earnings is computed as actual pretax income * (1 – third quarter ETR).  
 
64 Comprix et al. (2009) (2009) find that first quarter ETRs are on average the highest of the year and that ETRs 
decline monotonically through the year. The authors interpret this as being consistent with building slack in the ETR 
estimate that can be used to manage (increase) earnings later in the year.  Bauman and Shaw (2005) find that on 
average changes in interim ETRs help predict an opposite signed movement in next quarter earnings during their 
1994 to 2001 sample; however, they find the perplexing result that small increases in ETRs lead to large increases in 
next quarter earnings, while large increases in ETRs lead to lower next quarter earnings. 
65 Two studies test for changes in earnings management following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  Cook et al. (2008) 
extend Dhaliwal et al. (2004), testing whether this usefulness of the tax accounts to achieve “last chance” earnings 
management changed with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  They find that the earnings management discovered in 
Dhaliwal et al. (2004) is greater in firms that pay higher tax-related fees to their auditors and that this result did not 
change after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted.  They also find that among firms that pay no tax-related fees to their 
auditors, those that would miss their earnings forecasts utilize this form of earnings management more than for those 49 
 
Gleason and Mills (2008) conclude that the market mostly sees through the manipulation 
documented in Dhaliwal et al. (2004).  They measure the market reaction to the unexpected earnings of 
firms that beat the analysts’ forecasts without manipulating their tax expense.  Gleason and Mills (2008) 
then measure the market reaction to the unexpected earnings of firms that beat the analysts’ forecasts by 
manipulating their tax expense.  Comparing the two measures and controlling for abnormal accruals, they 
interpret a weaker market reaction to the manipulated unexpected earnings as evidence that the market 
sees through managerial manipulation of the tax expense account.  Nonetheless, it is puzzling why 
managers manage tax expense to meet analyst forecasts at all, if the market sees through almost all of the 
manipulation.   
Gordon and Joos (2004) identify another setting where the tax expense may be a prime candidate 
for earnings management.  The U.K. once employed a partial method of accounting for deferred taxes.  
Under the partial method, the financial statements only recognize deferred tax balances that are expected 
to reverse in the foreseeable future.  Thus, managers have some discretion in choosing which deferred 
taxes to record.  By not recording DTLs (DTAs), a company can increase (decrease) income and equity.  
Gordon and Joos (2004) find that managers of British firms opportunistically used their discretion to 
manage their leverage (through increasing equity) but not to smooth earnings.  While it is useful and 
interesting to know that firms did manipulate the tax accounts under the U.K.’s former accounting rules, it 
is not clear whether these results generalize to the less flexible AFIT rules under U.S. GAAP and IFRS.   
 
e.  Summary 
In general, evidence indicates that the tax accounts are used to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, 
but they are not used for other forms of earnings management.  Specifically, the general studies of 
earnings management, which do not look at specific balance sheet accounts, indicate that managers do use 
                                                                                                                                                             
that would not miss their forecasts.  This result does not hold after the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Gleason et al. (2007) 
(2007) also examine changes around the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  After studying cross-firm changes in earnings 
management following passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, they conclude that its mandated internal control reforms 
successfully reduced tax-accrual earnings management. 50 
 
the tax accounts to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.  Likewise, studies of the VA, the tax contingency, and 
the discretion in reporting foreign profits, indicate that these tax accounts are used primarily to meet or 
beat analysts’ forecasts.  However, there does not seem to be much evidence that managers use the tax 
accounts to smooth earnings, increase a big bath, avoid losses, or meet/beat prior earnings. 
In summary: 
•  Multiple studies report that managers manage the valuation allowance account to meet analysts’ 
forecasts, but do not appear to use it for other forms of earnings management. 
•  At least one study reports that firms: 
o  Manage the tax contingency account to meet analysts’ forecasts and prior earnings targets 
but not to smooth earnings; 
o  With over-reserved contingency balances did reduce the contingency balance in 2006 
(immediately before FIN 48), thereby increasing earnings; 
o  Choose an amount of permanently reinvested foreign earnings to meet analysts’ 
forecasts; 
o  Manipulate tax expense downwards in the fourth quarter to meet analysts’ forecasts. 
 
f.   Future Research in Earnings Management 
Given that earnings management is alleged to be rampant among the tax accounts but the 
empirical evidence is hardly overwhelming, we see many avenues for additional study in this area.  We 
close this section by highlighting some questions that remain unresolved:  
•  Does the lack of consensus about whether managers use the tax accounts to meet or beat prior 
earnings stem from which measure of prior earnings is being used as the benchmark?  Both 
Bauman et al. (2001) and Frank and Rego (2006) use prior year earnings as the benchmark and 
find no result consistent with this type of earnings management in the VA account.  However, 
Schrand and Wong (2003) find that the valuation allowance is used as hypothesized when they 
define the prior earnings benchmark as the three-year historical average.  In addition, Gupta and 51 
 
Laux (2008) find that tax cushion reversals are used to meet or beat prior earnings when they 
define prior earnings as earnings from the same quarter, one year previous.  Graham et al. (2005) 
report, for example, that while 85.1% of surveyed executives indicated that EPS from the same 
quarter in the prior year is an important benchmark, only 54.2% responded that the previous 
quarter EPS was an important benchmark. 
•  Why do managers not exploit the subjectivity in the tax accounts to facilitate big baths? 
•  The pre-FIN 48 earnings management studies related to the tax contingency had to be conducted 
using estimates of the contingency.  Now that superior information about the contingency is 
available, the use of the tax contingency to manage earnings should be revisited. 
•  Have the increased disclosures that are required under FIN 48 affected the earnings management 
behavior of firms?  In particular, has it decreased the use of the tax expense account to manage 
earnings?  If so, are firms now using other income statement accounts instead of the tax expense 
line item, or has total earnings management decreased? 
•  What role does the tax expense line item play in earnings management, given its location on the 
income statement?  Analysts and investors may be more interested in earnings reported above tax 
expense in the income statement, e.g., operating income (Robinson, forthcoming), EBITDA 
(Dyreng, 2009), or other accounts (Lipe, 1986).  If so, even though the tax accounts enjoy 
relatively high levels of subjectivity and opaqueness and may be the last accounts closed 
(Dhaliwal et al. (2004); Gleason et al. (2007))—characteristics that would make them attractive 
for managing earnings—managers would find them  less effective for managing earnings than 
accounts reported higher on the income statement.
66
•  Given the discretion permitted under APB No. 23, surprisingly few papers analyze this option to 
defer recognition of the residual U.S. tax on foreign earnings.  Graham et al. (2009) present 
  Can analysts and the market see through 
earnings management of the tax accounts? 
                                                 
66 Consistent with a pre-tax account focus, Nelson et al.’s (2003) survey of auditors finds that only a few of the 
actual earnings management schemes detected by auditors involve the income tax expense account. 52 
 
evidence that managers value the ability to defer the recognition of the residual U.S. taxes 
statistically as much as they value the ability to defer the actual cash payments.  Furthermore, this 
earnings management option likely will become more popular as foreign earnings become an 
increasingly large proportion of U.S. firms’ profits and as long as U.S. tax rates exceed those of 
most of its trading partners.  Together, these developments lead us to encourage further study in 
this area.    
•  Krull (2004) analyzes firms from 1993 to 1999.  She acknowledges that annual changes in the 
permanently reinvested foreign earnings account might “…raise suspicion with auditors…”  
Sarbanes-Oxley, FIN 48 and other regulatory changes have altered the practice of auditing.  We 
would be interested to know whether firms still manipulate the permanently reinvested foreign 
earnings amount to manage earnings in the current auditing environment. 
•  Besides earnings management, the option under APB No. 23 to lower the ETR provides 
researchers with an opportunity to study the importance that managers place on the ETR. 
•  Gleason and Mills (2008) report that the market sees through the management of the tax accounts.  
If so, why do firms manage the tax accounts to meet earnings forecasts?  Do managers believe 
they can fool the market?  If not, why are managers manipulating the tax accounts (and likely 
other accounts) to meet analysts’ forecasts, rather than other targets, which might be used in 
contracting?    
 
8.  The Pricing of Tax Information Reported in the Financial Statements 
The earliest AFIT studies assessed whether the market uses tax information to set prices.  The 
pricing of tax information continues to be an active area of research.  This section reviews the market-
related literature and highlights important unresolved issues.  In general, the evidence is consistent with 
the market impounding financial statement information about taxes. 
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a.   Deferred Tax Accounts 
i.  Empirical Studies 
Several early papers at least tangentially address the pricing of deferred tax accounts.  Beaver and 
Dukes (1972) determine that a measure of earnings that includes tax-related deferrals has a higher 
association with market returns than does a measure of earnings that excludes these deferrals.  Rayburn 
(1986) finds that the tax accrual provides information to the market that is incremental to cash flow 
information.  Similarly, Chaney and Jeter (1994) find that the deferred tax component of earnings 
provides information to the market incremental to that provided by income computed without the deferred 
tax component. 
Recent research focuses on two approaches to determine whether the market prices the deferred 
tax accounts.  The first approach used by Amir et al. (1997), Amir and Sougiannis (1999), Ayers (1998), 
and Dhaliwal et al. (2000), is a levels approach.  These studies include some measure of the level of 
market equity as the dependent variable and measures of the deferred tax accounts (along with other 
balance sheet variables) as explanatory variables.  Amir et al. (1997) provides perhaps the most 
comprehensive analysis of this issue.  They test whether the market prices components of the deferred tax 
accounts differently depending on when they are likely to reverse.  Using hand-collected data for a 
subsample of the Fortune 500 from 1992 to 1994, they regress market price on seven components of the 
deferred tax balance: (1) depreciation and amortization, (2) losses, credits and carryforwards, (3) 
restructuring charges, (4) environmental charges, (5) employee benefits, (6) valuation allowance, and (7) 
all others.  They report that the components are priced as though the market discounts the value of the 
deferred tax account based on its likelihood of and length of time until settlement.  For example, the 
market assigns the highest value to the deferred tax balances arising from restructuring charges, consistent 
with the deferred tax balances associated with restructuring charges reversing more quickly than other 
timing differences, such as depreciation.  They also find that the VA coefficient is only significant in one 
of the three years they study, consistent with the market assigning a lower value to the VA because of its 
high level of subjectivity. 54 
 
Amir and Sougiannis (1999) focus on the DTAs that arise from loss and credit carryforwards.  
They study how analysts (investors) use the DTAs from carryforwards in determining their forecasts 
(setting prices).  In general, they find that both the market and analysts view earnings as less persistent for 
firms with carryforwards, although the market evidence is somewhat mixed.  Both the market and 
analysts consider firms that have reported a VA to have even less persistent earnings and they both value 
the carryforward piece of the DTA as a true economic asset.  Tests of whether the market prices the VA 
are inconclusive, but the evidence suggests that analysts do not behave as if the VA is a reduction in the 
deferred tax asset.  Finally, the authors report that analysts’ accuracy is unaffected by the existence of 
DTAs attributable to carryforwards.
67
Ayers (1998) also performs a levels regression with market value of equity as the dependent 
variable and the DTA, DTL and VA balances included as explanatory variables.
 
68
                                                 
67 Amir and Sougiannis (1999), Amir et al. (1997) and Ayers (1998) regress stock prices on various accounting 
variables.  They report estimated regression coefficients greater than 1.0 for deferred tax assets and the valuation 
allowance, implying that the market-to-book ratios for these accounts exceed one.  This finding is surprising because 
the failure to discount the deferred tax accounts would be expected to cause the book value to exceed the market 
value.  De Waegenaere et al. (2003) advance an explanation for these empirical findings.  Modeling the valuation 
effects of firms with tax loss carryforwards, they compare the book value of the deferred tax asset (net of its 
valuation allowance) associated with a net operating loss carryover with the effect of the carryover on firm value. 
They argue that the book value could be higher or lower than the economic value because firm value reflects the 
discounted mean value, while GAAP records the undiscounted median value (The authors interpret the GAAP rule 
that the valuation allowance is recorded when the probability is 50% or higher that a tax benefit will not be realized 
to mean that firms report the 50
th percentile value, i.e., the median, net DTA amount.)  If taxable income is 
positively skewed (so that the mean exceeds the median), then the market value should exceed the book value. 
   He finds the 
coefficients are negative for the DTL and VA balances and are positive for the DTA balances.  This is 
consistent with the market separately using the information in the DTAs, the DTLs, and the creation of 
the VA in a manner that is consistent with tax obligations reducing firm value.  However, the fact that 
68 Ayers (1998) also examines whether the tax accounts are more value-relevant under SFAS 109 (adopted by FASB 
in 1992) than APB No. 11.  The new AFIT pronouncement required firms to separate their DTAs from their DTLs 
in their footnote disclosures.  In addition, the pronouncement established the VA.  Ayers (1998) compares the value 
relevance of the deferred tax accounts reported under APB No. 11 with those reported under SFAS No. 109.  He 
finds that the deferred tax accounts under SFAS No. 109 are priced incrementally to the deferred tax accounts that 
were reported under the old regime.   55 
 
Ayers (1998) finds the VA balance to be associated with market equity values is counter to the evidence 
in Amir et al. (1997).
69
Finally, unlike the previously discussed studies, which assess whether the market values the 
deferred tax accounts that appear on the balance sheet, Dhaliwal et al. (2000) test whether the market 
prices off-balance sheet DTLs.  The off-balance sheet DTL that they study arises from the LIFO 
conformity rule, which states that firms must use LIFO for book purposes if they use it for tax purposes.  
The authors contend that even if a firm reports its financial statements using LIFO, investors may value 
the firm’s inventory using FIFO (assuming FIFO is more relevant).  This is possible because required 
disclosures permit investors to adjust from LIFO to FIFO.  If the market makes this inventory-increasing 
off-balance sheet adjustment in an inflationary environment (under inflation, FIFO produces higher 
inventory costs than does LIFO), then the market also may impute an off-balance sheet increase to their 
valuation of the DTL.  Regressing the firm’s market value on an estimate of the off-balance sheet DTL, 
Dhaliwal et al. (2000) find that the market does price these off-balance sheet DTLs. 
  
To summarize, the “levels” analyses provide consistent evidence that the market prices the 
deferred tax accounts, with the exception of the VA.  The evidence on the VA is mixed.  However, there 
are at least two important issues to consider.  First, all three of the studies that examine the on-balance 
sheet deferred tax accounts use data from 1992, 1993 and 1994, which was when SFAS No. 109 was 
enacted.
70
                                                 
69 Kumar and Visvanathan (2003) contend that, although a change in the VA is embedded in earnings, the VA might 
be incrementally informative because decisions about the VA involve judgments about the amount, timing, and 
sources of future taxable income.  Consistent with this argument, they report that the market does find changes in the 
VA account to be incrementally informative.  However, it is unclear whether their findings can be generalized 
because they limit their sample to those firms whose changes in the VA account are disclosed to the media. 
  The generalizability of these studies is in question both because the sample sizes are small and 
because, during the years examined, the market likely was still learning how to impound these complex 
footnote disclosures.  Second, as detailed in section 7, because these papers employ price level regression 
models, they potentially face substantial econometric shortcomings that may undermine their findings. 
70 SFAS No. 109 was required for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1992.  Some firms adopted it a year 
early. 56 
 
The second approach for determining whether the market prices the deferred tax accounts is to 
examine the change in their pricing around the change of corporate tax rates.  For example, Givoly and 
Hayn (1992) use the 1986 reduction in the corporate tax rate from 46% to 34% to test the pricing of DTLs 
during the APB No. 11 era.  Since the 1986 legislation reduced future cash outlays, it should have 
increased the value of the firms.  Furthermore, if the market viewed DTLs as “real” liabilities (i.e., taxes 
to be paid in the future), then the change in the firm’s stock price should have been correlated with the 
amount of a firm’s DTLs (since those future tax payments would be less after the reduction in the 
corporate tax rate).  Givoly and Hayn (1992) find that the market does price DTLs as liabilities.  
Specifically, the abnormal returns of the firms in their sample are positively associated with the amount of 
DTL, consistent with the market anticipating that the DTLs would reverse when the tax rates fell. They 
also find that the market reaction is smaller for firms that were less likely to realize their DTL and also 
smaller for firms that had a longer expected period until reversal.  One potential problem with this study 
is that it does not include a measure of unexpected earnings as an explanatory variable.  Thus, coefficients 
could be biased if unexpected earnings are correlated with the change in the deferred tax accounts due to 
the tax rate change. 
Unlike APB No. 11 (Accounting Principles Board, 1967), when the corporate statutory tax rate 
changes under SFAS No. 109, the deferred tax balances must be recomputed using the new corporate 
statutory tax rate in the year of the tax law change, and income is adjusted accordingly in that period.  For 
example, under APB No. 11, the deferred tax balances were not altered when the statutory corporate tax 
rate fell from 46% to 34% in 1986.  If SFAS No. 109 had applied in 1986, the DTLs (DTAs) would have 
been revalued under the new lower rate and the change would have increased (decreased) current income.   
In 1993, corporate statutory tax rates increased from 34% to 35%, increasing DTLs (DTAs) and 
decreasing (increasing) current period income.  Chen and Schoderbek (2000) test whether analysts 
(investors) impounded this higher rate change into their forecasts (prices) before firms released their 
earnings.  They find no evidence that analysts or investors accounted for this information, even though 
analysts and the market should have been able to estimate the expected adjustment based on the firms’ 57 
 
current balance in their deferred tax accounts.  Their results could be interpreted as being consistent with 
an inefficiency on the part of analysts and the market.
71
 In summary, much of the AFIT pricing literature examines the extent to which the market values 
the deferred tax accounts.  With the possible exception of the VA account, the studies consistently show 
that the market impounds information from the deferred tax accounts into prices.  The studies also show 
that the pricing of the tax account components varies in predictable ways with the likelihood of settlement 
and the length of time until reversal.  However, it should be noted that most of these results are based on 
price level type regressions and thus should be interpreted with caution. 
  Alternatively, since the statutory rate change in 
1993 was only one percentage point, their tests may not have had adequate power to detect a response. In 
addition, the sample size of 158 is quite small, limiting the generalizability of the inferences. 
 
ii.  Theoretical Studies 
Three theoretical papers grapple with the valuation of deferred tax accounts.  The primary finding 
is that under certain circumstances the deferred tax accounts should not be discounted to reflect the length 
of time until the reversal. This implication stands in contrast to Givoly and Hayn (1992) and Amir et al. 
(1997) who present empirical evidence that the timing of the reversal matters. Sansing (1998), the first of 
these theoretical papers, evaluates whether DTLs should have any valuation effects given that DTLs are 
not discounted and may never reverse.  He demonstrates that the value of the DTL component related to 
depreciation is a specific fraction of the reported DTL component, thus providing theoretical support for 
the notion that DTLs should be valued at their full book value.
72
Guenther and Sansing (2000) extend Sansing (1998).  They demonstrate that if (a) the assets and 
liabilities that support the deferred tax accounts are reported at their present values, and (b) the tax 
deductions are taken on a cash basis, then the DTLs and DTAs should be valued at their reported 
 
                                                 
71 Chen and Schoderbek (2000) find that this mispricing was more severe for firms with an income-increasing 
adjustment and for firms that did not disclose the adjustment in their earnings release.  They do not find that the 
severity of the mispricing varies with the level of institutional holdings.  
72 The fraction is the tax depreciation rate divided by the sum of the tax depreciation rate and the cost of capital. 58 
 
amounts.  If those two conditions do not hold, then the DTLs and DTAs should be valued less than their 
reported amounts.  The authors also show that the anticipated reversal of the deferred tax accounts should 
not affect their value.  
Guenther and Sansing (2004) focus on the relevance of the reversal.  Evaluating the DTL that 
arises from BTDs in depreciation, they show that the value of the DTL is not a function of the expected 
time to reversal.  Their explanation is that the timing of reversal can only affect valuation if it has cash 
flow implications.  Since the rate of reversal is a function of book depreciation and has no cash flow 
implications, it should not have valuation implications.    
As mentioned above, these findings stand in contrast to the empirical results that the timing of the 
reversal matters.  A key difference appears to be whether the book-tax difference carries cash flow 
implications (e.g., warranty expense) or whether it has no cash flow implications (e.g., depreciation).  If 
the BTD does not involve cash flow, reversal appears irrelevant.  Would the theory’s non-reversal 
conclusions hold if the book-tax difference carried cash flow implications?  What conditions, if any, 
could the models relax to reach the same conclusions as the empirical papers?  
 
b.  Tax Contingency 
  Three papers address the market pricing of the unrecognized tax benefits (i.e., the tax 
contingency).  Both Frischmann et al. (2008) and Robinson and Schmidt (2009) examine the market 
reaction to the release of the contingency balance in the 10-Q.  Frischmann et al. (2008) regress the 3-day 
abnormal return (computed around the release of the 10-Q) on the unrecognized tax benefit balance 
reported in the footnotes (as required by FIN 48) and unexpected earnings.  They find that the 
contingency balance is positively associated with the abnormal return, consistent with the market viewing 
tax planning positively.  Robinson and Schmidt (2009) expand on this finding, testing whether this 
positive relationship varies with the quality of the disclosures.  They find that the association is less 
positive for firms with high quality disclosures, indicating perhaps that investors are more concerned with 
the proprietary costs of disclosure than they are with increased transparency.   59 
 
While these results are interesting, there are a number of potential problems.  First, they only 
examine the market reaction during the 1
st quarter of 2007 (i.e. the first quarter firms provided FIN 48 
disclosures).  It is unclear whether these results hold in subsequent periods after the market has had time 
to process the implications of this complex standard.  Second, since the returns are computed around the 
release of the 10-Q, the market could be reacting to other information, much of which could be correlated 
with the contingency balance.  Third, both papers use the contingency balance, rather than the unexpected 
contingency balance, which is more relevant when considering market reactions.  The implicit assumption 
that the market would assume a balance of zero, so the entire realized balance is unexpected, limits our 
ability to interpret the results. 
Blouin et al. (2009) is somewhat different because it uses a price-level regression to assess the 
market’s valuation of the contingency balance during 2006 to 2008.  The authors regress the market value 
of equity on the contingency balance along with various other balance sheet accounts.  Consistent with 
Frischmann et al. (2008) and Robinson and Schmidt (2009), they find that market value is positively 
associated with the contingency balance.  They also find that this is due primarily to the unrecognized tax 
benefit that relates to permanent differences (which affect earnings), as opposed to temporary differences 
(which only affect the timing of the tax payment).   
Again, the results of the study are interesting.  However, there are at least two concerns with the 
study.  First, as a levels study, it faces the econometric problems enumerated above, most of which the 
authors do not address.  Second, the authors use data that include observations from 2006, which is prior 
to the FIN 48 disclosure requirements.  The authors break the sample into pre- and post-FIN 48 and find a 
positive coefficient on the contingency balance in both periods.  However, it is unclear how the market 
obtains the information in 2006 given that it is not disclosed in the financial statements.  This raises the 
possibility that an unmeasured effect might cause the significant relations both before and after FIN 48 
was enacted. 
  In summary, the market seems to view the contingency account positively, consistent with a 
positive perception of tax planning activities.  However, potential problems with extant research suggest 60 
 
caution in interpreting the results and also provide an opportunity for future research to address the 
suspect issues. 
 
c.  Information Content of Estimated Taxable Income 
This section reviews a growing literature that investigates whether the tax information in the 
financial statements provides the market with information content incremental to that in book income.  As 
discussed above, market participants cannot observe actual taxable income because tax returns are 
confidential filings with the taxing authorities.  Nonetheless, researchers can attempt to estimate taxable 
income using the tax information in the financial statements.
73  The standard taxable income estimate that 
researchers use to assess whether market participants find the tax information in the financial statements 
to have incremental content is current income tax expense grossed up by the statutory corporate income 
tax rate.
74  Most studies adjust this amount by the change in net operating loss carryforwards.
75
We review two bodies of literature in this area.  First, we look at the studies that attempt to assess 
the association between contemporaneous returns and estimated taxable income.  This literature provides 
evidence on whether the market values information in estimated taxable income.  However, it does not 
address whether the market prices this information fully and efficiently.  For example, the market might 
react to one dollar of unexpected taxable income (as estimated using financial statement data), but it 
might do so in a manner that does not fully and instantaneously impound the information.  Thus, the 
second set of studies examines the association between future returns and estimated taxable income.  If 
the market correctly impounds all relevant information when estimated taxable income is released, these 
 
                                                 
73 See the detailed discussion in Section 6 about the limitations involved with estimating taxable income using the 
tax information in the financial statements. 
74 Section 6 notes that the research question dictates whether the researcher would ideally use actual or estimated 
taxable income.  This is an example of a setting where, even if they had access to the actual tax returns, researchers 
would focus on information available to market participants without regard to confidential tax returns.  Thus, the 
inability to observe the actual tax returns is not a limitation in this area of study.   
75 Lipe (1986) examines the information content of various components of earnings, including income tax expense.  
He finds that income tax expense provides additional information to the market incremental to that of the other 
components.  Looking at a more recent period, Thomas and Zhang (2009) (2009) find that the tax expense is 
positively priced by the market, unlike other expense components of income.  They attribute this to the possibility 
that taxable income is a measure of economic profit. 61 
 
studies implicitly assume that there should not be an association with future returns. If a statistical relation 
between current taxable income and future returns is found, it is possible that the market did not fully 
value taxable income when it was released.  Overall, these studies do not provide conclusive evidence 
about whether the relation between estimated current taxable income and future returns is evidence of 
market inefficiency, resolution of uncertainty that occurs as the future is realized, or some other cause.  
   
i.  Association between contemporaneous returns and estimated taxable 
income 
To test whether estimated taxable income provides the market with information that is 
incrementally “useful” beyond book income, Hanlon et al. (2005) perform three tests.  First, they test the 
incremental information content of estimated taxable income by regressing long-window 
contemporaneous returns on both the change in pre-tax book income and the change in estimated taxable 
income.  They find that both measures explain returns.  Although book income has a larger coefficient 
(and t-statistic), the coefficient on estimated taxable income is still statistically significant, consistent with 
estimated taxable income providing incremental information to the market.  Second, they test the relevant 
information content by comparing the adjusted R
2 from a regression of returns on the change in pre-tax 
book income to the adjusted R
2 from a regression of returns on the change in estimated taxable income.  
They find that the adjusted R
2 from the pre-tax book income is higher than the adjusted R
2 from the 
taxable income regression, thus concluding that book income is more “useful” than taxable income.  
Finally, they test portfolio returns to assess the returns that can be earned with foreknowledge of the 
change in income.  They find that knowledge of both the sign and magnitude of the change in pre-tax 
book income (estimated taxable income) results in returns of 27.4% (21.1%).  The analyses performed by 
Hanlon et al. (2005) are well done, and it is reassuring that they perform three different tests as well as a 
host of robustness analyses.   
Ayers et al. (2009) extend Hanlon et al. (2005) by considering cross-firm differences in tax 
planning and earnings quality.  They hypothesize that firms that engage in more tax planning will report a 62 
 
taxable income figure that is less representative of the firm’s underlying economic activity.  They also 
hypothesize that estimated taxable income will have relatively greater information content for firms that 
engage in higher levels of earnings management. They define high tax planning firms as those in the 
lowest quintile of accumulated effective tax rates (industry-adjusted) over a five-year window and low 
quality earnings firms as those in the highest quintile of absolute abnormal accruals.
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As discussed extensively in Raedy (2009), the second hypothesis (i.e., estimated taxable income 
will have greater information content for firms that engage in higher levels of earnings management) 
deserves further scrutiny.  It assumes that managers only undertake earnings management where book and 
tax do not conform and that the market treats book income and taxable income as substitute measures of 
economic income, as opposed to alternative measures.  Consistent with this potential conceptual problem 
with the second hypothesis, the results in Ayers et al. (2009) are fairly weak for that hypothesis.  
However, the first hypothesis (i.e., estimated taxable income will have lesser information content for 
firms that engage in higher levels of tax planning) is well conceived and the tests are implemented well.  
In addition, Raedy (2009) provides additional sensitivity tests for the first hypothesis (that the information 
content of estimated taxable income varies with the level of tax planning) and finds results consistent with 
those reported by Ayers et al. (2009).  One potential problem with the analyses in Ayers et al. (2009) is 
that they do not consider the effect of tax planning and earnings management simultaneously.  Thus, they 
  Their tests begin 
with long-window association tests between returns and both book income and estimated taxable income, 
where the returns and the income variables are measured contemporaneously.  From these regressions, 
they compute a ratio where the numerator is the R
2 from the estimated taxable income regression and the 
denominator is the R
2 from the book income regression.  They then compare the ratio for the two groups 
of test firms (i.e., high tax planners and the low earnings quality firms) with the ratio for all other firms.  
As predicted, they find that the information content of estimated taxable income (compared with the 
information content in book income) is lower for firms with high levels of tax planning and higher for 
firms with low levels of book earnings quality.  
                                                 
76 Abnormal accruals are measured using the modified Jones model as in Dechow et al. (1995). 63 
 
do not control for the book (tax) manipulation when testing the information content of the taxable income 
for tax planners (earnings managers).
77
Lev and Nissim (2004) also focus on how earnings quality (as measured by earnings growth) is 
affected by the magnitude of the book-tax differences.  They posit that the ratio of estimated taxable 
income to book income (TI/BI) is a measure of earnings quality (and thus contains information 
incremental to that found in accruals and cash flows) for three reasons.  First, discretionary accruals are 
included in book income but often excluded from taxable income, and since discretionary accruals must 
reverse in the future, they reduce earnings quality.  Second, if firms time transactions to smooth taxable 
income, then estimated current-period taxable income should reflect management’s assessment of future 
taxable income.  It then follows that high current estimated taxable income signals that managers 
anticipate having high future estimated taxable income and, by inference, high future book income.  
Third, since firms usually recognize income (deductions) for tax purposes before (after) they recognize 
revenue (expenses) for book purposes, a high ratio of TI/BI should predict high (low) future book 
revenues (expenses).  
   
To test whether TI/BI provides information content, Lev and Nissim (2004) regress earnings 
growth on TI/BI and controls.  They find that earnings growth is positively associated with TI/BI, 
consistent with the book-tax difference providing a measure of earnings quality.  They then explore 
whether the market prices this information about the quality of earnings contemporaneously by regressing 
the current E/P ratio on the TI/BI measure and controls.  Curiously, they find that the market seems to (at 
least partially) impound this information in the post-SFAS No. 109 period but not the period that precedes 
                                                 
77 Both Raedy (2009) and Chen et al. (2007) (2007) address this issue by including both the tax planning and 
earnings management variables in a regression together. Both papers find that the information content of estimated 
taxable income is less for tax aggressive firms, consistent with the results in Ayers et al. (2009).  However, results of 
the effect of earnings management on the information content of taxable income are inconsistent among the three 
papers.  64 
 
the enactment of the standard, which the authors attribute to investors’ more quickly and fully learning 
the implications of the tax information for future earnings.
78
While Lev and Nissim (2004) is an interesting paper that is generally well done, there are a few 
potential problems in the study.  First, the motivation is perhaps not as straightforward as suggested.  The 
authors are, in essence, assuming that the only form of tax planning involves tax smoothing.  This would 
not necessarily be the case; however, this focus most likely only biases against finding an association 
between TI/BI and future earnings growth. .  Also, there are several problems inherent in their research 
design.  First, there are many potential determinants of the book-tax difference.  This study only controls 
for industry effects.  Thus, the results could be attributable to something other than earnings quality 
driving the relevance of TI/BI.  Second, their measure of TI/BI is, in essence, merely current tax expense 
scaled by net income. Thus, they may not be capturing book-tax differences at all.  Third, they only use 
ranked values (ranging from 1 to 5) of TI/BI, thus losing a great deal of information, raising concerns 
about the robustness of the findings to a richer measure. Finally, see Section 11 for a discussion on how to 
deal with correlated residuals like those in Lev and Nissim (2004)’s specification. 
   
  Earnings quality also motivates Hanlon’s (2005) study of the potential information content of 
BTDs.  She focuses on deferred tax timing differences and tests whether BTDs affect the persistence of 
earnings, cash flows and accruals.  She hypothesizes that firms with the most extreme BTDs (whether 
positive or negative) will have less persistent book earnings and that the accrual portion of earnings will 
have less persistence for these firms.
79
                                                 
78 This explanation is a bit unsatisfactory.  It is unclear why the ability of the market to understand the implications 
of the tax information would be related to the enactment of SFAS No. 109.   While it may actually just be the results 
of a time trend in the market’s ability to interpret data, the authors do not provide any analysis of this. 
  Hanlon (2005) tests whether extreme BTDs affect the market’s 
assessment of the persistence of earnings.  She finds that firms with the most extreme BTDs experience 
less persistence in earnings, accruals, and cash flows, thus indicating that extreme book-tax differences 
79 Persistence is measured by the coefficient on a one-period lagged value of earnings (or the accrual portion of 
earnings), when the dependent variable is current period earnings. 65 
 
are associated with lower earnings quality.
80  Building on this, she then finds that for firms with extremely 
negative BTDs (book income is less than estimated taxable income), the market correctly estimates the 
persistence of earnings and cash flows, but overestimates the persistence of accruals.  For firms with the 
most extreme positive BTDs (book income is greater than estimated taxable income), the market actually 
underestimates the degree of persistence of earnings and cash flows, but correctly estimates the 
persistence of accruals.
81
There are a few issues to consider when interpreting the results in Hanlon (2005).  First, the study 
only examines earnings persistence, ignoring other measures of earnings quality, such as accruals quality, 
predictability, timeliness, and conservatism, to name a few.  Second, any one-time accrual could cause the 
association documented with persistence and yet have nothing to do with earnings quality per se.  Hanlon 
(2005) addresses this issue by excluding special items and rerunning the analysis.  However, given that 
the results weaken in this sensitivity analysis and that all one-time accruals are not contained only within 
special items, the results should be interpreted with caution.  Third, given Hanlon et al.’s (2005) finding 
that estimated taxable income for loss firms does not exhibit incremental explanatory power over book 
income, the results in Hanlon (2005) may be sensitive to its exclusion of loss firms.
   
82
Schmidt (2006) also investigates the persistence of tax information, focusing on the tax change 
component of earnings (i.e., the change in earnings attributable to a change in the ETR).  His work 
  Fourth, her finding 
that, in addition to earnings, cash flows exhibit less persistence when the firm has extreme book-tax 
differences raises concerns that the changes in earnings quality arise for reasons other than BTDs.  
Finally, the mixed results of the market tests are puzzling and difficult to reconcile. 
                                                 
80 In their extension of Hanlon (2005), Blaylock et al. (2009) (2009) find that when aggressive tax reporting creates 
extremely positive BTDs (book income is greater than estimated taxable income), earnings and accruals persistence 
is greater than when the extremely positive BTDs arise for other reasons.  Conversely, when upward earnings 
management creates extremely positive BTDs, earnings and accruals persistence is lower than when the extremely 
positive BTDs arise for other reasons.  
81 Jackson (2009) (2009) follows up on Hanlon (2005) and Lev and Nissim (2004) by attempting to sort out why 
large book-tax differences are associated with information about future firm performance.  He finds that temporary 
(permanent) book-tax differences are associated with future changes in pretax earnings (tax expense). 
82 Thomas and Zhang (2009) (2009) show that results in these types of analyses are quite sensitive to the exclusion 
of loss firms. 66 
 
extends earlier studies that as a group were inconclusive and inconsistent about the persistence related to 
ETR changes (e.g., Lipe (1986), Lev and Thiagarajan (1993), Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) and (1998), 
and Bryant-Kutcher et al. (2007)). Schmidt (2006) finds that the tax change component of earnings in the 
first fiscal quarter is not transitory and hence may have predictive value.  In fact, it rivals the ability of 
other (non-tax) components of earnings to forecast next year’s earnings.  However, Schmidt finds that 
revisions to the ETR in subsequent quarters are transitory and hence have less information content.  The 
transitory nature of later quarters is consistent with Dhaliwal et al.’s (2004) finding that firms use the 
income tax expense account to meet analysts’ forecasts in the fourth quarter.  In addition, he finds that the 
market tends to underweight the persistence of the tax change component of earnings.  Schmidt (2006) is 
well executed, though it is unclear whether the results are sensitive to the exclusion of loss firms.   
In summary, the papers that test whether contemporaneous taxable income (as estimated with 
financial statement data) has incremental information content reach similar conclusions.  All conclude 
that estimated taxable income has information content incremental to that in book income.  Furthermore, 
cross-sectional tests show that the relative contribution of estimated taxable income decreases when firms 
engage in aggressive tax planning.  There are conflicting results in the literature with respect to whether 
the incremental information content of estimated taxable income is higher (Ayers et al. (2009)) or lower 
(Chen et al. (2007)) for firms that have higher levels of earnings management. The literature also 
indicates that firms with extreme BTDs have less persistent earnings and accruals (and less persistence is 
interpreted as lower earnings quality).  In addition, firms with large book-tax differences (low values of 
the TI/BI ratio) also have lower P/E ratios and lower future earnings growth.  Finally, Schmidt finds that 
the earnings generated by a change in the ETR during the first quarter are informative in that they are 
positively associated with future earnings. 
 
ii.  Association between future returns and estimated taxable income 
This section reviews three papers that examine the extent to which (and how quickly) market 
prices impound information about estimated taxable income.  The earliest work was performed by Lev 67 
 
and Nissim (2004), who examine the explanatory power of TI/BI (the ratio of estimated taxable income to 
book income) for future returns.  They find that TI/BI is positively correlated with one-year ahead stock 
returns, consistent with the market not immediately impounding all information about estimated taxable 
income into prices.  The relation, however, is much weaker after SFAS No. 109, which, as discussed in 
the previous section, the authors attribute to investors’ more quickly and fully learning the implications of 
the tax information for future earnings.  
Thomas and Zhang (2007) control for book income in their analysis of the association between 
estimated taxable income and future market returns. They regress future stock returns on the surprise 
components for both taxable and book income (where surprise is defined as the current quarter’s income 
less the income from four quarters before).  They find that the estimated taxable income surprise is 
associated with stock returns up to six months in the future, consistent with the market not fully 
impounding the information in estimated taxable income when the financial statements are released. 
Thomas and Zhang (2007) explore two reasons that this anomaly might exist: (1) The tax surprise 
contains information about future book income that is not included in current book income; (2) The tax 
surprise captures information that is not contained in future book income but is contained in other 
financial information that will be released in the future.  They find support for both of these explanations.  
This study provides intriguing results and is competently executed.  It is difficult to interpret the second 
result (i.e. that the tax surprise captures information that is released in the future) without better 
understanding the type of information that (1) is not included in future book income, (2) is not predicted 
by current book income, (3) is not included in future cash flow, but (4) is priced when future earnings are 
released.    
Weber (2009) expands upon Lev and Nissim (2004) and Thomas and Zhang (2007) in several 
ways.  First, he demonstrates that the association between future returns and book-tax differences only 
exists in firms with weaker information environments (as measured by analyst following).  Second, he 
examines analysts’ forecasts to assess whether they fully capture the information in estimated taxable 
income.  Regressing analyst forecast errors on the ratio of estimated taxable income over book income, he 68 
 
finds that the forecast errors are significantly associated with this tax variable, which is consistent with 
analysts not fully utilizing the information in estimated taxable income.
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To summarize this section, both unexpected estimated taxable income and the ratio of estimated 
taxable income to book income predict future returns. Lev and Nissim (2004) and Thomas and Zhang 
(2007) leave unanswered the question as to why tax information is not fully and immediately impounded 
into market prices (given that current tax information affects future stock returns). Weber (2009) 
attributes this result to the failure of analysts to utilize properly the information in estimated taxable 
income, which, while intriguing, implicitly assumes that analysts play an important information-
processing role. Below we suggest possible extensions in this area of research. 
  Specifically, he finds that 
forecasts are, on average, more optimistically biased when book-tax differences are large.  He then tests 
whether this failure on the part of analysts explains the inability of the market to impound immediately 
and fully the information in current-period estimated taxable income.  Regressing future returns on both 
the forecast error and the tax variable, he reports that the analysts’ forecast error is significantly 
associated with future returns but the tax variable is not.  He interprets these results as evidence that the 
failure of analysts to fully incorporate current-period tax information into their forecasts (at least partially) 
explains the failure of the market to fully and immediately impound tax information.  While interesting, 
this hypothesis rests heavily on the implicit assumption that the market relies on analysts to interpret and 
report tax information. 
 
d.  Summary 
The research reviewed in Section 8 provides robust evidence that markets use the tax accounts to 
set prices.  Primary findings include: 
•  The market impounds information from the deferred tax accounts into prices.   
                                                 
83 In a separate study, Chen et al. (2003) find evidence that they interpret as indicating that analysts do not fully 
understand certain AFIT provisions. A one-time deferred tax adjustment was required in association with the 1993 
increase in corporate income tax rates from 34% to 35%. Given that this was a one-time adjustment, it should not 
have affected analysts’ forecasts of the future – but it did, on average, implying that analysts incorrectly thought the 
adjustment would be recurring. 69 
 
•  The market prices the tax account components at a discount, which reflects the length of time 
until expected reversal of the deferred tax component.   
•  Taxable income, estimated using tax information in the financial statements, provides information 
to the market incremental to the information in book income.   
•  In cross-sectional tests, the relative contribution of estimated taxable income decreases to the 
extent that firms engage in aggressive tax planning.   
•  Firms with extreme BTDs have less persistent earnings and accruals.   
•  Firms with large BTDs (low values of the TI/BI ratio) have lower P/E ratios and lower future 
earnings growth.  
•  Unexpected estimated taxable income and the ratio of estimated taxable income to book income 
predict future returns, a finding that Weber (2009) attributes to the failure of analysts to utilize 
properly the information in estimated taxable income. 
 
e.  Future Research about the Pricing of Tax Information Reported in the Financial 
Statements 
The findings in this section raise interesting questions and provide several avenues for additional 
work: 
•  Further work is needed to test and reconcile the theoretical predictions and the empirical findings 
about the valuation of DTLs and whether they should be discounted.  DTLs are not discounted 
under SFAS No. 109, and Guenther and Sansing (2004) show that, under certain assumptions, the 
value of the DTL is unrelated to the time until reversal.  On the other hand, empirical evidence 
indicates that the market discounts DTLs.  Policymakers, among others, would benefit from 
resolution of this apparent conflict between the theory and the empirical evidence. 
•  Additional work is warranted to determine whether the market prices the valuation allowance 
account.  Ayers (1998) reports that the VA is priced as a reduction in assets, while Amir and 70 
 
Sougiannis (1999) and Amir et al. (1997) report that it is not.  Reconciliation of these conflicting 
findings and exploration of the circumstances under which the VA proves to be value relevant 
could prove interesting.  A substantial issue with respect to these studies is that most of them 
conduct some form of a price level analysis, and thus are subject to a variety of econometric 
issues.  This literature, to date, has done very little to resolve these problems. 
•  Additional work is warranted to determine whether the incremental information content of 
estimated taxable income is higher (Ayers et al. (2009)) or lower (Chen et al. (2007)) for firms 
that appear to extensively  manage earnings. 
•  Resolution of the informativeness of temporary timing differences to the market is needed.  
Hanlon (2005) finds that temporary differences affect earnings persistence while Lev and Nissim 
(2004) report that they have no explanatory power for current E/P and future earnings growth.  It 
could be useful to disaggregate the BTDs and determine which are relevant for both current and 
future returns and why they are.  
•  Given that taxable income is estimated for these studies by grossing up the current income tax 
expense reported in the income statement, it is not clear whether the observed pricing behavior 
relates to the market’s attempts to actually price taxable income or whether the market is merely 
pricing a component of the income statement.  Further analysis is needed to assess what exactly 
the market is pricing.  
•  We look forward to research about the information content of taxes netted against below-the-lines 
items.  Do the markets respond to them the same as to other taxes?  To our knowledge, no one has 
explored how the market evaluates these items. 
•  As a whole, the tax (and non-tax) accounting literature has not adequately explained why and 
how tax information affects future stock returns. In other words, why is the market slow to 
impound current period tax information? 71 
 
•  It is interesting to note that this literature deals only with the use of the tax information by equity 
market participants.  However, as discussed by Holthausen and Watts (2001), there are many 
other users of the financial statements (e.g. public debt market participants, private creditors, 
customers, employees, and regulatory bodies.)  It could be interesting to examine the extent to 
which and the accuracy with which tax information in the financial statements is used by other 
groups. 
•  Finally, the measurement of standard errors could be improved in many of these studies. Future 
research based on robust standard errors may reverse or temper some of the extant conclusions. 
Section 11 explores this issue in more detail. 
 
9.  Book-Tax Conformity 
a.  Background 
As discussed above, for many transactions book and tax treatments are the same or similar.  For 
those transactions, financial accounting considerations can constrain tax management, and tax 
considerations can constrain financial reporting management, so that ultimately a firm has to balance tax 
and financial reporting choices.  If book and tax do not conform, then the tension (e.g., between higher 
earnings and lower taxable income) does not exist, or at least is reduced.  With lack of conformity, 
managers can potentially produce favorable outcomes for book purposes without increasing their tax 
liability or reduce their taxes without adversely affecting their financial reports.  In some cases when book 
and tax do not conform, managers can achieve both favorable financial reports and lower taxes.   
Since non-conformity appears to increase the opportunities for earnings and tax management, 
some tax scholars and policymakers have called for expanded conformity (also called alignment) of book 
and tax treatment as a constraint on earnings management and tax avoidance.
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84 Freedman (2008) notes that, while conformity is being advocated in the U.S. as a means of improving book and 
tax reporting, the conformity debate in the EU has centered on the appropriateness of IFRS for establishing the tax 
base and particularly the potential for harmonizing the EU tax base (see discussions in Schön (2004) and (2005) 
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proponents of conformity argue that aligning book and tax treatment will reduce earnings overstatement 
and taxable income understatement.
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Conformity proponents recommend that tax accounting adopt the same rules as financial 
accounting as often as possible, so that the tax liability approaches the product of the tax rate and pre-tax 
GAAP profits.  For example, in July 2009, Senators Carl Levin and John McCain introduced Senate Bill 
1491 (Ending Excessive Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act).  They propose setting the tax 
deduction for stock options equal to the book expense for stock options.  Currently, firms can deduct the 
excess of the stock’s market value over the strike at exercise.  For book purposes, the expense is 
determined at grant using an option pricing method.  If tax were conformed to book, then the tax 
deduction in the current period would shift from the ex-post tax realization to the ex-ante book estimate, 
eliminating the current difference between the financial accounting expense and the tax deduction.   
   
McClelland and Mills (2007) summarize many of the costs and benefits of taxing book income, 
besides reining in earnings and tax manipulation.
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(2005) and Freedman (2004), among others).  Although the debate is generating important attention on both sides of 
the Atlantic, we focus on the American issues swirling around increased alignment.    
  First, eliminating the need for tax accounting would 
enable firms to maintain a single set of books, thereby reducing record keeping, tax compliance, tax 
planning, and tax administration costs.  Second, for decades financial accounting has been refining 
measures of income.  Conformity would allow the tax system to better exploit this investment.  Third, 
conformity would eliminate cross-firm differences in effective tax rates and the need for the complexity 
of deferred tax accounts.   
85 For example, Badertscher et al. (2009) examine a set of firms that restated earnings.  They differentiate between 
firms that engage in conforming earnings management activities versus those that engage in nonconforming 
earnings management.  Conforming (nonconforming) earnings management involves management that does (does 
not) have current income tax consequences.  They find that nonconforming earnings management is more prevalent 
than conforming earnings management.   Thus, the authors suggest that since firms can currently find ways to 
manage book earnings upward without affecting taxable income, imposing book-tax conformity could discourage 
earnings management.  Mills and Newberry (2001) examine a sample of public and private firms and find that 
public firms have larger book-tax difference than do private firms.  This finding is consistent with book income 
being more useful for investors in public firms than for investors in private firms, who likely are insiders.  
86 For other discussions of the pros and cons of increased alignment, see Desai (2005), Neubig (2006), Lenter et al. 
(2003), Hanlon and Shevlin (2005), and Schön (2005) (2005), among others.   73 
 
A fourth possible benefit in McClelland and Mills (2007) is that by taxing book profits, the same 
amount of tax revenue could be collected with a lower, and thus less distortive, corporate tax rate.  This 
purported benefit assumes that firms would not reoptimize to reduce book income in a conformed system.  
It also assumes that book income exceeds taxable income.  As discussed above, the findings in Figure 3 
raise doubts about this second assumption.  Figure 3 shows that book income usually exceeds estimated 
taxable income.  However, dramatic declines in book profits in 2001 and 2008, both recessionary years, 
resulted in aggregate book income (summed from 1993 to 2008) actually being less than aggregate 
estimated taxable income.  Thus, the revenue benefits of conformity appear to vanish when economic 
downturns are taken into consideration.  
However, there is an effect, not mentioned in the extant literature, including McClelland and 
Mills (2007), that could lead to a reduction in corporate tax rates.  All else equal, if book income is more 
volatile than taxable income, then expected corporate tax revenues will increase if book profits are taxed 
because of the convexity of the tax schedule (see Graham and Smith (1999)).  The findings in Figure 3 are 
consistent with book income being more volatile than taxable income.  The coefficient of variation for 
book income is 0.48, more than double the coefficient of variation for estimated taxable income of 0.23.  
Consequently, this convexity effect would appear to enable a reduction in corporate tax rates, while still 
holding overall tax revenues constant. 
On the cost side, McClelland and Mills (2007) argue that there are several detriments to taxing 
book profits.  First, eliminating the need for separate tax accounting for U.S. federal tax purposes would 
not necessarily eliminate the need for tax accounting.  Firms would still need tax accounting for state and 
foreign jurisdictions and regulators.  Second, if firms were taxed on book profits, they would have an 
incentive to understate their earnings.  Such earnings understatement could diminish the usefulness of the 
financial statements for the capital markets.
87
                                                 
87 One possible way that firms could circumvent the adverse effects of reporting reduced earnings would be to use 
alternative means of communicating information to the markets, e.g., issuing pro-forma statements that would not 
use the same accounting as tax returns.    
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system would be non-trivial, particularly for multinationals and with respect to coordination with trading 
partners.
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Fourth, the goals and implementation of financial reporting differ from those of tax accounting in 
important ways.  For example, financial reporting requires more judgment.  Introducing more judgment 
into the tax system would undermine the certainty needed to administer a tax system.  Likewise, requiring 
firms to accelerate losses and defer gains (consistent with conservatism in financial accounting) runs 
counter to the principle of gain acceleration and loss deferral in the current tax system (which is designed 
to limit the loss of tax revenue from the government’s perspective).   
 
 
b.  Empirical Tests  
Rather than elaborating further on the pros and cons of conformity, we now turn to empirical 
work that attempts to inform policymakers about the benefits and costs of taxing book profits.  
Unfortunately, we find little work that is of direct usefulness in the policy arena, where the debate is most 
heated.  There are at least two reasons for the paucity of work in this area.  First, many accounting 
scholars believe that the costs of conformity far outweigh its benefits and that its passage is highly 
unlikely.  Consequently, few accounting researchers have engaged in the debate despite the competitive 
advantages of accounting researchers in this arena.  Second, the ideal research design for purposes of 
informing the policy community would observe the changes in financial reporting and tax planning 
following mandated conformity.  Unfortunately, researchers rarely have the opportunity to observe 
behavior before and after conformity.   
 Probably the most active area of related research investigates an indirect implication of 
alignment, i.e., whether the market would suffer a loss of information if book and tax were conformed.  
The potential loss of information in the financial statements arises because no BTDs would exist if book 
and tax accounting were identical.  Because we discussed many of these papers in Section 8.c. (e.g., Lev 
                                                 
88 See Hanlon and Maydew (2009) for a detailed analysis of the difficulties in applying book-tax alignment to 
multinationals.  Problems include differences in the consolidation of foreign subsidiaries, integration with other 
governments’ tax systems, and the determination of the source (jurisdictional location) of income.    75 
 
and Nissim (2004), Hanlon et al. (2005), Schmidt (2006), Thomas and Zhang (2007), and Weber (2009), 
among others), we do not review them here.  Although most of these papers do not explicitly discuss 
conformity, they speak to the implications of conformity when they test whether estimates of taxable 
income drawn from the financial statements have incremental content, even after controlling for book 
income. For example, Hanlon et al. (2005) infer from their findings that the financial statements would 
suffer a substantial decrease in information content if conformity were implemented.  Specifically, they 
estimate an information loss of 50% if book income were conformed and based on tax rules.   Largely, 
these studies conclude that conformity would lead to a loss of information to market participants.  The 
reason is that the tax accounts in financial statements, which they find informative, would no longer be 
necessary under conformity.   
For the remainder of this section, we focus on a handful of empirical studies motivated largely by 
conformity.  One setting in which before and after behavior is observed following a mandate to tax book 
profits ended with investigators disagreeing about the conclusions to be drawn.  A provision in the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 required a firm to include some of the excess of book profits over taxable income in 
its alternative minimum taxable income.  Gramlich (1991), Boynton et al. (1992), Dhaliwal and Wang 
(1992), Manzon (1992), and Wang (1994) report that companies shifted income from 1987 (when the law 
became effective) to 1986 (before the effective date).  However, Choi et al. (2001) question their findings 
on methodological grounds, concluding that sample partition procedures, difficulty in identifying 
treatment and control firms, the choice of scaling variables, and procedures to estimate discretionary 
accruals are so problematic in these studies that the literature provides little evidence that the AMT 
affected book earnings.
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89 For completeness, see Dhaliwal’s (2001) response to their concerns. 
  Consequently, this setting, which appeared to provide an excellent opportunity 
for estimating the impact of linking book profits to taxable income, failed to advance our understanding 
of the impact of taxing book profits.  Given the disappointing outcome of this series of papers, we cannot 
recommend further exploration of this AMT provision until there is a resolution of the methodological 
problems that plagued these inquiries.   76 
 
Guenther et al. (1997) and Hanlon et al. (2008) examine another setting where book-tax 
conformity was mandated.  Using a time-series design, both take advantage of the fact that the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 required a small set of firms to change from the cash to the accrual basis of 
accounting for tax purposes, thus increasing book-tax conformity for these firms.  Guenther et al. (1997) 
find that following the imposed increase in conformity, firms chose to defer book income in order to 
reduce their tax payments.  Hanlon et al. (2008) build on their study to test whether the information 
content of earnings for the firms that were forced to switch methods decreased after the legislation 
became effective.  They find that it did, indicating that in this case book-tax conformity resulted in a loss 
of value-relevant information.  An implication of their study is that book-tax conformity would reduce the 
quality of book income because firms would opt, at least to some extent, to pay less taxes even at the 
expense of providing the markets with poorer information.  The strength of these studies is they exploit a 
rare natural experiment.  Unfortunately, only a few, mostly small companies were required to change 
from the cash method to the accrual method.  Guenther et al. (1997) analyze only 66 firms that were 
forced to switch from cash to accrual and Hanlon et al. (2008) study only 56 firms.  Consequently, it is 
unclear whether these findings generalize to the broader population.  
Natural experiments are rare.  Therefore, few extant studies provide direct evidence about the 
impact of mandated conformity on earnings management and tax avoidance.  Nonetheless, a few papers 
have looked at ancillary implications of conformity.  Each of these studies identifies a cost of conformity 
that policymakers appear to have ignored, but which are important considerations. 
One example is Young and Guenther (2003), who attempt to test whether conformity might 
reduce international capital mobility.  They test whether countries with greater disclosure of value-related 
accounting information have more international capital mobility.  One of their measures of the value 
relevance of financial reporting is a categorical variable based on the degree of book-tax conformity.  
They classify 13 countries as high conformity (e.g., France, Germany, and Japan) and ten countries as low 
conformity (mostly countries that were under the British crown at some point, including the U.S., Hong 77 
 
Kong, and Singapore). They find that international capital mobility is inversely related to book-tax 
conformity, implying that aligning book and tax reduces international capital mobility.   
Although Young and Guenther (2003) attempt to control for differences between countries, other 
than conformity, their conclusions rest critically on the assumption that the interpretation regarding 
conformity is not adversely affected by an omitted, correlated variable that potentially captures a more 
important fundamental difference between these sets of countries.  In addition, since all countries have 
elements of conformity, but none is fully conformed, attempting to distinguish among countries based on 
a single categorical variable fails to capture the richness of the book-tax accounting relationship.  
Moreover, some countries, e.g., Germany, may be highly aligned at the company-level, but less so at the 
consolidated level. 
 Another study potentially undermined by omitted correlated variables is Ali and Hwang (2000), 
who report that conformity adversely affects the value relevance of earnings and cash flows.  Employing 
a cross-sectional research design and studying 16 countries, they find that high book-tax conformity is 
associated with low value relevance of earnings and cash flows.
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90 Ali and Hwang (2000) also examine the effect that three additional country-specific variables have on value 
relevance. These other variables fall outside the purview of our current discussion. 
  Their findings should be interpreted 
with caution for two reasons.  First, with only 16 countries, Ali and Hwang (2000) are unable to untangle 
the effects of conformity from other country-level differences.  This is particularly problematic because 
they document that a country’s book-tax alignment is correlated with whether its financial system is bank-
oriented or market-oriented, whether its financial accounting standards are set privately or by the 
government, and its level of spending on external auditing services.  Second, they too use a categorical 
variable to assess the level of conformity in a country.  While we applaud both Young and Guenther’s 
(2003) and Ali and Hwang’s (2000) aspirations to tackle important issues and recognize that they face 
data limitations that are common in cross-country analyses, advances in this area require more powerful 
settings and measures.   78 
 
Atwood et al. (forthcoming) develop a continuous measure of book-tax conformity that can vary 
across years.  Reasoning that the correlation between taxable income and book income should be greater 
in high-conformity countries, they measure a country’s book-tax divergence as the portion of current 
income tax expense that is not explained by book income and dividends.  They end up with country-year 
conformity measure for 33 countries from 1992 to 2005.  They then test whether the ability of current 
earnings to predict both future earnings and future cash flows varies with a country’s level of conformity.  
They find that current earnings are less useful for predicting future earnings and cash flows when book-
tax conformity is high.   
Interestingly, the country-level conformity measures (averaged over time) in Atwood et al.’s 
(forthcoming) Table 1 do not line up with the dichotomizations used in the prior literature.  For example, 
15 countries are included in both Ali and Hwang (2000) and Atwood et al. (forthcoming).  Ali and Hwang 
(2000) classify seven as low conformity countries and eight as high conformity.  Since Atwood et al.’s 
(forthcoming) scores are inversely related to conformity, we would expect the seven low-conformity 
countries to have scores less than those for the eight high-conformity countries.  We find that the opposite 
is true, although the differences are not statistically significant.  Specifically, the mean (median) 
conformity score for the low-conformity countries is 11.1 (11) compared with 10.4 (10) for the high 
conformity countries.   
Notably, Atwood et al. (forthcoming) classify only two countries, Canada and South Africa, as 
having less conformity than Germany, which is usually put forth as a very high-conformity country.  In 
their footnote 22, Atwood et al. (forthcoming) defend their classification of Germany because they 
evaluate firms based on their consolidated financial statements, which are not required by German law to 
conform, while other studies focus on their separate company accounts, which are required to conform.  
Perhaps similar explanations exist for other surprising differences in the Atwood et al. (forthcoming) 
measures and conventional thinking.  However, at a minimum, Atwood et al. (forthcoming) raises serious 
concerns about all of the conformity studies, including theirs, that attempt to measure the level of 79 
 
conformity in countries. A consensus is badly needed about the general ranking of conformity across 
countries before the literature can move forward. 
 
c.  Summary 
Book-tax conformity has emerged as a possible means of mitigating the adverse effects of both 
earnings management and tax underpayment.  Scholars struggle to construct strong empirical tests that 
can provide policymakers with some sense of the changes that would occur in response to conformity 
because conformity changes are rare.  To date, most empirical studies have attempted to assess the impact 
of conformity indirectly, although a few have identified settings where conformity has been implemented.  
Inferences, to date, are:  
•  The tax accounts provide incremental information to the equity markets.  Thus, the elimination of 
the book-tax differences would reduce the flow of information to the markets. 
•  In the rare natural experiments where conformity has been imposed, the evidence is mixed about 
whether firms have altered the information reported on their financial statements in order to 
reduce their tax liability. 
•  Strong inferences are difficult to draw from any of these studies of whether firms behave 
differently depending on the level of conformity in their country.  These studies struggle with 
omitted variables at the country-level that are potentially correlated with conformity.  They also 
lack consensus about how to measure conformity.  
   
d.  Future Research about Book-tax Conformity 
•  Given the important policy implications of conformity, we look forward to additional empirical 
tests of the extent to which more alignment might reduce earnings and tax management as well as 
those that shed light on other implications of conformity. Additional estimates of the savings in 
compliance costs, possible reductions in tax rates, and transition costs are needed.  Since 80 
 
accountants tend to emphasize the importance of high quality accounting information for the 
markets, they may dismiss the benefits of alignment and reject conformity out-of-hand.  While we 
share their strong reservations about conformity, going forward we encourage accountants, 
economists, lawyers, and others to take a balanced approach to evaluating the potential costs and 
benefits of increased book-tax alignment. 
•  The low-to-high conformity scores produced by Atwood et al. (forthcoming) raise doubts about 
the prior measures of the level of conformity across countries.  We look forward to the 
development of consensus measure of conformity, preferably continuous and varying across time, 
which is necessary to advance the important study of conformity. 
 
10. Unresolved Issues 
Throughout the paper, we have identified specific research questions and topics that merit 
additional inquiry.  In this section, we highlight five general issues that deserve attention from the 
research community. 
First, an overarching theoretical framework is needed to guide future empirical AFIT research.  
Shackelford and Shevlin (2001, pp. 377-378) termed AFIT research “a potentially understudied topic” 
and asserted that “Collaboration between tax and financial accounting researchers could address how 
firms coordinate reducing tax payments and managing book effective tax rates.”  Since this call for 
research, nearly 50 empirical AFIT studies have been conducted, and work in this area is continuing.  
Much of it is interesting and important.  However, looking forward, if no framework is developed, we 
envision diminishing returns as the empirical papers document increasingly minute AFIT factoids without 
really advancing our broad understanding of the role that AFIT plays in business, tax, and financial 
reporting decisions. 
An important issue that an AFIT framework must consider addressing is the coordination of tax 
considerations with the standard agency problems that underlie much of financial accounting and 
economics.  For example, tax information is reported confidentially to the taxing authorities and publicly 81 
 
through the financial statements.  Understanding how these dual reports affect tax, book, and other 
decisions might provide some guidance for empirical AFIT studies.  One recent theoretical paper that 
attempts to grapple with this coordination is Shackelford et al. (2009), who jointly evaluate taxation and 
financial reporting in a standard economic analysis of corporate behavior. They focus on the trade-offs 
between tax, book and investment choices.
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Until then, the AFIT literature risks remaining a collection of empirical findings, each interesting 
in its own right, but failing to provide a coherent narrative.  For example, despite numerous studies 
attempting to determine whether, why, and how the tax accounts are used to manage earnings, we can 
only report in this review that the evidence is mixed.  The new disclosures under FIN 48 will doubtlessly 
generate additional studies of earnings management through the tax contingency, and we believe that 
these studies are much more likely to reach clear and deep conclusions if conducted under an overarching 
framework, one that can guide tests of earnings management using the tax accounts. 
  Another is Edgerton (2009) who argues that because AFIT 
determines the reporting of tax information to public investors, the timing of cash tax payments is less 
salient than it would be if tax information were reported on a cash basis.  As a result, AFIT both mitigates 
the distortion from corporate tax minimization and diminishes the effectiveness of tax policy for altering 
behavior.  Similar studies are needed to develop a unified framework that could aid interpretation of the 
many varied, and sometimes seemingly contradictory, empirical findings.   
Perhaps this is a common weakness of an emerging field, and certainly this criticism applies to 
areas of accounting research other than AFIT research, e.g., despite years of studying earnings 
management outside the tax accounts, there remain many unanswered questions.  However, there are 
encouraging exceptions that might provide useful direction for developing a better mapping of empirical 
findings and theoretical models.  Three come to mind.  One, modern finance theory (beginning with 
                                                 
91 Shackelford et al.’s (2009) (2009) key finding is that, to the extent that managers value flexibility in their tax and 
financial reporting choices, they are more likely to make non-tax, non-book decisions that provide discretion.  A 
weakness of their study is that they do not formally model the role of information in determining the demand for 
financial reporting.  Instead, they employ a reduced-form model and assume that managers may value accounting 
earnings, conditional on firm’s cash flows. 
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studies such as Modigliani and Miller (1958)) continues to provide a paradigm for evaluating empirical 
findings in finance.  Two, positive accounting theory (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986) revolutionized 
thinking about the role of accounting in contracting, leading to extensive empirical study in financial 
accounting. Three, the “Scholes-Wolfson” framework (Scholes & Wolfson, 1992) has provided the 
structure for many tax studies in accounting, finance and economics over the last two decades.  Similar 
structure would aid AFIT empirical research immensely. 
Second, scholars need to reconcile seemingly inconsistent views about the tax information in the 
financial statements.  On the one hand, the findings from some of the earnings management papers 
covered in section 7 (e.g., Frank and Rego (2006), Schrand and Wong (2003), and Krull (2004)) imply 
that at least in some situations (e.g., to meet analysts’ forecasts), managers believe that the tax accounts 
can influence at least some users of financial statements.  In addition, section 8 discusses other studies 
(e.g., Lev and Nissim (2004), Hanlon (2005), and Thomas and Zhang (2007)), which show that the 
markets appear to treat the tax items in the financial statements as if they contain information that is 
incremental to the information in book income in terms of explaining future earnings and share prices.  
On the other hand, anecdotal evidence from accountants, auditors, and tax specialists suggests that 
practitioners doubt that much can be learned about a firm’s actual taxes by perusing its financial 
statements.
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We find it puzzling that the tax information in the financial statements can simultaneously 
communicate so little about a firm’s actual taxes (as asserted by practitioners) and still influence analysts, 
explain future earnings, and predict share prices, among other things (as found in the empirical studies 
  They assert that the tax information in the financial statements is inadequate and too 
obfuscatory to convey much information, in part because firms do not want to aid the taxing authorities in 
their audits.   
                                                 
92 See anecdotes in McGill and Outslay (2002), among others.  One purported reason for making the tax information 
somewhat opaque is to limit information to the taxing authorities.  While this might explain the financial reporting 
choices of some smaller companies, the extent to which the IRS relies heavily on the public tax disclosures of large 
companies (given that they conduct continual tax return audits) is unclear.  In fact, findings from some of the early 
FIN 48 studies, e.g., Frischmann et al. (2008), are consistent with added disclosure (in this case, FIN 48) providing 
little information to IRS auditors.  83 
 
discussed above). We look forward to research that resolves this conundrum.  One possible explanation is 
that analysts and the capital markets are not interested in the firm’s actual taxes.  Instead, market 
participants may find something useful in the tax information that is unrelated to the actual taxes paid.  
For example, Thomas and Zhang’s (2009) finding that returns are increasing in the tax expense, 
especially the current portion, suggests that the tax information provides another assessment of a firm’s 
profitability.  If so, researchers need to identify the non-tax information that is apparently communicated 
solely or more effectively through the tax accounts. 
Third, disaggregating the book-tax differences may aid in resolving this and other puzzles.  Some 
studies indicate that aggregated BTDs are associated with market pricing, aggressive tax planning, and 
earnings management, among other things (e.g., Desai 2003 and Hanlon et al. 2005).  These studies use 
aggregated BTDs because the few separately disclosed BTDs in the financial statements are not readily 
available in computer readable form.  Since some BTDs presumably convey little information to the users 
of the financial statements (e.g., differences in depreciation), this implies that other BTDs must provide 
important information that cannot be found elsewhere.   
We are interested in research that disaggregates book tax differences and discovers the specific 
BTDs that are informative and why they are informative.  We see at least two barriers to such inquiry.  
First, to our knowledge, no theory exists to guide researchers in their search for the more informative 
BTDs.  In fact, it is difficult to imagine the types of BTDs that might be informative.  Second, data 
collection likely will be costly.  For example, to gather disaggregated BTDs, Poterba et al. (2009) and 
Seidman (2008) hand-collect data.  Notwithstanding these barriers, BTD disaggregation could both 
advance scholarship and aid in policy questions concerning book-tax conformity.     
Fourth, the pricing of the tax accounts raises questions about whether the market is inefficient or 
whether there is an important pricing factor that is not well understood.  There is ample evidence that the 
market prices the tax information in the financial statements.  At the same time, there also is evidence that 
current period tax information is associated with future prices.  The challenge for future studies is to 84 
 
discern whether the long-run return effects are driven by market inefficiencies or a form of efficient 
pricing not currently understood.
93
Finally, the U.S. is moving toward a convergence of current GAAP and IFRS, if not full adoption 
of IFRS.  While there may be several researchable implications of this transition, it is currently unclear 
what the end result will be once we are through the transition.  For example, this may result in 
opportunities to examine the issues surrounding book-tax conformity.  The IRS (and Congress) will need 
to decide how they will handle the tax implications of IFRS adoption.  Depending upon what they decide, 
there may well then exist a setting where the degree of book-tax conformity changes in the U.S.  
       
In addition, there will likely be changes to the AFIT rules, either as a result of convergence of 
IAS 12 and SFAS No. 109 or as a result of full adoption of IFRS.  Currently, the IASB has issued an 
exposure draft to revise IAS 12 and are anticipating the issuance of a final standard late in 2010.  While 
there are currently a number of differences between SFAS No. 109 and the revised IAS 12, it is uncertain 
which of these differences will remain upon the issuance of a final document.  Thus, although it seems 
likely that there might be some changes in the AFIT rules if the U.S. adopts IFRS, it would be premature 
to chart a course for future research in this area.
94
While the exact AFIT rules under IFRS are currently in transition, it is generally true that the 
international financial standards are more principle-based then the U.S. standards.  Thus, there might exist 
an opportunity to reexamine the implications on the earnings management behavior of firms and the 
implications on market pricing under a set of standards that, in principle, allow for more judgmental 
decision making on the part of management.   
  
 
                                                 
93 We recognize that the pricing of tax accounts is not the only area that raises this puzzle.  Similar issues exist with 
post-earnings announcement drift, for example. 
94 There are still a number of differences in SFAS No. 109 and the revised IAS 12.  For example, while the exposure 
draft now includes requirements for the reporting and measuring of tax contingencies, it is a one-step process under 
IFRS and the contingency is measured using a probability-weighted average as opposed to the FIN 48 requirement 
that bases the amount of the benefit to be recognized on the largest amount of tax benefit that is greater than 50% 
likely of being realized upon ultimate settlement.      85 
 
11. Econometric Issues 
We close by focusing on problems involving econometric techniques and statistical inference that 
frequent the AFIT literature.
95  The central issue is that AFIT researchers have often relied on ordinary 
least squares (OLS) methods to estimate parameters and calculate standard errors, implicitly assuming 
identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.) errors.  This assumption is violated when residuals are 
correlated through time or across firms.
96
We start by examining an empirical model that contains a measure of book tax differences as a 
right-hand-side variable. Recall from Figure 3 that book tax differences move dramatically in aggregate, 
depending on the state of the economy.  Therefore, a specification including BTD is likely to contain 
residuals that are not particularly correlated for a given firm through time--but likely will contain 
(positive) cross-sectional correlations in the sense that many firms move together in a given year.
  With such correlation in residuals, there are effectively fewer 
“independent observations” than assumed by OLS, and therefore the t-statistics are often inflated.  Once 
one adjusts for this correlation (i.e., clustering) in residuals, estimates of standard errors usually grow and, 
therefore, statistical significance as measured by corrected t-stats usually shrinks.  Note that for clustering 
to affect a standard error, both the independent variable and the residual (or loosely speaking, the 
dependent variable) must be correlated across firms or through time. (This is because a standard error is 
associated with an estimated coefficient that itself measures the covariation between X and Y.) Thus, 
accounting for the correlation in residuals addresses the lack of independence problem.  We keep our 
discussion intuitive, to help researchers think through the basic issues and corrections.  Readers interested 
in more details are encouraged to read Petersen (2009), Thompson (forthcoming), or Gow et al. 
(forthcoming).  
97
                                                 
95 The issues discussed in this section are also commonly encountered broadly in empirical work in the fields of 
accounting, finance and economics, and they are by no means peculiar to AFIT studies. 
  In 
96 In this section, we focus on the independence assumption of residuals when we discuss clustering standard errors, 
and only briefly mention the impact of violations of the identical distributional assumption (i.e., heteroskedasticity) 
when we examine empirical examples. 
97  Consistent with such correlation patterns, in an untabulated analysis we find that the serial correlation in book tax 
differences, calculated separately for each individual firm and then averaged, is about 0.03. At the same time, there 
is high cross-sectional correlation because aggregate book tax differences move dramatically from positive to 86 
 
such a setting, when we cluster standard errors by time (i.e., across firms in a given year) we expect a 
large effect on standard errors.  The relatively small serial correlation for the typical firm implies that 
clustering standard errors by firm will not have much impact. 
To illustrate these points, we estimate a model roughly similar to Heltzer (2008).  Heltzer (2008) 
investigates the relation between book tax differences and accounting conservatism. In her specification, 
she includes indicator variables based on book tax differences on the right-hand side.  Our goal is not to 
exactly mimic Heltzer (2008) but rather to illustrate general econometric points. Therefore, in our 
specification in equation (1) we include two straight-forward book tax difference variables, though the 
point we make here is the same if we copy her specification exactly.  Specifically, we estimate the 
following regression for a panel of Compustat firms from 1983 to 2007: 
          (1) 
where E/Pi,t is the earnings-to-price ratio adjusted for the market’s E/P ratio, Reti,t is the 12-month 
cumulative stock return in excess of the CRSP market return and is aligned with the contemporaneous 
fiscal year-end.  LPBTDi,t (large positive book tax difference) is an indicator which is equal to 1 if the 
firm-year’s book-tax difference scaled by average assets falls in the top quintile of the 2-digit SIC 
industry, and LNBTDi,t (large negative book tax difference) is an indicator which is equal to 1 if the firm-
year’s book-tax difference scaled by average assets falls in the bottom quintile of the 2-digit SIC industry 
for firm i in time t. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the estimated coefficient on the large positive BTD is 0.957 in the 
OLS specification, with an estimated standard error of 0.189 and a t-statistic of 5.07.  When we correct by 
clustering standard errors by time in column 4, the standard error nearly doubles, and the t-statistic falls 
almost in half. (Note that the estimated coefficient does not change. The analysis is simply to correct the 
standard errors and does not affect the coefficients.)  In contrast, as conjectured (because serial correlation 
is low), clustering standard errors by firm (i.e., for a given firm through time; see column 3) has little 
                                                                                                                                                             
negative (the latter during economic downturns), apparently affecting the cross-section of firms similarly at any 
point in time (see Figure 3 for aggregate patterns). 87 
 
effect on standard errors or t-statistics.  The effects are even starker for the variable that measures large 
negative book tax differences.  The time-clustered standard error increases by a factor of five, with a 
similar effect on the estimated t-statistic.  For LNBTD, there are some firm-clustering effects but as 
before not as large as for time-clustering. 
Two other points are worth making.  First, what would happen if one were to blindly correct for 
both time- and firm-clustering?  We can see from Table 2 that the estimated coefficient is again the same, 
and the estimated standard errors in this case are similar to those for just time clustering (because in this 
case, time clustering is the correction that matters).  That is, there is not much to gain (or in this case lose) 
in correcting for both potential issues.
98 
99
Table 3 shows another example in which the earnings-to-price (E/P) ratio is a dependent variable. 
The empirical model is similar to that in Lev and Nissim (2004) who examine the ability of tax-based 
  In general, however, we believe it makes sense to anticipate 
which correction(s) is (are) more likely to be needed so as to properly model the situation at hand.  The 
second point is that when time-clustering is the primary issue, the traditional Fama-MacBeth method of 
correcting standard errors works well (very well for the book-tax difference variables in Table 2but not as 
well for the return variable).  The Fama-MacBeth approach addresses cross-sectional correlation because 
it first estimates one cross-sectional equation per year.  In a second stage, Fama-MacBeth then estimates 
the coefficients and standard errors based on the time series of these first stage  estimates – but the 
standard errors from the first stage, and any cross-sectional clustering effects in first stage residuals, are 
not used and thus do not affect the second-stage outcome.  If there is little firm-specific serial persistence 
of residuals, like for the book-tax difference variables in this example, the standard errors from this 
second step exhibit little bias due to autocorrelation effects, and Fama-MacBeth effectively produces 
standard error estimates close to the true standard errors. 
                                                 
98 However, a “small” number of clusters could lead to large variances in standard error estimates (note that the 
standard errors that one uses are estimates of the “true” standard errors). Therefore, clustering standard errors in both 
dimensions (i.e., firm and time) is not always optimal. See the discussion at end of this section. 
99 Though not the focus of the example in Table 2, note that because returns (Ret) are correlated both through time 
and across firms, t-statistics fall when residuals are clustered by firm (column 3), by time (column 4), or both 
(column 6). Also note that, as discussed next, Fama-MacBeth (column 5) only addresses time clustering, and 
therefore does fully address the column (1) inflated t-statistic on the return variable.  88 
 
fundamentals to predict the E/P ratio.  Specifically we estimate the following regression for a panel of 
Compustat firms from 1980 to 2008: 
      (2) 
where E/Pi,t is the earnings-to-price ratio, LNTAi,t is the log of total assets, Leveragei,t is book leverage, 
Divi,t is common dividend divided by net income, and Taxi,t is the ratio of taxable income × (1 – top 
statutory federal tax rate) and net income for firm i in time t.     
Since the models in Lev and Nissim (2004) and Heltzer (2008) have very similar dependent 
variables (i.e., E/P), we expect that the standard errors would be affected by time-clustering but not as 
much by firm-clustering for this specification.  Indeed, Table 3 shows that implications of standard errors 
correction for Lev and Nissim (2004) are similar to Heltzer (2008).  Across independent variables, 
standard errors increase by a factor of three to five when we cluster by time while they increase only by a 
factor of about two when we cluster by firm.  In particular, the coefficient on LNTA appears highly 
significant for the OLS standard errors (t-stat = -11.08) but is barely significant (t-stat = -1.79) when the 
standard errors are corrected for clustering in the time dimension. 
We conclude these examples by noting that Heltzer (2008) and Lev and Nissim (2004) use the 
Fama-MacBeth approach, so the potential statistical issues in the data are largely addressed. We will not 
do so here so as to avoid picking on particular papers, but many papers do not correct standard errors in a 
similar setting.  It is our hope that future research into AFIT (as well as accounting, finance, and 
economics more generally) will properly address standard error issues, perhaps reevaluating the 
conclusions or earlier research along the way. 
Another potential case for which clustering standard errors by time is recommended occurs when 
one uses permanently reinvested foreign earnings (“PRE”) as a dependent variable.  Suppose that a large 
number of firms fail to meet an earnings target in an economic downturn.  Then, many of these firms may 
respond to the bad year by increasing PRE to meet the earnings target.  Similarly, many firms would 
decrease PRE in good years.  Therefore, we expect that economy-wide shocks to earnings would lead 89 
 
PRE for many firms to move together; therefore, clustering standard errors by time is important for 
correct inference when permanently reinvested foreign earnings is a left-hand-side variable. 
We now turn to an example involving the valuation allowance as a left-hand-side variable.  The 
VA allowance contains substantial serial correlation and modest correlation in the cross-section.
100
        (3) 
  We 
use an empirical specification similar to that of Miller and Skinner (1998), who examine the determinants 
of the valuation allowance for deferred tax assets.  Specifically, we estimate the panel regression in the 
following equation from 1993 to 2007: 
where VAi,t is the valuation allowance divided by total assets
101
Table 4 presents the effects of correcting standard errors for clustering by firm, time, or both, 
when the dependent variable is the valuation allowance.  The first column shows the OLS coefficient and 
standard error estimates based on the assumption of i.i.d. residuals.  In this specification, the coefficient 
on tax-loss carryforward is -0.342 and the standard error estimate is 0.008 with a very large t-statistic of -
41.60.  When we cluster standard errors by firm in the third column, the standard error estimate more than 
quadruples to 0.039 and thus the t-statistic becomes -8.72.  Similarly, standard errors estimates for 
average ROA and book leverage also increase by a factor of three to five when we cluster standard errors 
by firm.  In contrast, when we cluster standard errors by time (or equivalently use the Fama-MacBeth 
procedure), the estimates of standard errors only double for all coefficients.  This result suggests that firm 
effects are more important than time effects in this setting because residuals and regressors are more 
highly correlated within rather than across firms.  As a result, contrary to the examples of Heltzer (2008) 
, AVGROAi,t is the average of return on 
assets (EBIT / beginning-year total assets) for current and previous years, Leveragei,t is book leverage 
defined as short- and long-term debt divided by total assets, and TLCFi,t is net operating loss carryforward 
divided by total assets for firm i in time t. 
                                                 
100 Consistent with a persistent firm effect, we find that the valuation allowance has a mean within-firm 
autocorrelation of 0.46. 
101 We thank Jeri Seidman and Jim Poterba for providing these valuation allowance data. 90 
 
and Lev and Nissim (2004), using the Fama-MacBeth procedure (or similarly, clustering by time) does 
not adequately correct residuals that are clustered by firm in this example.
102 
103
Note that if firm effects are permanent, standard errors can be corrected for firm-level clustering 
by including firm fixed effects in the specification. However, if the firm effects are not fixed (that is, not 
permanent), then this approach will not completely address firm-level clustering of residuals. Moreover, 
even when firm fixed effects do completely address standard error issues, the estimated coefficients of 
independent variables generally differ from OLS coefficients because the former are not based on total 
variation (i.e., firm-level variation is excluded). Analogously, time fixed effects can be used to address 
time-clustering with the same caveats.  
  
As mentioned above, clustering standard errors affects inferences when independent variable(s) 
and the residual (or loosely, the dependent variable) are both correlated across firms (or through time).  
For example, if an independent variable is serially uncorrelated, clustering standard errors by firm would 
not change standard error estimates even when a dependent variable alone is highly serially correlated.  
Also, although clustering standard errors by firm or time increases the standard error estimates and 
thereby decreases the significance of coefficients in the examples above, there are cases in which 
correcting for clustering actually reduces standard errors. This could happen if an  independent variable 
has a negative correlation through time (or across firms) while the dependent variable has a positive 
correlation through time (or across firms), or vice versa. 
We conclude this section by noting that using more robust standard errors (e.g., double clustering 
by firm and time rather than clustering in one dimension only) is not always best.  In general, more robust 
standard errors tend to be less biased but have higher variances because estimates of clustered standard 
                                                 
102 In principle, to address firm clustering, one could follow a “transposed Fama-MacBeth” strategy of first 
performing a single time series regression for each firm, and then averaging these first stage estimated coefficients 
across firms. Such an approach in principle would side-step serial correlation for any given firm. However, for small 
sample reasons, we would not recommend such an approach unless a very long time series (large T) is available. 
103 While it is not a focus of this section, the example in Table 4 illustrates that heteroskedasticity in the errors can 
introduce bias to estimates of standard errors.  For instance, standard errors more than double for AVGROA and 
TLCF when we use the heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (White, 1980) compared to the OLS standard 
errors. Also, note that the clustering techniques discussed in this section correct for heteroskedasticity.  91 
 
errors are based on sample averages across clusters (e.g., firm or time).  When the number of clusters is 
small, the estimates of clustered standard errors become noisier due to small samples.
104
 
  Therefore, 
researchers should begin by using economic reasoning about the existence of cross-sectional or serial 
correlation in variables of interest, and then choose methods for correcting standard errors, rather than 
blindly using the most elaborate standard error corrections. 
12. Closing Remarks 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts to provide a comprehensive structure for 
understanding and evaluating recent research about the tax information in financial statements.  
Historically largely overlooked by both financial accounting and tax researchers, no area of tax research 
in accounting is currently attracting more scholarly attention than is accounting for income taxes.  
Applying skills developed in and questions imported from mainstream financial accounting research, the 
empirical studies have concentrated on the role of the tax accounts in earnings management and the extent 
to which the market prices the tax information that is contained in the financial statements. 
AFIT studies have been conducted primarily by accounting scholars with expertise in both 
financial accounting and taxation, a sufficiently rare combination that has served as a barrier to 
researching this complex area of financial reporting.  We hope that this review will encourage, expedite, 
and guide further AFIT study.  We also hope that this paper will expose scholars from finance, 
economics, law, and other fields to the ongoing AFIT work, interest them in both producing and 
consuming its knowledge, and guide them toward questions of interest.  We conclude our review with a 
summary of our findings.   
The first half of the paper explains the tax accounts and the rules that govern them, discusses 
permanent and temporary differences, and provides descriptive information about the tax disclosures.  It 
                                                 
104 See Thompson (forthcoming) for more a detailed discussion of the trade-off between the bias and variance in 
clustered standard errors estimates. He argues that one would like at least 25 observations in a given direction to 
minimize the impact of false rejections that can occur in small samples. Thus, Thompson concludes that fewer than 
25 clusters in both dimensions would be considered too few to apply double-clustering techniques. 92 
 
also notes the inadequacy of the tax information in the financial statements for estimating actual tax return 
information and assessing the effectiveness of the firm’s tax planning. 
The second half of the paper begins with a review of earnings management using the tax 
accounts.  We find mixed evidence about earnings management.  Managers appear to use the valuation 
allowance and the uncertain tax contingency to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts, but not to meet or beat 
prior earnings, smooth earnings, increase a big bath, or avoid losses.  This result is a bit puzzling, and we 
suggest some avenues for future research to address these inconsistencies. Studies of the new disclosures 
under FIN 48 are emerging, and they may provide fresh insights about the use of the tax contingency 
account to manage earnings. 
Next, we address the pricing of the tax accounts.  With the possible exception of the VA account, 
the studies consistently show that the market impounds information from the deferred tax accounts into 
prices.  Furthermore, the pricing of the tax account components varies in predictable ways with the length 
of time until reversal.  In addition, taxable income (estimated from the financial statement tax accounts) 
provides information to the market incremental to that in book income.  Unexpected estimated taxable 
income and the ratio of estimated taxable income to book income predict future returns.  Finally, large 
BTDs are associated with less persistent earnings and accruals, lower P/E ratios, and lower future 
earnings growth.  Further understanding of BTDs may require disaggregating them to determine which 
differences are driving the results.  
We discuss a topic of increasing interest in the tax policy community, namely the alignment of 
book and tax accounting.  Proponents see book-tax conformity as a means of constraining both earnings 
manipulation and tax evasion, among other advantages.  Those opposed to conformity point to the 
different goals of financial accounting and tax compliance and question whether conformity would 
impede manipulation of book or tax accounts.  The limited empirical evidence suggests that conformity 
would reduce the information that financial reports provide to the capital markets, but additional studies 
are needed to fully discern the costs and benefits of increased book-tax alignment.     93 
 
In the final two sections of the paper, we identify issues that deserve close scrutiny going 
forward.  First, empirical AFIT research is suffering from a lack of theoretical guidance.  As a group, the 
empirical studies reviewed in this paper lack focus, which impedes interpretation of extant findings and 
identification of the next frontiers.  Second, some findings suggest that market participants greatly value 
the tax information in the financial statements.  This stands in stark contrast to a widely held view among 
many practitioners that tax disclosures are of little value.  Further study is needed to explain how 
reportedly poor quality disclosures convey such important information.   
Third, numerous studies point to book-tax differences as evidence of aggressive earnings 
management and/or aggressive tax planning and find that the market responds to cross-sectional 
differences in BTDs.  However, almost all of these studies use aggregated BTDs.  Some BTDs are 
presumably evidence of neither earnings management nor tax planning (e.g., differences in depreciation).  
Thus, disaggregating BTDs into their specific accounts could enable us to identify those BTDs that are 
related to earnings management, tax planning, or other factors, such as growth and business cyclicality. 
Fourth, the extant literature is mostly silent about whether certain market reactions, in particular 
long run return effects, are evidence of market inefficiency or limits to arbitrage or some other market 
imperfection.  We hope that future research can help to resolve these puzzling effects related to the 
pricing of tax information.  Fifth, the coming adoption of IFRS in the U.S. will affect the tax information 
in the financial statements and provide further research opportunities. 
Finally, the paper closes with a discussion of econometric weaknesses that permeate some AFIT 
research.  Few of the papers reviewed herein take advantage of state-of-the-art econometric techniques 
that are available to properly calculate standard errors when residuals are correlated cross-sectionally or 
through time, or both.  Presently standard errors in much AFIT research are calculated as if all 
observations are independent.  Therefore, the statistical significance likely is overstated for many findings 
in the literature. Going forward, empirical AFIT research should give careful attention to clustered 
standard errors and cross-correlation patterns in the residuals.  94 
 
In conclusion, AFIT research has blossomed in the last few years, vastly expanding our 
knowledge about the use of the tax information in the financial statements.  Assuming that a framework 
develops to better interpret extant empirical findings and guide future study, we see many questions that 
still need resolution.  We have detailed many suggestions for additional research throughout the paper and 
look forward to further discovery of knowledge and understanding about the tax accounts in the financial 
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Temporary Difference - 
Deferred Tax Liability 
 
Temporary 
Difference - DTA  
Simplified Income Statement               
               
Sales Revenue  $500    $500    $500    $500  
Municipal Interest        $40         
Installment Sales Revenue          $60     
Warranty Expense              ($110) 
Income before income taxes (NIBT)  $500    $540    $560    $390  
Income Tax Expense  ($175)    ($175)    ($196)    ($136.5) 
  Net Income  $325    $365    $364    $253.5  
               
ETR  35%    32.4%    35%    35% 
               
Balance Sheet               
               
Assets:                
   Cash      $40         
   Accounts Receivable  $500    $500    $500    $50  
   Accounts Receivable - Installments          $60     
  Deferred Tax Asset              $38.5  
TOTAL  $500    $540    $560    $538.5  
               
Liabilities and Owner's Equity:               
  Warranty Liability              $110  
  Income Taxes Payable  $175    $175    $175    $175  
  Deferred Tax Liability          $21     
  Owners' Equity  $325    $365    $364    $253.5 







This figure shows the book-tax gap from 1993 through 2008.  Book income is pretax income adjusted for minority interest.  Taxable income is 









Figure 3. Aggregate Book-Tax Gap, 1993-2008








Table 1: Summary of Extant Literature 
 




•  The majority of companies have net DTL 
balances (as opposed to net DTA 
balances). 
•  On average, VA balances are 
approximately half of the DTA balances. 
•  Book income typically exceeds taxable 
income, on average.  2001 is the only 
year for which the opposite is true. 
•  BTDs are concentrated in the largest 
firms. 
•  BTDs are concentrated in the financial 
and information industries. 
•  Determinants of BTDs include tax 
planning, change in sales, level of PPE, 
earnings management behavior, general 
business conditions, and changes in 
financial accounting rules. 
    •  There is some evidence 
that companies will 
shift book income to 
lower their taxes when 
book-tax conformity is 
imposed. 
•  High conformity 
countries experience 
reduced international 
capital mobility, less 
value relevance for 
earnings and cash 
flows, and higher 
correlation between 
book and taxable 
income.  
•  Higher levels of book-
tax conformity are 
associated with lower 
value relevance of 
earnings and cash 
flows.  
•  Higher levels of book-
tax conformity are 
associated with a lower 
level correlation 
between current 
earnings and both future 




  •  Managers in the U.K. use 
their discretion in reporting 
deferred tax accounts to 
manage their leverage, but 
not to smooth earnings. 
•  The market prices the 
deferred tax liability 
and asset accounts.  It 
does so in a way that is 
consistent with the 
likelihood of and length 
of time until settlement. 
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•  Theoretical studies 
indicate that under 
certain circumstances, 
DTLs should be valued, 
even though they are 
not discounted and they 
may never reverse.  In 
addition, the models 
show that the valuation 
of a DTL may not 
depend on the time 
until reversal, if the 




•  Determinants of the VA balance include 
the four sources of income listed in 
FAS109 as well as the magnitude of 
carryforwards. 
•  Studies have generally 
shown that mangers use the 
VA account to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. 
•  Studies have consistently 
found that firms do not use 
the VA account to engage 
in earnings smoothing 
behavior. 
•  Studies have generally 
indicated that  managers do 
not use the VA to take (or 
increase) big baths. 
•  There is mixed evidence as 
to whether managers us the 
VA to meet prior and zero 
earnings targets.  The bulk 
of the evidence indicates 
that the VA is not used for 
these purposes.  
•  Evidence is mixed as to 
whether the market 





•  Variables that are positively correlated 
with the amount of the tax contingency 
balance include the amount of the 
expected loss, the likelihood of having a 
tax shelter, firm value and the magnitude 
of abnormal accruals. 
•  The study performed before 
FIN 48 indicate that the tax 
contingency is used 
primarily to meet analysts’ 
forecasts but is not used as 
much to meet other 
•  The market seems to 
view the tax 
contingency account in 
a positive fashion, 
consistent with the 
market rewarding tax 
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•   According to FIN 48 disclosures the 
contingency balance averages between 
1.5% and 1.8% of assets. 
•  The quality of the FIN 48 disclosures is 
inversely related to the tax 




•  Tax aggressive firms 
did not, in general, 
experience negative 
abnormal returns 
around events related to 
the passage of FIN 48. 
Foreign 
Earnings 
  •  Managers use their 
discretion in reporting 
permanently reinvested 
foreign earnings to meet 
analysts’ forecasts. 
•  The market values 
permanently reinvested 
foreign earnings net of 
the U.S. taxes that will 





•  Some book information appears to be 
useful for assessing tax information, such 
as book NOLs and simulated book 
MTRs. 
•  Some book information appears to be 
less useful for assessing tax information.  
In particular, there is little correlation 
between discretionary tax accruals and 
discretionary book accruals. 
•  Managers manipulate tax 
expense to meet/beat 
analysts’ forecasts.  In 
addition, the market (at 
least partially) sees through 
this behavior. 
•  Estimated taxable 
income provides 
information to the 
market that is 
incremental to book 
income.  This effect is 
lower for firms that 
engage in greater tax 
planning. 
•  The ratio of taxable 
income to book income 
is positively associated 
with earnings growth, 
current P/E, and future 
returns. 
•  Extreme book-tax 
differences are 
associated with less 
persistent book 
earnings.   
•  Unexpected taxable 
income is associated 
with future returns. 
•  Analysts’ forecast 
errors are positively 
associated with the ratio 
of taxable income to 
book income, implying 
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that potential market 
inefficiencies identified 
in the literature are 
partially due to 
analysts’ inefficiency.  
 
 
 Table 2 - Clustering Standard Errors for Book-tax Difference 
This table presents estimates of coefficients and standard errors based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and the Fama-
MacBeth procedure for a model similar to Heltzer (2008). Columns 1 to 4 and 6 (column 5) show coefficient estimates based on OLS 
(Fama-MacBeth). OLS standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (column 2), clustering by firm (column 3), clustering by 
time (column 4), or both firm and time (column 6). Clustering by firm addresses serial correlation for a given firm through time. 
Clustering by time addresses correlation across firms in a given time period. In addition to column (4), Fama-MacBeth (column 5) 
also addresses time clustering.  The dependent variable, market-adjusted E/P, is the earnings-to-price ratio adjusted for the market’s 
E/P ratio, Ret is the contemporaneous cumulative stock return in excess of the CRSP market return, LPBTD (large positive book tax 
difference) is an indicator which equals to 1 if the firm-year’s book-tax difference scaled by average assets falls in the top quintile of 
the 2-digit SIC industry, and LPBTD is an indicator which equals to 1 if the firm-year’s book-tax difference scaled by average assets 
falls in the bottom quintile of the 2-digit SIC industry. 
 














Ret  Estimate  8.948  8.948  8.948  8.948  10.246  8.948 
 
Standard error  0.133  0.180  0.192  1.085  0.926  1.087 
 
t-stat  67.31  49.66  46.63  8.25  11.06  8.23 
                LPBTD  Estimate  0.957  0.957  0.957  0.957  0.917  0.957 
 
Standard error  0.189  0.150  0.184  0.340  0.341  0.356 
 
t-stat  5.07  6.36  5.20  2.82  2.69  2.69 
                LNBTD  Estimate  -23.092  -23.092  -23.092  -23.092  -22.362  -23.092 
 
Standard error  0.190  0.268  0.309  1.048  0.997  1.060 
   t-stat  -121.58  -86.32  -74.72  -22.03  -22.42  -21.79 
N 
 
77,162  77,162  77,162  77,162  77,162  77,162 
R




Table 3 - Clustering Standard Errors for Earnings-to-price Ratio 
This table presents estimates of coefficients and standard errors based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and the Fama-
MacBeth procedure for a model similar to Lev and Nissim (2004). Columns 1 to 4 and 6 (column 5) show coefficients estimates based 
on OLS (Fama-MacBeth).  OLS standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (column 2), clustering by firm (column 3), 
clustering by time (column 4), or both firm and time (column 6). Clustering by firm addresses serial correlation for a given firm 
through time. Clustering by time addresses correlation across firms in a given time period. In addition to column (4), Fama-MacBeth 
(column 5) also addresses time clustering.  The dependent variable, E/P, is the earnings-to-price ratio, LNTA is the log of total assets, 
Leverage is book leverage, Div is common dividend divided by net income, and Tax is the ratio of taxable income × (1 – top statutory 
federal tax rate) and net income. 
Dep. Var = 
E/P    
OLS 
(1) 










LNTA  Estimate  -0.118  -0.118  -0.118  -0.118  0.039  -0.118 
 
SE  0.011  0.011  0.020  0.066  0.076  0.068 
 
t-stat.  -11.08  -10.67  -5.91  -1.79  0.51  -1.73 
                Leverage  Estimate  4.509  4.509  4.509  4.509  4.082  4.509 
 
SE  0.109  0.136  0.219  0.432  0.439  0.464 
 
t-stat.  41.48  33.15  20.59  10.45  9.29  9.71 
                Div  Estimate  -0.975  -0.975  -0.975  -0.975  -1.077  -0.975 
 
SE  0.027  0.025  0.039  0.070  0.090  0.076 
 
t-stat.  -35.54  -39.19  -25.22  -14.02  -11.94  -12.90 
                Tax  Estimate  -1.374  -1.374  -1.374  -1.374  -1.283  -1.374 
 
SE  0.039  0.037  0.052  0.200  0.211  0.203 
   t-stat.  -34.85  -37.57  -26.42  -6.87  -6.08  -6.75 
N 
 
105,968  105,968  105,968  105,968  105,968  105,968 
R




Table 4 - Clustering Standard Errors for Valuation Allowance 
This table presents estimates of coefficients and standard errors based on ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions and the Fama-
MacBeth procedure for a model similar to Miller and Skinner (1998). Columns 1 to 4 and 6 (column 5) show coefficients estimates 
based on OLS (Fama-MacBeth). OLS standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity (column 2), clustering by firm (column 3), 
clustering by time (column 4), or both firm and time (column 6). Clustering by firm addresses serial correlation for a given firm 
through time. Clustering by time addresses correlation across firms in a given time period. In addition to column (4), Fama-MacBeth 
(column 5) also addresses time clustering.  The dependent variable, VA, is the valuation allowance divided by total assets, AVGROA 
is the average of return on assets (EBIT / beginning-year total assets) for current and previous years, Leverage is book leverage 
defined as short- and long-term debt divided by total assets, and TLCF is net operating loss carryforward divided by total assets. 
 
Dep. Var: 
Valuation Allowance / Assets 
OLS 
(1) 










AVGROA  Estimate  0.245  0.245  0.245  0.245  0.237  0.245 
 
Standard error  0.010  0.025  0.045  0.022  0.020  0.044 
 
t-stat  24.14  9.85  5.43  11.06  11.68  5.60 
                Leverage  Estimate  0.030  0.030  0.030  0.030  0.026  0.030 
 
Standard error  0.003  0.006  0.010  0.007  0.007  0.011 
 
t-stat  8.75  4.87  2.96  4.17  3.93  2.78 
                TLCF  Estimate  -0.342  -0.342  -0.342  -0.342  -0.320  -0.342 
 
Standard error  0.008  0.022  0.039  0.018  0.026  0.037 
   t-stat  -41.60  -15.83  -8.72  -18.91  -12.46  -9.14 
N 
 
5,466  5,466  5,466  5,466  5,466  5,466 
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Appendix B: Glossary 
 
 
Accrual system  Accounting method in which revenues (expenses) are recognized when, in 
the normal course of operations, net assets increase (decrease), regardless 
of when cash is transferred to (from) the entity. 
 
APB No. 23  APB 23  Accounting for Income Taxes – Special Areas.  Effective for fiscal 
years beginning after December 31, 1971, this standard governs the 




The “line” refers to net income from continuing operations (or net 
operating income) on the income statement.  Items that appear below this 
line are profit or loss from discontinued operations, extraordinary items, or 
prior period adjustments.  The amounts reported in these items are 
presented net of tax, unlike items that appear above the line on the income 
statement which are presented pre-tax with all tax effects aggregated into 
the tax expense line. 
 
Book basis  The amount of an asset’s cost (liability’s benefit) that has not yet been 
recorded as expense (revenue) on the income statement.  Basis is normally 
calculated as purchase price minus accumulated depreciation.  The book 




Differences between book (financial accounting) and tax (tax reporting) net 
income that arise when the reporting systems recognize the revenue or 
expense arising from a transaction differently.  Differences can be 
temporary or permanent. 
 
Cash system  Accounting method in which revenues (expenses) are recognized when 




A financial accounting (book) account that accumulates reductions to a 
specific asset account such that the net of the asset account and the contra-
asset account represents the net book value of the asset.  An example is a 
building (asset) account and accumulated depreciation (contra-asset) 
account.  The cost of acquiring the building is recorded in the asset account 
and remains constant period to period.  As depreciation expense is 
recorded, the accumulated depreciation account increases in size and the 
net book value of the asset (cost less accumulated depreciation) decreases. 
 
Cushion  Colloquial term used to refer to the income tax contingency. 
 
Deferred tax asset  A financial accounting (book) asset that arises when temporary differences 
result in the book bases of assets being lower than their tax bases.  The 
asset is calculated as the aggregate temporary difference times the tax rate 117 
 




A financial accounting (book) liability that arises when temporary 
differences result in the book bases of assets being higher than their tax 
bases.  The liability is calculated as the aggregate temporary difference 
times the tax rate of the entity. 
 
Effective tax rate 
(ETR) 
A financial accounting measure of the tax rate faced by the entity in the 
period.  Calculated as the sum of taxes currently payable and deferred tax 
expense, divided by net income before tax. 
 
FIN 48  Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Interpretation Number 48, 
Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes – an interpretation of FASB 
Statement No. 109.  Effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 
2006, this interpretation increased the required disclosures related to the 
calculation of the income tax contingency. 
 
Implicit taxes  The difference in the pre-tax rates of return available on tax-favored assets 
and similar tax-disfavored assets.  For example, the rate of return on a tax-
exempt municipal bond is normally lower than that on a similar taxable 





A loss contingency (as defined in FAS 5) representing an entity’s estimate 
of the additional tax liability that would be payable following a potential 
audit by tax authorities.  This account is also known as cushion, uncertain 
tax benefit, unrecognized tax benefit, and tax reserve.  
 
Marginal tax rate  The change in the present value of total taxes arising from earning an 




The financial accounting principle whereby expenses are recorded in the 
same accounting period as the revenue to which they are most directly 
related, regardless of when cash is paid by the entity. 
 




A book-tax difference that arises when book (tax) recognizes revenue or 
expense related to a transaction and tax (book) does not.  An example is the 
interest received from tax-exempt municipal bonds: book recognizes 
interest revenue as it accrues while tax does not (and never will) recognize 





Under U.S. tax law, the worldwide income of corporations domiciled in the 
U.S. is subject to U.S. tax.  However, the U.S. tax due on the earnings of a 
foreign subsidiary are deferred until they are repatriated to the U.S. parent 118 
 
in the form of a dividend.  Therefore, if the earnings are permanently 
reinvested in the foreign jurisdiction, no U.S. tax will ever be paid on the 
foreign earnings.  For financial accounting purposes, APB 23 requires 
firms to accrue a tax expense for earnings that will be repatriated as a 
dividend in the future, but does not require such an accrual if the foreign 





The financial accounting principle contained in FAS No. 5:  revenue 
should be recognized when it is realized and earned.  The application of 
this principle can result in revenue being recognized before, at, or after the 
collection of cash. 
 
SFAS No. 109  SFAS 109, Accounting for Income Taxes.  Effective for fiscal years 
beginning after December 15, 1992, this standard governs the accounting 
for income taxes. 
  
Tax basis  The amount of an asset’s cost (liability’s benefit) that has not yet been 




A book-tax difference that arises when book accounting and tax accounting 
agree on the aggregate amount of revenue or expense that is recognized, 
but disagree on the timing of the recognition.  An example is depreciation 
expense: both book and tax record the difference between cost and 
proceeds of disposition as expense over the life of the asset, but book 
records the expense over the useful life of the asset while tax records the 




This is a contra-asset account to the deferred tax asset account.  SFAS 109 
requires an entity to estimate the portion of its deferred tax asset that is 













Income: Book  > Tax: 
 
Book revenue greater than income under the tax law 
 
Municipal Interest Income  
Dividend Received Deduction 
Life Insurance Death Proceeds 
 
Book expenses less than tax deductions 
 
Domestic production activities deduction 
Stock option deduction (until recent change in book) 
 
 
Income: Tax > Book: 
 
Book revenue less than income under the tax law 
 
None to our knowledge 
 
 
Book expenses greater than tax deductions 
 
Fines and Penalties 
2/3 Antitrust Treble Damages 
Excess parachute payments 
Section 162(m) compensation 
Certain meals and entertainment 
Life insurance premiums 




Temporary Differences (classified in terms of originating transaction): 
 
Book Assets > Tax Asset (DTL) 
 
Revenue/Income Items: 
  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
Installment Sales  Recognize when paid  Recognize when sold 
Increase in Life Insurance Cash 
Surrender Value 
 
Recognize when realized 
 
Recognize when value increases 
     
 
Expense/Deduction Items: 
  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
Accelerate Depreciation  MACRS  Usually straight line 
Goodwill  Amortize over 15 years  Test for impairment 
Bank Loan Origination Costs  Deduct upon incurrence  Amortize over loan life 
     
   
 
Tax Assets > Book Assets (DTA) 
 
Revenue/Income Items: 
  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
None to our knowledge     
     
     
Expense/Deduction Items:   
  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
Net Capital Losses  Non deductible  Expense 
Excess Charitable Contributions  Non deductible  Expense 
Obsolete Inventory  Not written down  Written down 




Book Liabilities > Tax Liabilities (DTA) 
 
Revenue/Income Items: 
  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
Unearned Revenues (Advance 
receipts) 
Recognize on receipt  Recognize when earned 
     




  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
Contingent Liabilities  Deduct when amounts are fixed  Expense when probable and 
estimable 
     
     
 
 




  Tax Treatment  Book Treatment 
 
Certain Construction Contracts  Recognize upon completion  Recognize systematically over 
the life of the project 
     





None to our knowledge 122 
 
Appendix D: Deferred Tax Accounts 
The deferred tax accounts are among the more complex dimensions of AFIT.  This appendix 
expands on the discussion about DTAs and DTLs in the main body of the paper.   
Four possible scenarios give rise to DTLs and DTAs.  First, the tax basis of assets could be 
greater than the book basis of assets, generating a DTA. (Note that investors and the IRS cannot observe 
the tax bases of assets and liabilities but the firms themselves can.)  For example, inventory is written 
down for obsolescence under GAAP, but not for tax purposes.  Thus, if a firm has obsolete inventory, the 
tax basis of inventory will be higher than the book basis.  Eventually, when the inventory is sold at a loss 
(or disposed of), the firm will receive a tax benefit because this will create a tax deduction. Thus, until the 
timing difference reverses (i.e., until the inventory is sold or disposed of) the firm will report a deferred 
tax asset on their books, representing this future tax benefit. 
Second, the tax basis of liabilities could be greater than their book basis, generating a DTL.  One 
example involves long-term construction contracts.  For book purposes, most firms recognize the profits 
periodically as the project is completed, a method known as percentage of completion.  However, for tax 
purposes, some small contractors can choose to report no taxable income until the project has been 
completed (completed contract method).  When a firm uses the completed contract method, payments 
received prior to completion are recorded as a liability, unearned revenue.  The temporary differences 
arising from these alternative accounting methods result in a DTL.  Under percentage of completion, the 
book basis of the liability (unearned revenue) is zero because the profits have been recognized throughout 
the project.  Under completed contract, the tax balance basis of the liability equals the unreported 
profits.
105
                                                 
105 The journal entry on the tax books is debit cash (as cash payments are received) and credit unearned income. 
  Therefore, at completion, the book profits and their associated income tax expenses have 
already been recorded, but no actual taxes have been paid to the government.  Thus, a DTL arises in 
recognition of the taxes to be paid at completion, even though no income tax expense will be recognized 
at completion. 123 
 
Third, the book basis of assets could be greater than the tax basis of assets, generating a DTL.  As 
discussed previously, fixed assets are typically depreciated (i.e., expensed) at a quicker rate for tax 
purposes than for book purposes.  Thus, the basis in these assets is greater under GAAP reporting than it 
is under income tax reporting.  Consequently, in future years the firm will have fewer tax deductions 
related to these assets, which will result in their income tax payment to the government being greater than 
the income tax expense reported on the books (as it relates to these assets).   
Finally, the book basis of liabilities could be greater than the tax basis of liabilities, generating a 
DTA.  For example, under GAAP reporting, a firm will recognize a contingent liability when the liability 
is both estimable and probable.  However, it will typically not be reported as a liability under tax 
reporting until it is more certain.  Thus, the book basis of the liability is greater than the tax basis.  Since 
the firm has not yet deducted these amounts, this will result in a future tax benefit when the deduction 
occurs.  Therefore, the firm books a deferred tax asset.   
These four scenarios are summarized in the following table: 
  Assets  Liabilities 
Tax Basis > Book Basis  DTA  DTL 
Book Basis > Tax Basis  DTL  DTA 
 
 
  